

YALTA, A TRIPARTITE NEGOTIATION TO FORM THE POST-WAR WORLD
ORDER: PLANNING FOR THE CONFERENCE, THE BIG THREE'S STRATEGIES

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British influence on the diplomacy of WWII, as it relates to postwar planning, is underappreciated. This work explores how the use of astute tactical maneuvering allowed Winston Churchill and Anthony Eden to impact the development of the post-war world in a greater degree than is typically portrayed in the narratives of the war. Detailing how the study of business negotiations can provide new insights into diplomatic history, *Yalta* exposes Britain's impact on the creation of the post-war order through analyzing the diplomacy of WWII as a negotiation. To depict WWII post-war planning diplomacy as a negotiation means that the Yalta Conference of 1945 must be the focal point of said diplomacy with all the negotiations either flowing to or from the conference.

This analysis reveals that Britain harnessed the natural momentum of the negotiation process to create bilateral understandings that protected or advanced their interests in ways that should not have been afforded the weakest party in the Grand Alliance. By pursuing solutions to the major wartime issues first and most stridently through the use of age-old British diplomatic tactics, they were able to enter into understandings with another member of the Grand Alliance prior to the tripartite conferences. Creating bilateral understandings with the Americans on the direction of military operations and the Soviets over the European settlement produced the conditions under which the tripartite negotiations transpired. Options available to the excluded party were thus limited, allowing for outcomes that aligned more favorably to British interests.

A synthesis of diplomatic documents, diaries, and memoirs with historical writings as well as research on business and international negotiations brings to life the diplomatic encounters that led to the creation of the post-war order. To provide the reader a basis for analysis of wartime diplomacy, this work is broken down into two parts. Part I focuses on the strategies created for Yalta. Part II (future doctoral dissertation) will use these strategies to evaluate the performances of each party. Combined the two parts expose that British diplomatic maneuverings is an undervalued aspect of wartime diplomacy.

Kevin Cramer, Ph. D., Chair

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Conferences of WWII

1. **Atlantic Conference** (Riviera¹, August 9-12, 1941) – Anglo-American political meeting.
2. **First Moscow Conference** (September 29 – October 1, 1941) – Anglo-Soviet-American supply meeting.
3. **First Washington Conference** (Arcadia, December 22, 1941 – January 14, 1942) – Anglo-American military meeting.
4. **Second Washington Conference** (Trident, June 20-25, 1942) – Anglo-American military meeting.
5. **Second Moscow Conference** (August 12-17, 1942) – Anglo-Soviet military meeting.
6. **Casablanca Conference** (Symbol, January 14-24, 1943) – Anglo-American military meeting.
7. **First Québec Conference** (Quadrant, August 17-24, 1943) – Anglo-American military meeting.
8. **Moscow Ministers' Meeting/ Third Moscow Conference** (October 18 – November 1, 1943) – Anglo-Soviet-American foreign ministers meeting.
9. **First Cairo Conference** (Sextant, November 23-26, 1943) – Sino-Anglo-American military and political meeting.
10. **Teheran Conference** (November 28 – December 1, 1943) – Anglo-Soviet-American heads of state meeting.
11. **Second Cairo Conference** (December 4-6, 1943) – Anglo-American military and political meeting.
12. **Bretton Woods** (July 1-15, 1944) – The Allies' international monetary policy meeting.
13. **Dumbarton Oaks** (August 21-29, 1944) – The international organization's drafting meeting.
14. **Second Québec Conference** (Octagon, September 12-16, 1944) – Anglo-American military and political meeting.
15. **Fourth Moscow Conference** (Tolstoy, October 9-17, 1944) – Anglo-Soviet political meeting.
16. **Malta Conference** (January 30 – February 2, 1945) – Anglo-American pre-Yalta meeting.

¹. Denotes the conference codename.

17. **Yalta Conference** (Argonaut, February 4-11, 1945) – Anglo-Soviet-American heads of state meeting.

18. **United Nation Organization Conference** (April 25 – June 26, 1945) – The international organization’s charter meeting.

19. **Potsdam Conference** (Terminal, July 17 – August 2, 1945) – Anglo-Soviet-American heads of state meeting.

Introduction

Prologue

The Yalta conference of World War II (WWII) was the pinnacle of wartime diplomacy, as it related to postwar planning. “At Yalta the three leaders (Franklin D. Roosevelt, Joseph V. Stalin, and Winston S. Churchill)” of the Grand Alliance (US, UK, and USSR), notes Geoffrey Roberts; “were firmly focused on the emerging postwar order.”¹ All decisions regarding the creation of the postwar order either flowed to or from the conference. Still, despite its importance, Yalta is often misunderstood, affecting the way that WWII postwar planning as a whole is assessed. “Stalin won” the conference, declares Robert Gellately, “because he was a better negotiator.”² A better appraisal is that the Russians emerged from Yalta in the premier position because they had the greatest options available for their postwar aims to be realized. Yet, the Western parties also secured their counterparts’ adherence to their foremost diplomatic aims at the conference.

The British protected all but one of their traditional interests and achieved most of their diplomatic objectives. British diplomat, Gladwynn Jebb, observed, “[I]t is indisputable that our major foreign political objectives have largely been secured by the constitution of the new World Organization [the UN],” because it was the “principle objective” of their diplomacy “to induce the United States to accept lasting commitments on the continent of Europe.”³ Furthermore, the US also achieved their major diplomatic goal: the establishment of American socio-economic principles – defined by the Roosevelt administration – as the foundation of the postwar world order. All three parties had achieved real success in imprinting their ideas onto the emerging order. If the Big Three had maintained their alliance into the postwar, this outcome would appear likely as the result of a collaborative negotiation, but the alliance fell apart, making these conclusions appear counterintuitive. So, how can these seemingly disparate outcomes exist together?

1. Geoffrey Roberts, “Stalin at the Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam Conferences” in *Journal of Cold War Studies* 9, no. 4 (Fall 2007), 21.

2. Robert Gellately, *Stalin's Curse: Battling for Communism In War and Cold War* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2013), 103.

3. Paul Preston, Michael Partridge, and M. L. Dockrill, *British Documents On Foreign Affairs--Reports and Papers From the Foreign Office Confidential Print. Part III, From 1940 Through 1945, Series L Second World War and General*, 5 vols. (Bethesda, MD: University Publications of America, 1998), (hereafter referred to as FO: General), vol. 5, 233, 328.

Britain's astute use of tactics – an act whose aim is to convince, cajole, or induce the other party(s) to adopt the party employing the act's position – to harness control of the negotiation process created the context in which WWII postwar planning was determined. However, they were the weakest party and thus could not overcome, through force or leverage, the natural suspicions and distrust that their control over the process unleashed. The British framed the options available at the tripartite negotiations to reflect their preferred positions by entering into bilateral understandings (verbal or non-specific written agreements) with the Russians and, more often, the Americans through acting as the Big Three's intermediary. "Framing refers to the mental structure," notes David de Cremer and M.M. Pillutla, "which we use to make the situation in question more readily understandable and accessible."⁴ These tactics weakened the bargaining power of the Soviets and Americans and defined how the options available were perceived when the Grand Alliance met at the tripartite conferences.

Bilateral Anglo-American military negotiations at Casablanca, Québec I, and Cairo I, for instance, dictated the timing of the opening of the Western front, leaving Stalin little ability to affect when it would take place at Teheran. Similarly, the agreement between Churchill and the Russian ruler dividing up Eastern Europe – the percentage deal – left Roosevelt with no option but acceptance of the agreements' implications when the Big Three met at Yalta. The delayed invasion of Europe allowed Britain to focus the war effort in the Mediterranean in 1942-43, plus the percentage deal placed Greece under the British auspice, thus protecting Britain's preeminent position in the Near East. They never forced their partners to make decisions, much to their consternation; however, due to presenting the issues to one party at a time (acting as an intermediary) and entering into bilateral understandings (framing) the British were able to channel the process of the negotiations and thus created the context for the postwar planning diplomacy.

The process of a negotiation displays a dynamic momentum; decisions build upon themselves, reducing options and at the same time defining how the parties viewed the available alternatives. As Thomas Smith notes, amidst a negotiation "constraints are imposed by previous decisions taken, and the range of choices narrows."⁵ Britain used the

⁴ David de Cremer and M. M Pillutla, *Making Negotiations Predictable: What Science Tells Us?* (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 82.

⁵ Thomas W Smith, *History and International Relations* (London: Routledge, 1999), 142.

aforementioned tactics to exploit the dynamic momentum of a negotiation as well as the inherent process of a multilateral negotiation: that even with “the presence of several parties,” a negotiation wants to “become bilateral encounters.”⁶ Their exploitation of the process through the shrewd use of the procedures (tactics) granted British positions more authority than their standing (often called prestige) should have afforded them had all three parties determined the course to be taken simultaneously. This progression eventually fostered an outcome by which most of their traditional interests were protected.

Initially, Churchill and his Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, worked at cross purposes, which meant the protection of their interests was short-lived. Only when the two men start to work together, in late 1944, does Britain’s tactics work as hoped. We know the final British bilateral understanding of the war as the Anglo-American “special relationship.” The “special relationship,” stresses David Reynolds, should be seen as British “diplomatic stratagem” more than a natural occurrence.⁷ Afterwards, the US helped ensure stability on the Continent, underwrote and eventually succeeded British maintenance of Near Eastern stability as well as trade routes, helped perpetuate colonial rule in Southeast Asia, and even retreated from their major commercial policy victory in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The final act of framing was Churchill’s famous “Iron Curtain” speech, which portrayed Britain and American interests as overlapping and anti-Soviet. Far from sinister or duplicitous, the English statesmen, during WWII, pulled off an impressive feat of diplomacy.

At Yalta, the Russians negotiated agreements that gave them the prime bargaining position moving forward but were unable to capitalize on this advantage. Written agreements favorable to their ends were obtained, i.e., the options chosen were beneficial to their objectives. However, the Soviets did not finalize these agreements in a manner that upheld or advanced these gains. Reparations were the embodiment of their failure to capitalize on the advantageous results at Yalta. The Soviet’s assumed they had achieved success on the issue by convincing the West to acquiesce to the Russian’s \$10 billion figure as the basis of reparation discussions. Yet, they soon found out an issue is not settled until

⁶ William Zartman, “The Structure of Negotiation,” in *International Negotiation: Analysis Approaches, Issues*, 2nd Edition, ed. Victor Kremenyuk, (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2002), 80.

⁷ David Reynolds, “Rethinking Anglo-American Relations” in *International Affairs* 65, no. 1 (Winter 1988-89), 94.

the agreement is implemented. With security as the foremost priority, at Potsdam, Stalin reluctantly conceded large-scale reparations to maintain his gains in Eastern Europe. Working together at the conference, the Anglo-Americans left the Russians with no other option but to choose either security (maintenance of their gains in Eastern Europe) or reparations. With the former reflecting their underlying interest, Stalin conceded any claim to large-scale reparations.

The Americans emerged from WWII as the preeminent world power partly because they were left virtually untouched by the war. However, the US achieved this status primarily because they never moved from *hard positions* (detailed momentarily) during the postwar planning negotiations. Though the Americans made a number of concessions, some in a magnitude greater than necessary, they never conceded their hard positions – the United Nations Organization (UNO) founded on American concepts and principles as well as Washington’s control over international commercial (multilateral free trade) and monetary (dollar-based world economy) policy. Despite the American right’s myths about a sellout of Eastern Europe, it was “not an area in which the United States Government wished to participate,” nor did the region encompass their vital interests, recalled Britain’s wartime ambassador to the US, Lord Halifax.⁸ The British who had to concede on international commercial and monetary policy and the Russians on reparations, however, did move from hard positions. The Americans’ lack of movement on these positions allowed them to instill their socio-economic concepts worldwide and emerge from the war as the Premier world power.

The previously described picture of WWII diplomacy appears when it is studied as a negotiation that follows certain patterns typical of that process, yet also takes into account the differences amongst the actors and the influences that shaped their thinking. The dynamic momentum of the negotiation process defines how the participants viewed the available options while their influences shaped the way they sifted through these options, i.e., the negotiator’s decision-making context. Contextualizing an event is the major aim of a historian; still, a sole focus on its background fails to take into account the impact of the

⁸ Paul Preston, Michael Partridge, and Richard Crockatt, *British Documents On Foreign Affairs--Reports and Papers From the Foreign Office Confidential Print. Part III, From 1940 Through 1945. Series C North America*, 5 vols. (Bethesda, MD: University Publications of America, 1998), (hereafter referred to as FO: North American), vol. IV, 392.

negotiations' process. Only a methodology that incorporates the background as well as the process and procedures at work will be able to properly analyze an international negotiation.

Some of the best works on Yalta and WWII diplomacy combine the study of History with International Relations (IR) to connect background and process. Historical methodology allows an analyst the ability to ascertain the background of individuals and states as well as detail the actors' influences. IR generates an understanding of the processes at work in inter-state relations. However, a key piece of the puzzle is missing – the procedures of negotiations. The incorporation of negotiations analytics will reveal the interplay between actor and process through the use of procedures. Negotiation analytics combined with historical methodology while maintaining some IR methods will help avoid the consistent pratfall emblematic of structural diplomatic history – determinism. As Orfeo Fioretos declares, strict “path dependence” is often “criticized for having a deterministic understanding.”⁹ The historiography will detail more thoroughly how the addition of negotiation analytics will help fill in the gaps, add weight to previous arguments, and overcome the tendency towards determinism.

“IR theory,” relates Inanna Hamati-Ayati, views the system “as having some essential, unchanging feature, whether at the level of its unit actors (realism) or its own structure (neorealism).”¹⁰ These concepts fail to take into account how the actors can affect the process and the process can mold and shape the way the actors view their own and each other's actions, creating an organic system that the strict universality of structuralism can easily overlook. Negotiation analytics' method of qualitative assessment, which determines prioritization through the concepts of vital interests (hard positions) and interests worth sacrificing (soft positions) grants the analyst a means to gauge the affect of actor and process on the shape of a negotiation. It is created by discerning how the actor's influences shaped their decision-making and how the process affected what options were available as the negotiation moved forward. The inclusion of this method with diplomatic historical

⁹ Orfeo Fioretos, “Historical Institutionalism in International Relations,” *International Organization*, 65, no. 2 (Spring 2011), 377.

¹⁰ Inanna Hamati-Ayati, “Paths Not Taken: A Retrospective Systemic Reading of Post-Soviet International Alternatives,” *Journal on World Peace*, 27, no. 3 (September 2010), 12, 13. Some IR theorists – constructivists – “consider that international order is not merely a given insofar as it is mainly constructed by the beliefs of the international actors,” as Ayati notes. However, they tend to downplay the effect of the organizational structure on the way the actors define their beliefs, thus negotiation analytics is a better combination of the two most important structural factors – the actors and organization – than three leading schools of international relations: constructivism, neorealism, and realism.

methodology will reveal that although the process does reduce alternatives, these options are not as static or conditioned as determinism suggests. The actors have a certain control over the process through the *procedures* they employ, but the effect the process has on the actors is still present, since each decision limits or at least redefines the options remaining.

The chronology-based time-series negotiation analytics techniques and its principles seem most applicable to this type of analysis. “The most popular application of time-series techniques is to predict outcomes retrospectively,” proclaims Daniel Druckman. Using this method, “an analyst desires to recreate a path of events leading to an outcome.” In addition, “[f]or Negotiation Analysis, the value of this approach is to understand the processes that preceded – or led to – the outcome,” either to comprehend events or concoct a strategy for future negotiations.¹¹ It is complemented by organizational theory, which helps assess the composition of the delegations. Ascertaining the primacy of particular intra-delegation perspectives is vital in determining what were hard and soft positions (prioritization). These techniques will shed light on how the seemingly disparate conclusions – that Russia achieved the best results at Yalta and Britain protected most of their traditional interests, yet the Americans emerged the preeminent world power – resulted from the negotiation that was WWII postwar planning diplomacy. This work will not be the first to put forth the aforementioned argument; instead, the use of negotiation analytics will provide a fuller voice to this contention.

WWII was one of those historical events that touched everyone’s lives directly. The process of total mobilization drew into the conflict every segment of society. Rightfully, the story of WWII is about all of these groups – the front line infantry; the politicians; the women in factories; the civilian heroes of Dunkirk, Leningrad, and Stalingrad; the families dealing with war; etc. However, the story of WWII diplomacy *as it relates to the planning and creation of the postwar order*, up to and including Yalta, was a story of three men – Churchill, FDR, and Stalin – and their favored subordinates. The populace during these phases should be thought of as *factors* with little *direct control* over the events. Reynolds’ analysis of summits (discussed momentarily) emphasizes that only in the final stage does “how to present the meeting to their publics” become “an overriding concern for leaders.”¹² Therefore, in the

¹¹ Daniel Druckman, “Time-Series Designs and Analyses,” in *Methods of Negotiation Research*, ed. Peter J. Carnevale and Carsten K.W. de Dreu (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006), 62.

¹² David Reynolds, *Summits: Six Meetings That Shaped the Twentieth Century* (New York: Basic Books, 2007), 432.

years after the fall of France through Yalta, all decisions about which of the available options would further their countries' interests were made by Churchill, FDR, and Stalin. These choices reflected their vision of their countries' national interests and at the same time laid the foundation for the postwar order. As Charles Maier points out, diplomacy, even in a democracy, "is still largely executed, if not ultimately shaped, from the top-down."¹³ Similarly, some may argue that other countries, like China and France, helped shape the postwar world. Again, however, these countries had little control over and instead were only factors in the decision-making processes of the Big Three leaders *up to and including the Yalta conference*.

When the organizational structure of the WWII postwar planning negotiation is ascertained, it exposes an exclusivity of control, which is similar to the management of business negotiations, allowing for the transference of methodology. These negotiations are typified by a hierarchy with the leading member being the sole decision maker who is informed by his subordinates about the issues (difference between the parties) to be addressed by the negotiations. The members of the administrations such as Averill Harriman, Alec Cadogan, and Andrei Gromyko were specialists who helped their respective leaders create positions (a stance a party takes on an issue). Yet, Churchill, FDR, and Stalin (or a person to whom they delegated this authority) decided *solely* whether to adopt a position and what priority to assign it, as Hans Morgenthau points out; it is 'essentially the character of the president which determines the outcomes of policy.'¹⁴ General Alanbrooke backs this notion, the Prime Minister's (PM) "personality was such, and the power he acquired was adequate, to place him in a position where both Parliament and Cabinet were only minor inconveniences to be humored occasionally."¹⁵ Thus, the organization of the delegations was tiered and controlled from the top-down, with the heads of state as the main molders of the process, then he and his favored subordinates determined what were vital and less vital interests, and finally those not included in the top tiers – the remainder of the government and the population as a whole – factored into molding and shaping the outcome.

¹³ Smith, 123. Maier quoted.

¹⁴ Ibid, 83. Hans Morgenthau quoted.

¹⁵ Alan Brooke Alanbrooke, Alex Danchev, and Daniel Todman, *War Diaries, 1939-1945: Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 170.

The process of negotiations further granted the Big Three leaders control over WWII diplomacy, since it was conducted primarily through the heads of state's correspondence, foreign ministry communiqués, bilateral meetings, and tripartite summitry. The latter two were the arena where most decisions were made about the postwar order. Churchill coined the term "summit" for these types of meetings "at the highest level." He wanted "a parlay at the summit" because only at the summit (the head of state) could an agreement be reached without the need to take it to other bodies for further deliberation.¹⁶ Under this setting, the leader can make immediate decisions and establish *quid pro quo* cooperative bargaining – a negotiation. The tripartite summits of Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam were, respectively, the pinnacle conferences of the three stages of negotiations: pre-negotiations, negotiations, and implementation.

Teheran was the major conference of the pre-negotiation stage, but the Moscow Ministers Meeting and other bilateral and tripartite discussions during 1940 to early 1945 comprise the stage as well. When the parties are "exploring possible trades, suggesting possible packages," and creating "written agreements," they are in the negotiation stage, according to Lawrence Suskind; this describes Yalta succinctly.¹⁷ Since a peace conference never occurred, as was presumed, Potsdam takes on greater importance as the apex of the implementation stage. Still, with the leaders believing a peace summit would occur, not all issues are resolved at Potsdam, and the implementation stage lasted until the crises of 1946-47 – Berlin, Greece, Iran, and Turkey – and the GATT negotiations when the new order was codified. The process exposes a clear delineation point: when the delegation's principle has overriding control (1st and 2nd stages) and when they are influenced by other groups (3rd stage).

However, this study's main purpose is adding business methodology to the methods of study diplomatic history. For this reason, a different delineation point is needed; separating the preparation stage from the negotiation and implementation of the agreements on the postwar order because it allows for a focus on strategies (a coordinated and synchronized plan of action based on prioritized aims as well as concessions and/or fallback

¹⁶ Robert Rhodes James, ed., *Winston S. Churchill: His Complete Speeches*, Vol. 8 (Columbia University, New York, 1974), 7944, 8484-85.

¹⁷ Lawrence Suskind and Jeffrey L Cruikshank, *Breaking Robert's Rules: The New Way to Run Your Meeting, Build Consensus, and Get Results* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 37.

positions). Besides discerning the Big Three's strategies, this delineation permits an understanding of the background of Churchill, FDR, Stalin, and their favored subordinates as well as the context of the negotiations. All three aspects are prerequisites for analyzing WWII diplomacy in regards to the creation of the postwar order.

Part I: Planning for the Conference: the Big Three's Strategies will therefore focus on the diplomacy up to Yalta. *Part II: A Successful Conference and a Failed Alliance: Negotiated Agreements versus Implemented Agreements* will focus on the conference and the subsequent meetings that implemented (or cast aside) the decisions reached at Yalta.

Part I will examine only the diplomacy that exposed the Big Three's strategies entering the conference, since it is impossible to cover every aspect of WWII diplomacy. More importantly, far too often, post-Yalta events bleed into the analysis of the conference, affecting the interpretation in negative ways by contextualizing events using Cold War patterns which were neither recognizable nor influential on the parties' decision-making. Defining strategies going into Yalta will help negate this phenomenon. For some baffling reason, very few historians have taken the time to ascertain the parties' strategies prior to their analysis of a conference. Still, those who included these details have greatly enhanced their works. Keith Sainsbury's *Turning Points* is the epitome of how defining strategies prior to an analysis of a conference strengthens a historian's argument. Not coincidentally, his work has stood for thirty years as one of the best analyses of Teheran.

The key to any form of negotiation analytics is to discover the catalyst for position evolution and to track said evolution. Negotiation analytics' emphasis on tracing position evolution relates the varying effects of the actors and process as well as the procedures used. Furthermore, "an analyst desires to recreate a path of events leading to an outcome" because position evolution reveals prioritization.¹⁸ Prioritization then allows an analyst to ascertain the value placed on a particular position vis-à-vis other positions. In a negotiation, the party wants "to prioritize among goals, while contemplating fall back positions and potential trade-offs," relates Herb Cohen.¹⁹ Once priority is ascertained, the give-and-take aspects of the negotiation, i.e., what were hard and soft positions, are affirmed. This is important because in establishing a negotiation strategy, the "first and foremost important factor is your

¹⁸. Druckman, "Time Series," 62.

¹⁹. Herb Cohen, *Negotiate This!: By Caring, but Not T-H-A-T Much* (New York: Warner Books, 2003), 27.

objective for [it].” In other words, proclaims de Cremer and Pillulta, it is “the price that you are prepared to pay to achieve your objectives.”²⁰ Once all of these parts are put together, the whole takes shape; that is to say, it can be discerned with a high degree of certainty what strategies the Big Three were pursuing when entering into the negotiations at Yalta.

Historiography

Much of the recent literature on Yalta is both thought provoking as well as very informative, especially to this project. However, it always seemed that even though the formula came out with the right numeral (a greater role for the British in shaping the outcome of the postwar order than has typically been portrayed), a remainder (an unaccounted piece) was always attached, which made the answer seem inconclusive. A few recent examples can reveal how and why there seemed to be a remainder. At the same time, this brief historiography can expose where combining historical methodology with negotiation analytics and its principles can fill in certain gaps, add needed aspects and facets, as well as avoid deterministic conclusions.

When Fraser Harbutt set out to analyze Yalta in his attempt to comprehend “the transition from WWII to the Cold War,” he came to a very significant conclusion: one must “reject the familiar ‘East/West’ conception.” His conclusion is ascertained by designing the analysis to “look forward to Yalta” instead of trying “to explain the origins of the Cold War” via the conference. The East/West dichotomy, argues Harbutt, is a “Cold War pattern,” not a wartime pattern. Worse, it “attributes profound effects to American thoughts and actions,” especially in regards to Europe. Thus, Harbutt finds that modern historiography on WWII diplomacy is too American-centric, something this work’s dual methodology will confirm. Furthermore, it fostered a vision of diplomacy based on a three-tiered hierarchy: US-Soviet political, Anglo-American military, and “a thinly developed” and little noticed Anglo-Soviet political discussions.²¹ This tiered hierarchy distracts the historian’s attention away from crucial Anglo-Soviet deliberations that propelled the momentum of the negotiations as well as limited the available options.

²⁰ David de Cremer and M. M Pillulta, *Making Negotiations Predictable: What Science Tells Us?* (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 13.

²¹ Fraser Harbutt. *Yalta 1945: Europe and America at the Crossroads* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), IX, X, XIV.

Cold War patterns as the basis of an interpretation negatively affects a historian's analysis. Under the new pattern, "[w]e start to see Yalta as it appeared to contemporaries rather than as it seems to us in Cold War retrospect," proclaims Harbutt. When viewed in this manner, Yalta (and the strategies going into the conference) becomes "rooted in the prewar 1930s patterns," instead of the "Cold War patterns."²² For instance, the Roosevelt administration's multilateral trading program was designed to deal with the autocratic tendency of the 1930s, not the Cold War's bipolar economics, which came to a head in 1971 when the Bretton Woods Accords are drastically modified. The pattern is important, argues de Cremer and Pillutla, because "the context can have a more decisive influence on the final outcome of the negotiations than the personality of the negotiator."²³ Again, the importance of the interplay between actor and process is depicted.

Represented in this manner, the record exposes a more passive American diplomatic approach to Europe, with greater "separation, up to the time of Yalta, of the European and American political worlds." The vacuum this created was filled by Anglo-Soviet discussions and understandings, in particular the Anglo-Soviet Treaty negotiations in 1942, the Eden/Molotov discussions at Moscow in 1943, and the percentage deal agreements in 1944. These events had "profound" effects on "the future of Europe," even though they were completely removed from the summitry that so encompassed previous analyses.²⁴ The impact of the Anglo-Soviet political discussions on the postwar order is revealed by using negotiation analytics search for the catalyst of position evolution.

The explanation that typical analyses of Yalta and wartime diplomacy overlook the role Anglo-Soviet political discussion played in the formation of the postwar order is enlightening. Yet, Harbutt diagnoses only a symptom, not the cause, of why Britain's impact on the postwar order was greater than typically portrayed. Two missing pieces fully explain why the Anglo-Soviet political diplomacy had such a "profound effect" on the future of Europe – the process and procedures of WWII's postwar planning negotiation.

WWII diplomacy evolved after the fall of France, the invasion of the Soviet Union, and the attack at Pearl Harbor into tripartite negotiations amongst the Big Three. Tripartite negotiations have a number of forms. In this case, the parties do not have equal standing

²² Ibid, XVII.

²³ De Cremer and Pillutla, 81.

²⁴ Harbutt, XVII, XVIII.

(the status of a party vis-à-vis the other party(s) with whom it is negotiating). One form, under this scenario, unfolds with the two superior parties appropriating, through force or leverage, the possessions of the junior party. Some, especially our British friends, might want to depict WWII diplomacy in this form. With the exception of global financing, however, British possessions, neither colonies nor markets, were appropriated by the US or USSR *during postwar planning diplomacy*. Therefore, this form lacks support from the record.

Another form of unequal tripartite negotiations is characterized by the junior partner's maneuvering as the impetus for position evolution amongst all parties. Under this scenario, the junior partner tries to reach bilateral understandings through operating as the liaison between the senior parties that reduced, favorably to them, the options of the non-consulted major party. The aim is to define the context for future tripartite negotiations so as to provide undue significance to the junior partner's position(s) – framing. "Various studies have shown," relates de Cremer and Pillutla, "that the process of framing can have a significant impact on the final outcome of the negotiations."²⁵ The percentage deal illustrates this type of junior partner maneuvering. Before entering into the Yalta negotiations, "Churchill and Stalin had already agreed on a postwar framework for (sic) Europe," observes Harbutt, "and both seemingly wished to protect and preserve it," leaving FDR little choice but to accept the agreement or risk Red Army participation in Manchuria.²⁶ The PM exposed the tactics by reaching an agreement first with Stalin then presenting it to Roosevelt, thus limiting and defining his available choices.

A focus on strategies reveals the impact of these types of maneuverings. This is best done by tracking a nascent position as it evolves until the position is either adopted, conceded, or deemed untenable. The priority a party places on a position as well as the price that a party is willing to pay to have it adopted is identified through this method. Since the record reveals the British machinations forced enough Soviet and American position evolution, WWII Big Three negotiations were advanced by the junior partner's maneuverings as the main impetus for all the parties' position evolution. Thus, the reason Harbutt found a greater role for the UK in postwar planning is explained by the nature of

²⁵ De Cremer and Pillutla, 84.

²⁶ Harbutt, 286.

WWII diplomacy – junior partner-led negotiations (process) shaped by the tactic of framing through Britain’s ability to act as liaison (procedures).

S.M Plokhy’s *Yalta: The Price of Peace* focuses on the conference as a negotiation. Depicting Yalta as what it was (a give-and-take discussion between parties – a negotiation) grants him a better understanding of the conference because the pattern depicted is akin to the way participants themselves would have evaluated what took place. Others have attempted to analyze Yalta as a negotiation, such as Diane Clemens. Yet, claims Warren Kimball, “Plokhy’s study of the conference supplants Diane Shaver Clemens’s *Yalta*” because as another of his reviewers, Vlad Zubok, argues, “Plokhy analyzes rather than moralizes.”²⁷ This emphasis leads Plokhy to a more nuanced conclusion, “No matter how much effort is put into the preparation and conduct of an international conference, however skillful and resourceful its participants, and however promising its outcome, democratic leaders and societies *should be prepared to pay a price* for close involvement with those who do not share their values (Itals, MMG).”²⁸ His analysis is based on how humans act, not how one would want them to act.

Clemens argues, “Unfortunately, the Soviet Union’s co-operativeness was soon forgotten,” which is why the Yalta accords failed. She believes “the decisions made there portended a different course than relationships took after the war.”²⁹ However, Plokhy sees the two systems possessing “profoundly different geopolitical aspiration.”³⁰ He concludes the West would not have been served by acquiescing to Soviet wishes because they paid the heaviest price during the war. “[Revisionist] accounts,” notes Gellately, “do not consider the consequences of any such concession.”³¹ As Cohen relates, “[I]f the relationship is adversarial, the contending party may see a concession that came to easy as a sign of weakness.”³² Clemens’ work is an example of how moralism adversely affected previous attempts to study the processes of Yalta.

The West should have weakened their national interests for the betterment of the world, according to Clemens, a laudable goal but an infeasible basis for assessing the

27. Warren Kimball, “S.M. Plokhy, *Yalta: The Price of Peace*,” *Journal of Cold War Studies* 13, no. 3 (Summer 2011): 205; Vladislav Zubok, “*Yalta: The Price of Peace*,” *Slavic Review* 70, no. 1 (Spring 2011): 204. *(reviews)*

28. S.M. Plokhy, *Yalta: The Price of Peace* (New York: Viking/Penguin Books, 2010), xxviii.

29. Diane Shaver Clemens, *Yalta* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), 5, 268.

30. Plokhy, 396.

31. Gellately, 10.

32. Cohen, *Negotiate This*, 152.

performance of the delegations. “[W]hile it is important to take the other party’s needs into consideration, it is not a good idea to own their problems,” according to de Cremer and Pillutla, because of the risk “the other side may try to make you an unwitting partner to their problems.”³³ Furthermore, Plokhy found “no indication Stalin would have been prepared to yield.” Hence, “the Western delegates at Yalta had little choice but to accept the fact of preponderant Soviet Power” in Eastern and Central Europe.³⁴ What is important to recognize, therefore, is not the Soviets and their needs but what aims could the West achieve with a “weak hand.”

Unlike many Yalta scholars, Plokhy starts his analysis by divulging to the reader the aims of the Big Three. Furthermore, he prioritizes these aims so that the reader can understand what each party was willing to concede in return for what they wanted. By analyzing the conference as a negotiation and finding the aims of the Big Three as well as prioritizing them, i.e., their strategies, as Zubok relates, “Plokhy lays to rest the myth of the ‘betrayal of Yalta.’”³⁵ Plokhy concludes, “Roosevelt did not do too badly” because the Soviets participated in the war in the Pacific and the United Nations was formed on a tiered and worldwide basis, his “two main goals.”³⁶

Plokhy bases his evaluation of Yalta on the achievement of aims. A better way to evaluate a negotiation is to use the previously mentioned hard and soft positions. When Churchill decreased the British role in most of Eastern Europe during the percentage deal, he was moving from a hard position and accepting a Russian hard position: a collective security system including all European states to that of a dual bloc system. He makes a greater concession to the Soviets than when FDR traded the Kurile Islands, Darien, etc., for Red Army participation in the Pacific. Roosevelt’s trade was a soft position aimed at deal-making, since it did not hinder only advanced American vital interests. Yet, both achieved major aims: British maintenance of their traditional role in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Red Army fighting the Japanese. If these concessions are evaluated by ends, then both are relatively equal. However, if they are judged by whether the party moved from a hard or soft position, then Churchill’s maneuver is less impressive and therefore the British *paid a*

³³ De Cremer and Pillutla, 28.

³⁴ Plokhy, 250, 396.

³⁵ Zubok, “Yalta: The Price of Peace,” 203. *review*

³⁶ Edwin B. Burgess, “Plokhy, S.M. Yalta: The Price of Peace,” *Library Journal* 135, no. 2 (Feb. 2010): 81. *(review)*

higher price than the Americans. Remember, it is just as important to know what “price” a party “is prepared to pay to achieve” their objectives as it is to know their aims.³⁷ Negotiation analytics does not radically challenge Plokhy’s assessment; instead, it adds greater weight to his argument that the West did what they could with a “weak hand.”

Reynolds’ *Summits* is an exploration into the “human dramas of summitry.” When he analyzed six different summits of the twentieth century, he found a number of similarities existed in all of them. Three notable findings give weight to the contentions made by this work. First, summits can be viewed as “a business meeting to clinch a deal” displaying the characteristics of “an intimate business meeting between two or three heads of government,” which “turns on the capacity of individual leaders.” These leaders are dependent on “smooth teamwork with their bureaucrats.” Reynolds terms the summit at Yalta a “Plenary Summit” because the personal meetings were complemented by specialists who helped their leaders directly via their own preliminary meetings or advising during main sessions. “Lower-level negotiations between specialists are therefore essential,” since they laid the groundwork for the principles meeting(s).³⁸ Ultimately, this description would be readily recognizable to anyone who has entered into business-to-business negotiations. It exposes the analogous organizational structure between high diplomacy and business negotiations.

Second, Reynolds finds that during these meetings, “leaders find it hard to disentangle their country’s national interests from their personal political goals.” With the control noted above, these leaders, therefore, have more say than usually given leaders, especially democratic heads of state. They push an agenda defined by them, not their countrymen. It is actually the point of summitry to grant greater agency to the leaders. Reynolds observes this as well, proclaiming “summitry is often undertaken ... in the hope that by going to the very top you can soar above the fog” of political and diplomatic malaise. Recall, only in the implementation (final) stage does “how to present the meeting to their publics” become “an overriding concern for leaders.”³⁹ Thus, Reynolds seems to find from his analysis of summits backing for the contention that these are atypical “great men”-driven events.

³⁷. De Cremer and Pillutla, 13.

³⁸. Reynolds, *Summits*, 4-5, 425, 434.

³⁹. *Ibid*, 429, 432.

Finally, Reynolds reminds us that “a summit involves three distinction phases: preparation⁴⁰, negotiation, and implementation.”⁴¹ Cristophe DuPont and Guy-Oliver Faure have also identified these three stages as the makeup of any negotiation. However, they point out, “The process may be fuzzy, the phases may be of differing duration, they may overlap or backtrack, and confusion may appear in the secession of events. Nevertheless, looking at the whole sequence, one sees the process is distinctive and original.”⁴² That stages are elastic is a vital aspect of postwar planning negotiations that cannot be properly incorporated by studying Yalta exclusively. The three-stage formula is inner summit *and* is the pattern for all meetings and discussions that relate to the issues being addressed by the negotiation, in this case the creation of the postwar order.

Yalta was not the only postwar planning negotiation; it was the penultimate. A better assessment of prioritization can be garnered when position evolution is traced from the beginning of negotiations instead of identifying them at an arbitrary point. This traced evolution exposes the positions’ prioritization, allowing the analyst to discern hard and soft positions. Positions prioritization divulges the price each party is willing to pay as well as the options still available. Therefore, the three-stage pattern must contextualize all wartime meetings and discussion regarding postwar planning to ascertain the dynamic momentum created by the interplay between actor and process through the procedures used.

A quick glance at Keith Sainsbury’s *Turning Points* exposes why discerning the parties’ strategies is crucial to this type of analysis. It also reveals why discerning the options available to each party is vital to understanding the diplomatic decision-making process. For instance, he begins his strategy section for the Moscow Ministers Meeting by identifying two essential points: the makeup of the delegation and whether a consensus existed amongst them. In the case of the Americans, the delegations’ preferred positions “were not different from Roosevelt’s,” which makes it easier to distinguish the main priority. Sainsbury pinpoints this as “the agreement of Russia and Britain to the principle of postwar international

⁴⁰ Preparation and pre-negotiation are one and the same.

⁴¹ Reynolds, *Summits*, 428.

⁴² Cristophe Dupont and Guy-Oliver Faure, “The Negotiation Process” in *International Negotiation: Analysis and Approaches, Issues, 2nd Edition*, ed. Victor A. Kremenjuk, (San Francisco, Joessy Bass, 2002), 42.

cooperation.”⁴³ Thus, he identified the Americans’ underlying interest allowing him to discern position prioritization.

Sainsbury finds that China’s role is deemed essential for postwar international cooperation by Secretary of State Cordell Hull who Roosevelt authorized to negotiate on his behalf. FDR’s Chinese “policy was aimed at creating a strong pro-American China to emerge from the war as a great stabilizer among the oppressed peoples of the Orient,” recalled American Air Commander in China, Claire Chennault.⁴⁴ So, elevation of China to the role of a major power was a central concern to the US at the conference. Another salient aspect to establishing a strategy is to find what position(s) would be helpful as concession(s), i.e., “the price that [one is] prepared to pay,” to make certain their main positions were adopted.⁴⁵ Since the Russians had made clear their fear of and need to control Germany after the war, “Germany was therefore the second item on the US agenda,” with plans for harsh treatment of the country.⁴⁶ This would show good faith to the Russians and set up a possible trade. Without belaboring the point, the effect of ascertaining strategies can reveal much about how the parties viewed each other, themselves, the issues, and their positions.

However, a problem exists with Sainsbury’s exploration of the conferences of 1943. He claims these conferences “resulted in a ‘turning point’” and that Moscow and Teheran marked the point when “the option of resisting effectively the creation of a Soviet sphere of interest in Eastern Europe probably ceased to exist.”⁴⁷ Sainsbury relies too much on the endowment effect – the mental process by which value is added to a possession because of one’s custody of it. It is true that as de Cremer and Pillutla claim, “[C]oncessions which have been negotiated with the other party in previous negotiations are viewed as valuable possessions which are difficult to renegotiate.” Yet, all “this means is negotiations will run less smoothly,” not that they are ended or that a position change is untenable – the price has just become higher.⁴⁸

A closed option does not mean that option is off the table. These are two distinctly different places for the option to rest. An option off the table means it will no longer be

⁴³ Keith Sainsbury, *The Turning Point; Roosevelt, Stalin, Churchill and Chiang Kai-shek, 1943: The Moscow, Cairo and Teheran Conferences* (New York: Oxford University, 1985), 12.

⁴⁴ Chennault, 225.

⁴⁵ De Cremer and Pillutla, 13.

⁴⁶ Sainsbury, 15.

⁴⁷ Ibid, 307.

⁴⁸ De Cremer and Pillutla, 49.

discussed, whereas a closed option can be reopened if a party is willing to make a major concession, usually moving from a hard position. Thus, options reduction is always present, but alternatives are not static. The percentage deal exposed this type of movement. When Churchill traded away British say in Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria, the British recaptured predominance in Greece and reestablished influence in Yugoslavia. Sainsbury's determinism caused him to overlook the two phases of agreements. It is essential to comprehend that deals made via negotiations follow a two-phase process, which if not taken into account leads to an improper view of what options were still available to the parties.

Dean Pruitt purports, "[I]he concept of negotiation is a joint decision-making process" that follows "a two-phase activity: exploring to find a formula of agreement and then adjusting the details."⁴⁹ In the case of the percentage deal, Moscow and Teheran were the first phase, and Tolstoy (the percentage deal meeting) the second. For the negotiations as a whole, Yalta was the process of "finding a formula" for agreement. Though the loss of FDR changed the members, Potsdam and the other post-Yalta conferences and discussions was the "adjusting of details" phase i.e., implementation. During this phase adjustments to previous decisions about borders, zones of occupation, etc., were made. An agreement can be made between parties, but until the exact details are decided and put into effect, maneuverability is possible, especially if, like Churchill, a delegation head is willing to move from a hard position. Also, "Even if a deal is made," highlights Robert Mnookin, "there is a risk it may not be honored."⁵⁰ Therefore, written agreements are only one side of the coin, and to ascertain the way a negotiation unfolds, both sides must be analyzed. To evaluate any conference properly, the analyst must look beyond the main conference to the point when the decisions reached at said conference are either implemented or cast aside.

The implementation of an agreement gives time for new options to become available, thus undercutting a deterministic argument. A focus on process and/or actors without including procedures used can cause an analyst to fall into other deterministic snares. Ironically, this is exactly what happens in Neil Fergusson's work the *Cash Nexus* because the book aimed at revealing why Paul Kennedy's economic determinism in *The Rise*

⁴⁹. Dean Pruitt, "The Actors in Negotiations," in Victor A. Kremenjuk, *International Negotiations: Analysis, Approaches, and Issues* (Baltimore: Jossey-Bass Inc. Publishing, 1991), 44.

⁵⁰. Robert H. Mnookin, Scott R Peppet, and Andrew S Tulumello, *Beyond Winning: Negotiating to Create Value In Deals and Disputes* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000), 32.

and Fall of the Great Powers was not formulaic. Fergusson exposes the failure of Kennedy's concept of "overstretch" when it came to Vietnam and the Soviets' loss in Afghanistan. Furthermore, the concept would have seen the American system start to falter in the 1980s and 1990s as it took on greater commitments in an attempt to cause the fall of Soviet Union and later by maintaining and expanding NATO after said fall. Fergusson's argument that the US political system was "the right balance ... between the different sections of the economy" allowing the Americans "to maximize war-making resources without undermining domestic well-being" is astute.⁵¹ Economics is an important factor in the power of a country, but unlike Britain earlier in the century, no country existed to take the place of America if they "overstretched." Therefore, no actor could enact the procedures necessary to replace American hegemony, and thus a pattern or rule could not be extrapolated from the earlier phenomena. Yet, Fergusson falls into the same deterministic trap by trying to claim that political systems govern state-to-state relations.

"The key difference between France and Britain in the eighteenth century," emphasizes Fergusson, "was not a matter of economic resources. France had more. Rather it was a matter of institutions," which led to Britain's supremacy over its chief rival. Similarly, in the case of the Soviet-American postwar rivalry, "Reagan's defense budget was a symptom of American superiority, not a cause of the Soviet collapse," as Kennedy determinism would suggest.⁵² Fergusson's contention that "under the right circumstances, rising public expenditure on the technology of defense and destruction can co-exist with rising consumption" was a good refutation of Kennedy's thesis. However, in the same theory, his political determinism could not be used as a nomothetic rule for all American international actions.

Fergusson's belief in the idea that the politics of nation determined the course it would take in international relations led him astray. At the end of *Cash Nexus* he contends American people, specifically their democratic underpinnings, would restrain US policymakers from embarking on any truly imperialistic adventures such as the invasion of Iraq and the overthrowing of its regime to instill democracy in the country. He argues, "The idea of invading a country[,], deposing a dictator[,], and imposing free elections at gunpoint is

⁵¹. Fergusson, 420.

⁵². Ibid, 174, 409.

generally dismissed as incompatible with American ‘values.’”⁵³ However, this event did take place only two years after the completion of his work. George W. Bush and his administration had underlying interests – misplaced security concerns, money/oil, reelection, or a score to settle (depending on one’s view of Operation Iraqi Freedom) – that upset the paradigm established by Fergusson. Whatever interest to which one subscribes, it caused the administration to violate Fergusson’s rule by manipulating American public opinion, through fear, away from what he deemed its “traditional” thinking. The structure was important, but the actors still had the ability to affect the way the system functioned through the procedure of fear-based propaganda.

Thus, as revealed from the examples of Fergusson, Kennedy, and to a lesser extent Sainsbury, the process is very important to understanding how international interactions unfold as well as who is making the choices amongst options and how they sift through said alternatives. Yet, the ability of the actors to shape the process and the feedback that has in reducing alternatives is equally important. Therefore, to understand how the negotiations at Yalta unfolded all three parts, the background and influences of the actors (History) as well as the process and procedures (Negotiation Analytics) must be incorporated into the study. Done properly, this multidisciplinary methodology will forestall the tendency towards structural determinism indicative of History’s combination with realist and neorealist IR.

Overview

Four different aspects of WWII postwar planning diplomacy background need to be ascertained to uncover the Big Three’s strategies going into Yalta: the makeup of the parties and the influence derived from their life experiences, the standing of the parties, the issues to be addressed, and the parties’ positions. Taking into account DuPont and Faure’s warning about the elasticity of the negotiational stages, each of these aspects can be viewed as separate parts and as such are the focal points of the four chapters of Part I. Each chapter reveals how the British and Churchill, in particular, were able to lead the negotiations and thus framed the debate – junior partner-led negotiation. This can further inform us about the dynamic processes at work during the postwar planning diplomacy and why the outcome of an East/West division happened when that partition was not the way the negotiations themselves transpired.

⁵³ Ibid, 417.

Chapter 1, which is an overview of the postwar visions of Churchill, FDR and Stalin, reveals the opening given to the PM and the British to lead the negotiations. Why they needed to act as an intermediary and frame the debate is explained when the standing of the three countries and its effect on the negotiations is depicted in Chapter 2. The issues confronting the Grand Alliance appear in Chapter 2, but in Chapter 3 these issues become readily apparent. Here the differences between the parties, especially the Western ones, are detailed, which further depicts the failure of the traditional East/West pattern to describe events up to and including Yalta. Chapter 3 grants the first glimpse of positions; however, Chapter 4 relates how these positions evolved and what events predicated this change. Churchill's vacillation, at times pragmatic and at others chaotic, between Teheran and Yalta exposed how British actions affected the other parties and forced their positions to evolve, which details that Britain's maneuvering directed the momentum behind the negotiational processes of WWII postwar planning diplomacy. Part I culminates, with the aid of contemporary preparatory work from the State Department, Foreign Office (FO) and Foreign Commissariat, in the retracing of the evolution of position to form a concrete determination of the Big Three's strategies for Yalta.

Chapter One: Lessons of the Past

The reason this work combines historical methodology with negotiation analytics is that a historical examination gives an analyst the best ability to ascertain the background of the parties, in particular the delegation leaders, as well as the context of the negotiations. Both are prerequisites for understanding the delegations' strategies. "A basic fact about negotiation" that is "easy to forget," emphasize Roger Fisher, William Ury, and Bruce Patton, "is that you are dealing not with abstract representatives" but "with human beings" who "have emotions, deeply held values, and different backgrounds," which affect their decision-making.¹ An exclusive focus on negotiation analytics would fail to identify all of the various influences that informed the thought processes of Churchill, FDR, and Stalin as they developed their postwar plans and decided amongst the options available to them. "The path to understanding foreign policy almost certainly travels through the minds of the foreign policy maker," relates Smith.² Without identifying these influences and the concepts derived from them, it would be difficult to discern how and why the Big Three leaders' positions evolved.

Churchill

Winston Churchill (1874-1965) was born in Victorian England, which held a special place in his heart throughout his life. During this period, Britain was the preeminent world power. The future Prime Minister felt it should maintain this paramount position in the world. He believed they earned this status because though it "had been very tempting to join with the stronger [European coalitions] and share the fruits of his conquest" England "joined the less strong powers ... and thus defeated and frustrated the Continental military tyrant," which "preserved the liberties of Europe [as well as] protected the growth of its vivacious and varied society."³ Along with this aid to Europe, the PM noted, the British Empire "has spread and is spreading democracy more widely than any other system of government," which helped orient countries towards the Empire.⁴ Britain was able to accomplish these feats due to the power derived from their colonies and vast trade networks,

1. Ronald Fisher, William Ury, and Bruce Patton, *Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement without Giving In* [3rd ed.] (New York, Penguin Books, 2011), 20.

2. Smith, 188.

3. Winston Churchill, *The Gathering Storm* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1948), 208.

4. Winston Churchill, Franklin D Roosevelt, and Warren F Kimball, *Churchill & Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence* Vol. 3, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), 140.

which gave the British men and resources independent of the Continent and made them a great power. However, by the start of the war, it was quickly becoming apparent that the Americans would replace the British as the leading world democracy and economic powerhouse.

The 1930s revealed that the Empire was as much of a burden as it was an asset. The Empire setup, especially the colonies, involved large military outlays to protect a price that the Americans did not have to assume. Since the Premiership of Pitt the Elder, “vast outlays of public funds” had been extended “to support armies [and navies] all around the world,” relates Francis Jennings.⁵ Furthermore, in spite of the Great Depression, America’s economic metrics were such that they were primed to become the economic juggernaut of the democratic world, with all the power that entails. This new position would mean like-minded countries would look first to Washington, not London, for direction in world affairs. Still, Churchill did “not believe that [the] Americans wish[ed] to deprive us of our legitimate place in world affairs.”⁶

“Britain cannot be a first-class power without its empire,” declared diplomat John Davis.⁷ If England could partner with the Americans, the combination would lead world affairs. The British, notes Mark Stoler, “had used and would continue to use bilateral understandings as a means of getting powers to protect its far-flung interests.”⁸ Therefore, Churchill and most of the Cabinet felt, Britain had “to collaborate with the United States, whatever happens, to survive as a Great Power.”⁹ Shifting some of the financial burden for protecting trade routes and the Pacific (cover for British colonies) onto the Americans would preserve the Empire. As British diplomat Lord Vansittart claimed, without American backing, Britain ‘must eventually be done in the Far East.’¹⁰ Both countries wanted security and the ability to trade; Churchill realized these desires were the opening to align the two countries.

5. Francis Jennings, *Empire of Fortune: Crowns, Colonies, & Tribes in the Seven Years War in America*, (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1989), 359.

6. FO: General, vol. II, 142.

7. Thorne, 183. Davies quoted.

8. Mark A. Stoler, *Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Grand Alliance, and U.S. Strategy in World War II* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 9.

9. FO: North American, vol. IV, 332.

10. Thorne, 16. Lord Vansittart quoted.

Lessons from Britain's past gave Churchill the inspiration on how he could frame British interests as Anglo-American interests. "The evident influence on his thoughts of great persons and great events of times long past" was apparent to all, recalled Halifax.¹¹ His love affair with the Victorian age drew much of the PM's attention to the period known as the Concert of Europe (1815-1853). In many ways, he wished 'to put the clock back to the Congress of Vienna,' remembered British diplomat Oliver Henry.¹² His perception of how the Concert functioned guided Churchill's thinking about the postwar order.

The Concert was formed by the leading powers of nineteenth century Europe: Austria-Hungary, Britain, France, Prussia, and Russia. The period, according to Gordon Craig, was marked by diplomacy and statecraft of the "Great Powers," which "were capable of restraining the passions" of the lesser powers of Europe through "the principle of the balance of power."¹³ The balance of power within the Concert was maintained by two or three power understandings. The agreements upheld the balance of power and forestalled changes to the existing order. As Henry Kissinger wrote this type of "balance of power inhibits the capacity to overthrow the international order."¹⁴ For instance, during the Belgian Revolution crisis (1830s), "Britain," declares Matthew Rendell, "held the balance of power between Prussia and France" because "had either side committed an act of aggression, London surely would have thrown its support to the other side."¹⁵ Thus, declares G. John Ikenberry, Churchill's aim was "to provide a measure of restraint on the autonomous and indiscriminate exercise of power by major states."¹⁶ This aim could only be achieved through "a revived European balance in which Britain had influence," allowing Britain to "remain a Power of the first rank," contends B.J.C. Mckerber.¹⁷

Sustaining British geo-political standing through a balance of power setup, therefore, was the most powerful influence on the PM's postwar planning. A re-adaptation of the

¹¹ Edward Frederick Lindley Wood Halifax, *Fullness of Days* (London: Collins, 1957), 273-74.

¹² Gordon, Craig, Gordon Alexander, Bruce A Thompson, Carolyn Halladay, and Donald Abenheim. *Tact and Intelligence: Essays On Diplomatic History and International Relation*, (Palo Alto, CA: Society for the Promotion of Science and Scholarship, 2008), 265. Oliver Henry quoted.

¹³ Ibid, 247.

¹⁴ Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 77.

¹⁵ Matthew Rendell, "Defensive Realism and the Concert of Europe" in *Review of International Studies* 32, No. 3 (July 2006), 538.

¹⁶ G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major War* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001), 81.

¹⁷ B.J.C. Mckerber, *Transitions of Power: Britain's Loss of Global Preeminence to the United States, 1930-1945* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 322.

Concert' makeup, based on three powers (UK, US, USSR) seemed the best mechanism to reestablish a European balance of power. As will be detailed, it was more than just a Big Three triumvirate that Churchill desired; he felt he must act as the triumvirate's intermediary to compensate for Britain's lack of standing amongst the group. Like the Concert period, Churchill felt the British would need to work with the Russians to forestall American ambitions. However, similar to the late Concert period, one of the powers (in that case France) was clearly the ideal partner for most instances due to their complementary setup to the British Empire – America.

By the time Queen Victoria came to power (1840s), relates Rendell, “the French” believed “the European status quo” was beneficial to their interests.¹⁸ This new belief presented the British, who profited the most from the status quo, with an opportunity to find a like-minded Continental power to aid them in its maintenance. Besides fear of the Eastern powers (Prussia and Russia), the British and French had complementary defensive setups. The British were a sea power with a trade empire that gave them access to the world's resources. Even with the massive losses due to Napoleon's defeat, no other power could “bear the brunt of a French onslaught,” contends Rendell.¹⁹ Thus, Britain provided the naval protection and supplies – the arsenal – for the French soldiers on the continent – the sentinel. “Britain had since the eighteenth century,” notes David Edgerton, “armed allies” to keep “its own forces out of the front line.”²⁰ The success of the Anglo-French combination was revealed when they hindered Russian expansionism in the 1850s.

Britain's traditional geo-political concern was a continental hegemon, more than any other factor; it had drawn the British to the Anglo-French understanding. Churchill realized that after the war, they alone could not halt a potential hegemon, but coupled with the Americans, they could. The PM viewed this relationship as a reversal of the Anglo-French setup; Britain would be the “sentinel” of Europe aided by the Americans' “arsenal.” The Anglo-American partnership, like the combining with the French in the previous century, provided Continental stability while protecting their Empire as well as the resources – men, raw materials, and trade – and status derived from it.

¹⁸. Ibid.

¹⁹. Rendell, 535.

²⁰. David Edgerton, *Britain's War Machine* (New York: Penguin Group, 2011), 280.

As part of his strategy to create a modern Concert, one of the PM's first acts when attaining the role was to establish a relationship with FDR. "My own relations with him had been most carefully fostered," wrote Churchill, and "was a vital factor in all my thoughts."²¹ He believed a natural kinship existed between the English-speaking nations, which constituted "a solid identity of interests," having seen during WWI the benefits of the 1890s Anglo-American rapprochement.²² These coinciding interests – a desire to promote the freedom of the seas, liberal democracy, and trade – could be used to frame British interests as Anglo-American ones.

Yet, Churchill always felt he needed to lead the Anglo-American combination in its dealings with the rest of the world in order to protect British interests. His desire to lead was especially true in Europe where he felt Americans "had strong opinions and little experience," especially the combinations' interactions with Russia.²³ Vice President Henry Wallace recalled, "England would try to deal with Russia directly and put us in the positions of dealing with Russia through England as an intermediary."²⁴ Acting as the Soviet-American go-between was part of his way of reestablishing the balance of power, reprising Lord Castlereagh's role in Vienna. Furthermore, guiding the Anglo-American partnership was also part of his way of ensuring Europe would look to Britain for answers to postwar problems; along with maintaining the Empire, these two prerequisites were what he felt the UK must achieve to remain a great power.

The other aspect of the Concert that influenced Churchill's postwar planning was the position of the smaller states of Europe. The fragmentation of Germany into small principalities had advantages for the Concert's status quo – acting as buffers between the major powers – but also had major drawbacks that worried the PM. The small states were weak and unable to work in unison, which allowed the Austro-Hungarians, French, and Prussians to use them for their own ends. A similar circumstance took place between the World Wars – the interwar period. The Little Entente, a grouping of small Eastern European states, was never able to effectively link together, and thus, they were divided and conquered

21. Winston Churchill, *Their Finest Hour* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1949), 553.

22. Winston Churchill, *The Hinge of Fate* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1950), 559.

23. Churchill, *Hinge of Fate*, 209.

24. Henry A. Wallace, *The Diary of Henry Wallace, January 18, 1935-September 19, 1946* (Glen Rock, N.J.: Microfilming Corp. of America, 1977), 238.

by Germany. In both instances, without the ability to work together, the small states had been at the mercy of the larger powers.

One of the Concert's great powers, Austria-Hungary, was of particular interest to the PM as a way to overcome the economic viability and security problems of the small states. It "had afforded a common life, with advantages and trade and security, to a large number of peoples," who, according to Churchill, on their own did not have "the strength or vitality to stand by themselves."²⁵ Austria-Hungary, the PM felt, linked diverse groups and held in check their various political and religious fervors. The appeal was the stability provided by large groupings based on economics and security. Its success juxtaposed against the failure of the smaller independent states heavily influenced Churchill's planning for Europe. Any combination of small states, therefore, would need "to provide durable safeguards against" foreign "penetration and to promote the security and prosperity of the area."²⁶ If these prerequisites were acquired then he could "re-create in modern forms" the "general outline of the Austria-Hungarian Empire," while still providing the buffer between the major powers.²⁷ The PM, thus, preferred strong combinations of small states over their alignment with major powers.

To recreate the Austria-Hungarian setup and solve European security problems, Churchill wanted to establish confederations in Central and Eastern Europe. He believed in the "need for a Scandinavian bloc, Danubian bloc, and a Balkan bloc."²⁸ These blocs were economically viable and therefore less susceptible to major power manipulation. Early in 1943, Halifax was alerted, "The United States Government were at present examining the possibility of some form of federation of the nations of Eastern Europe."²⁹ This statement gave the PM hope that he could reach an understanding over confederations with the Americans. However, this scheme would only work if "the Western Powers" were "permanently associated in their support."³⁰ Preserving the confederations security and equalizing Big Three standing gave rise to Churchill's ideas on the international organization (UNO).

²⁵ Churchill, *The Gathering Storm*, 10.

²⁶ FO: General, vol. II, 485.

²⁷ Winston Churchill, *Closing the Ring* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1951), 406-07.

²⁸ Churchill, *Hinge of Fate*, 803. Feb. 2, 1943 Churchill cable to Roosevelt.

²⁹ FO: General, vol. II, 479.

³⁰ FO: General, vol. II, 488.

Churchill understood any agreement with the Americans must include adherence to the UNO. If designed his way, the organization would cause Europeans to look to Britain first while allowing the British to continue their role as the Big Three's intermediary into the postwar. "Churchill had laid great emphasis," recalled Wallace, on the existence of "three regional councils."³¹ The PM's desire for the UNO to be founded upon regional councils arose from the need to equalize Big Three standing. At Québec I, he stated, "[S]ubordinate to this world council there should be three regional councils, one for Europe, one for the American Hemisphere and one for the Pacific."³² The Big Three would each head a council; however, their makeup was unclear, as well as what role Africa was to play and where the colonies would be placed. US ties to Latin America, and their desire to sustain them, was the opportunity Churchill thought he could use to receive American agreement on the councils. He was aware that "[t]he United States believed that the inter-American system had an even more important role to fill in the future than in the past."³³ As the head of a regional council, the British would have the same standing as the Americans and Russians, i.e., the same position in geo-politics.

The maintenance of Britain's geo-political standing was Anthony Eden's top concern as well. He thought, however, that the Russians would be the better partners, initially. Like Churchill, the Foreign Secretary sought to make sure decisions about the makeup of Europe were heavily influenced by British opinion. He wanted London to become the "diplomatic capital of the world," allowing Britain to guide Continental decision-making.³⁴ Eden was able to pursue his own strategy due to the nature of the UK's cabinet structure.

Secretaries in the British cabinets (at least ones with portfolios) have authority independent of the PM who appoints them. Moreover, as Under-Secretary Alec Cadogan proudly proclaimed, "[N]either Halifax nor Eden" nor himself were "in the least inclined to grovel to the Prime Minister." Consequently, "the Foreign Office preserved a much stronger

³¹ Wallace, 205.

³² United States Department of State, *Foreign relations of the United States. Diplomatic papers. The Conferences at Washington and Québec 1943* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1942), (hereafter referred to as FRUS: W/Q), 167.

³³ Harley A. Notter, *Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939-1945* (Washington D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1949), 280.

³⁴ FO: North American, vol. III, 374. November 7, 1943 Halifax memo to Eden.

position during the Second World War than under Lloyd George in the First.”³⁵ This leeway, coupled with differing opinions on what strategy England should pursue, led to tensions between the PM and the Foreign Secretary until late 1944. As David Carlton observes, “It is possible to see the two men by 1941 as already more rivals than allies.”³⁶ This was not helped by Churchill’s intrigues about “restoring the old European system,” which “struck Eden,” related Craig, “as antiquated and unrealistic,” nor by the fact “[t]he PM generally cared little for diplomats,” lamented Cadogan, “or for the F.O. as an institution.”³⁷ Furthermore, the Foreign Secretary believed that the Americans would not be a reliable partner in the stabilization of postwar Europe.

Eden did all he could “to reduce the risks of a later withdrawal” of Americans troops; still, he was haunted by “the League of Nations” when Americans had abandoned the Continent.³⁸ Therefore, he wanted an understanding with the Russians to stabilize Europe and prevent the revival of the German military threat – at first. Harbutt points out, “[I]t was Eden rather than Churchill who was the principal actor” in fostering “the Anglo-Soviet alliance.”³⁹ The Foreign Secretary felt “that there was no reason why there should be any conflict of interest between the Soviet Government and ourselves” and “that policy [was] firmly based on history.”⁴⁰ The threat of Anglo-Soviet power would forestall any nascent Continental powers, leaving Britain the means to continue the Empire with its resources and trade, therefore sustaining their great power status. Plus, the Russians did not have South East Asian aspirations, unlike the Americans who he presumed would retreat back to the Western Hemisphere but continued to expand into the Pacific, a crucial part of the Empire’s trade networks.

Less concerned about American susceptibilities, Eden’s Anglo-Soviet understanding was based on spheres of influence in contrast to Churchill’s Anglo-American partnership founded on regionalism, which took into account America’s antipathy towards spheres of influence. A British-led Western-bloc – the Western Democracies of Europe – based on “a

³⁵ Alexander Cadogan and David Dilks, *The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, O.M., 1938-1945* 1st American ed. (New York: Putnam, 1972), 301.

³⁶ David Carlton, “Churchill and the Two ‘Evil Empires’” in *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, Sixth Series* 11 (2001), 94.

³⁷ Craig, 233-234; Cadogan and Dilks, 300.

³⁸ Anthony Eden. *The Reckoning, the Memoirs of Anthony Eden, Earl of Avon 1897-1977* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), 598.

³⁹ Harbutt, 96.

⁴⁰ FO: General, vol. II, 285.

strong France” would reestablish a European balance of power with the Russians guiding Eastern European decision-making. Both British planners looked to past security systems. Where Churchill looked to the Concert to guide his planning, Eden hoped to finally achieve the collective security that failed to materialize during the interwar period. He pursued the same goals as Churchill just through different means, which ultimately allowed their planning to synchronize.

It was due to strategic differences between Churchill and Eden that two plans arose. The British pursued these plans simultaneously through 1943. Both were based on framing British interests as joint interests, either Anglo-American or Anglo-Soviet, through directing their combinations diplomacy with the non-consulted party. Acting as intermediaries and framing would be features of Britain’s postwar planning diplomatic strategy throughout the war. However, working at cross purposes undermined each other’s planning, which was revealed at the meetings in 1943. These meetings caused both men to alter their initial strategies, i.e., evolve their positions. With the PM and the Foreign Secretary adjusting their planning in 1944, it is difficult to determine the British strategy for Yalta. Therefore, ascertaining how and why their positions evolved becomes even more important. Only through discerning these factors can an understanding of their priorities be discovered, the major factor in determining a strategy. As Britain’s strategy is revealed, it exposes how they used the dynamic momentum of the negotiations to reduce the options available to the senior parties – US and USSR – and caused their planning to evolve as well.

Stalin

Joseph V. Stalin (1878-1953) was a suspicious person, if not outright paranoid. As his wartime number two, V.M. Molotov remembered, ‘Stalin was extraordinarily suspicious of everyone around him.’⁴¹ Psychological analysis from afar is dubious, but it is clear that the autocrat’s upbringing and rise to power left him less trusting than his Big Three counterparts. As Roy Medvedev stresses, the Marshal became “an extremely secretive person[;] he never told anyone his true intentions.”⁴² Control over those around him was his way of overcoming his distrust of people. As a result, power, not nationalism, nor idealism,

⁴¹ Felix Chuev, *Molotov Remembers: Inside Kremlin Politics Conversations with Felix Chuev*, trans. Albert Resis (Chicago: I.R. Dee, 1993), 224.

⁴² Roy Aleksandrovich Medvedev and George Shriver, *Let History Judge: The Origins and Consequences of Stalinism* Rev. and expanded ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), 537.

nor even revolutionary zeal, drove Stalin. After Vladimir Lenin's death, the Soviet leader slowly worked to his ultimate aim – unchecked power.

In pursuit of unlimited power, “[h]e aimed at breaking up groups or cliques who might,” declares Keith Eubanks, “build a rival political organization.”⁴³ Stalin was able to defeat his enemies by compiling information against them and destroying them with it when the time was right.⁴⁴ Furthermore, as Reynolds exposes, “he always had an inferiority complex” about his rural upbringing and his “lack of formal education,” which led him to be “deeply xenophobic” and eventually manifested itself in the dictator “lashing out at signs of Russian subservience.”⁴⁵ His thinking was, therefore, influenced by a desire for unlimited power coupled with the need to see Russia on par with or greater than the Western capitalist powers. Zubok describes this thinking as “a combination of insecurity and wide ranging aspirations.”⁴⁶ Thus, the Russian ruler's postwar planning is defined by the interplay between his security concerns and his aspirations for greater control.

The past was Stalin's guide to the questions that the war thrust upon him. Simon Sebag Montefiore notes, “He regarded Ivan the Terrible as his true alter ego, his ‘teacher[,]’ something he revealed constantly to comrades.”⁴⁷ He tried to replicate the rule of the great leaders of Russia's past – Ivan, Peter, and Catherine – because “Stalin assigned an inordinate significance to the role of personality in politics,” asserts Mastny.⁴⁸ Yet, as the editor of his letters emphasizes, “Stalin was a believer.”⁴⁹ He was devoted to communism and accepted as true that it would ultimately prevail worldwide. Still, Geoffrey Roberts observes, “Stalin did not see his ideological policy as incompatible with his security policy.”⁵⁰ Zubok states, the Marshal “transform[ed] the international communist ideology into an imperial, statist one,

⁴³ Keith Eubanks, *Summit At Teberan* (New York: W. Morrow, 1985), 217.

⁴⁴ Whenever a Soviet official fell from power, Stalin would send his henchmen to collect all the papers in said official's dacha with the aim of repressing any negative information about himself and to hold, until needed, any negative information on other Soviet officials to use in eliminating them if they gained too much independent power.

⁴⁵ Reynolds, *Summits*, 115.

⁴⁶ V.M. Zubok, *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev* (Chapel Hill: North Carolina Press, 2009), 32.

⁴⁷ Simon Sebag Montefiore, *Stalin: The Court of the Red Tsar* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2003), 177-178.

⁴⁸ Vojtech Mastny, *Russia's Road to the Cold* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), 48.

⁴⁹ Lars T Lih., Oleg V Naumov, L Kosheleva, and O. V Khlevniuk, *Stalin's Letters to Molotov, 1925-1936* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995) 62.

⁵⁰ Geoffrey Roberts, *Stalin's War: From World War to Cold War, 1939-1953* (New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 2006), 231.

rooted more in Russian history than in Comintern Slogans.”⁵¹ He also realized that ideology could be used as a cover for his personal aims.

The prime example of Stalin’s use of ideology to cloud his actual aim (sole control the Soviet state) was the Purges. The Purges were a series of show-trials that took place during the late 1930s, ostensibly against enemies of the state. They were aimed “mainly at political opponents” but were “broadly focused on social opposition,” specifically “the Kulaks” and “ethnic groups that might threaten the regime,” notes Gellately.⁵² Stalin felt he would need to eliminate individuals holding important positions if they were not loyal to him. He spent the 1930s removing people who had a potential to create opposing power bases, especially in strategic points such as Leningrad and Kiev. Even the dictator’s former friends like Sergey Kirov, Lev Kamenev and Leningrad Party boss Grigory Zinoviev were not immune.⁵³ Eliminating these people and groups removed any potential independent power bases that might arise to upset the autocrat’s hold on power.

An excuse for why the country had not succeeded as well as predicted in the first two five-year plans – state-guided economic programs – was also provided by the Purges. “[Stalin] typically blamed his own miscalculations on scapegoats while raising the alarm about the country security,” declares Mastny.⁵⁴ The Marshal blamed saboteurs and ‘wreckers’ for non-fulfillment; ‘an enemy of the people is not only one who does sabotage but one who doubts the righteousness of the party line.’ He finished with, “[W]e must liquidate them.”⁵⁵ The essential aspect, however, was to eliminate the people who did not follow ‘the party line.’ As the Italian Marxist Paulo Spraino asserts, Stalin assumed “he had to kill the spirit of old Bolshevism,” which meant eliminating “the old Bolshevik leading group,” especially Nikolai Bukharin.⁵⁶ An additional benefit of this process was that a cult of personality formed around the dictator, which he cultivated to enable his one-man rule.

Stalin was a smart tactician during his rise to power; he was able to control (through sycophants) all of the institutions of the Soviet state. Amidst the Purges, he helped usher

⁵¹ Vladislav Zubok, “Stalin’s Plans and Russian Archives,” *Diplomatic History*, 21, no. 2 (Spring 1997): 296. The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR).

⁵² Gellately, 34.

⁵³ Montefiore, 112ff. It is not coincidental that Kirov was killed just weeks after he was the star of the Seventeenth Party Congress, the Premier Soviet event of the 1930s.

⁵⁴ Vojtech Mastny, *The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 13.

⁵⁵ Montefiore, 243. Stalin quoted.

⁵⁶ Paolo Spraino, *Stalin and the European Communists* (London: Verso, 1985), 46.

through a new Soviet Constitution (1937) that centralized most functions of the state under the auspice of the Central Committee, the leading body of the Politburo. By the time the war had begun, the Soviet leader had consolidated all political power in the Central Committee and assumed its chairmanship. Thus, “During Stalin’s lifetime, Soviet policy was for all intents and purposes his policy,” contends Mastny.⁵⁷

The Marshal was not challenged in this process because “[t]hose who were capable of such an act were stopped not so much by fear for their lives as by fear of the social consequences, which could not be predicted in the conditions of the cult,” declares Medvedev. He further claims, “Stalin’s cult of personality was strongest in the party stratum of the working class, among the new young intelligentsia, and most especially in the party and state apparatus, particularly the apparatus that took shape after the repression of 1936-38.”⁵⁸ These groups made up the sycophants who instilled Stalinism throughout the Soviet system. It was a well-thought-out and methodical approach that allowed him to establish his one-man rule through removing rivals and potential power bases as well as controlling the USSR’s strategic points. The length and methodical nature of this process cannot be overstated while investigating the Russian ruler’s postwar planning.

Stalin thought his domestic tactics and policies could be transferred to the international arena. His security scheme planning, domestically and internationally, was based on the same principles: eliminate those who could potentially rise up against him or create independent power bases and hold strategic points. The Marshal divulged his concerns about vital spots to his interpreter, Valentin Berezhkov, after the war, “[Russia] must have the opportunity of occupying the most vital strategic points.”⁵⁹ Holding strategic points either personally or with dependents and sycophants was the last principle that informed Stalin’s postwar planning.

It could be that Stalin always planned on pursuing a unilateral (non-Big Three) postwar plan. As Nikita Khrushchev recalled, “His naked power and unlimited, unchallenged authority went to his head.”⁶⁰ Yet, this opinion seems wanting. A better explanation is Stalin’s main underlying interest was the preservation of his own power with the security of

⁵⁷ Mastny, *Cold War and Soviet Insecurity*, 191.

⁵⁸ Medvedev and Shriver, 620, 716.

⁵⁹ V. Berezhkov, *History in the Making: Memoirs of World War II Diplomacy* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1983), 294.

⁶⁰ Nikita S. Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers*, trans. Strobe Talbott (Boston: Little Brown, 1970), 62.

the Soviet state interlinked with his personal power. As Maisky stated “the principal objective of the Soviet Government was security,” and Stalin subsumes “everything to the preservation of his own power,” noted Bukharin.⁶¹ The positions that he adopted were influenced first and foremost, therefore, by security concerns.

The Soviets needed to be systematic in their expansionism, according to the dictator. He felt being too expansionist *a lá* Hitler would be the catalyst for the West “to combine together.”⁶² The fear of a capitalistic combination aimed at the Soviet Union was a major concern “reinforced by Leninist assumptions about the behavior of capitalist nations,” emphasizes Marvin Leffler.⁶³ Thus, the intertwining of Stalin’s security concerns and the interests of communism are exposed. He concluded, as a result, that a methodical approach akin to his takeover of the USSR was needed; collaboration with the allies would buy him time and resources. Therefore, the Marshal would only “reject collaboration with its Western Allies” if his “conditions” were not “accepted,” contends Eubanks.⁶⁴ The initial conditions were revealed immediately after the Soviet Union entered the war.

Stalin’s “worship of military might,” contends Mastny, stemmed from his belief that his strength at home and his country’s standing in the world were dictated by military prowess.⁶⁵ Therefore, when the Nazis launched their invasion and sent the Red Army reeling, the dictator felt his power threatened. However, almost immediately Churchill and Roosevelt dispatched envoys to Moscow to ascertain what help the Western powers could offer the fledging Soviet forces. The West’s offer of aid and a wartime alliance presented the Marshal with a way out of his predicament. They could provide the Russians the two things they needed the most at that time: supplies and a second front.⁶⁶ If the West armed the Red Army and opened a second front, Stalin’s power would be preserved and perhaps even enhanced. He would work with the West, ideology aside, if they supplied the Russians with these desperately needed elements.

⁶¹ United States Department of State, *Foreign relations of the United States. Diplomatic papers. The Conferences at Malta and Yalta 1945* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943), (hereafter referred to as FRUS: Yalta), 177. January 20, 1945 Harriman memo on conversation with Maisky; Robert V. Daniels, ed., *A Documentarian History of Communism*, vol. 1, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), 308. Bukharin quoted.

⁶² Lih, et al., 47. Stalin recap of Politburo meeting to Molotov.

⁶³ Melvyn P. Leffler, “Inside Enemy Archives: The Cold War Reopened: Review” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 75, No. 4 (Jul. - Aug., 1996), 125.

⁶⁴ Eubanks, 424.

⁶⁵ Mastny, *Cold War and Soviet Insecurity*, 16.

⁶⁶ Mastny, *Russia’s Road*, 49-55.

Western assistance to beat back the Nazi threat would allow Stalin time to achieve his main international security aims: incorporate vital border territories and dominate the regions surrounding the Soviet Union. In a failed attempt to stall Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union, Stalin authorized Molotov to sign an agreement with the Germans dividing Eastern Europe between them. The agreement, normally referred to as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, gave the Russians the territories in Eastern Europe they wanted to maintain possession of after the war – Eastern Poland, the Baltic States, parts of Romania and Hungary, etc. At numerous points, specifically at Teheran, Stalin specified the territories on his Eastern perimeter he felt must be incorporated into the Soviet State – the Kurile Islands, South Sakhalin, and the Ports of Arthur and Dairen.⁶⁷ His security scheme also needed the countries stretching from Korea to Finland, including strategic points such as the Baltic Straits, the Dardanelles, Manchuria, and the Polish plain, to be “friendly”.

What a “friendly” government meant to the autocrat was exposed during the Benes-Stalin talks in 1943. Edward Benes was the leader of Czechoslovakia during the war. “No other established leader was to play a more important role in the wartime Soviet designs,” declares Mastny.⁶⁸ Benes made a Faustian bargain with Stalin during these talks, which was the model for what the Marshal desired in a friendly leader. The Czech leader would act as a surrogate for the Russians inside Czechoslovakia; in return, they would restore the country to its pre-Munich borders.⁶⁹ In essence, Benes would be dependent on Soviet, specifically Stalin's, goodwill.

The Marshal was not naïve; a country might become “friendly” through dependence, but he would always have a military presence (threat) to make sure the country followed the Soviet Union's lead. Capitalist countries would have access to Eastern European markets,

⁶⁷ Chuev, 8. After Yalta, Stalin detailed to Molotov the exact territories he had desired; the list was consistent with the Marshal's demands throughout the war. “Let's see what we have here” he continued, “everything is all right to the north. Finland has offended us, so we moved the border from Leningrad. Baltic States – that's age-old Russian land! – and that's ours again. All Belorussians live together now, Ukrainians together, Moldavians together. It's okay to the west.” On the Eastern borders “What do we have there?” He then stated, “The Kuril[e] Islands belong to us now; Sakhalin is completely ours – you see, good! And Port Arthurs ours, and Dairen is ours and the Chinese Eastern railway is ours. China, Mongolia – everything is in order.”

⁶⁸ Mastny, *Russia's Road*, 59.

⁶⁹ Vojtech Mastny, “The Benes-Stalin-Molotov Conversations in December 1943: New Documents” in *Jahrbucher fur Geschichte Osteuropas, Neue Folge* 20, no. 3 (September 1972): 367-402. A picture of a statesman with a similar blind spot to Faust is presented. Benes in a combination of pressure from the exigent circumstances of the war and his personal hubris decided that the agreement with Stalin was worth the potential cost. Like Faust, the Czech President failed to comprehend what the deal actually entailed until it was too late.

but these governments would orient themselves towards the Soviet Union. The dictator told Yugoslavian rebel leader Josip Tito, '[W]e deem it necessary to explain that we do not plan the Sovietization of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, but instead, prefer to maintain contacts with Democratic Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, which will be allies of the USSR.'⁷⁰ Stalin believed in time the countries around him would become communist, as Leninist doctrine taught him. However, their orientation towards the Soviet Union either through dependence or fear was the main concern, especially for the successful implementation of his preferred military/security policy: defense by depth.

Alexander I had dispatched Napoleon when he invaded Russia by employing the strategy known as defense by depth. It was founded on the concept of attrition; invaders would be beaten back by a grinding defensive assault across vast lands. Russia's immense territories would allow this to occur before an invading force reached its heartland. Gabriel Gordestky observes, "Defense through strategic retreat and exploitation of depth" was the centerpiece of Soviet military strategy.⁷¹ Stalin took heed of Russia's past accumulation of territory for the depth part of defense by depth. As a result, "the geographical legacy of czarist Russia," notes Zubok, became a "central source of Stalin's foreign-policy."⁷² Plus, as State Department Official Chip Bohlen emphasized, "Underlying Soviet fears was a belief that in important matters the capitalist nations would join despite their rivalries, to preserve the economic system."⁷³ The friendly countries would be allies in this potential bipolar war while still providing the land where the battles of attrition could take place as they had during Alexander's time, once again revealing the interconnectivity of Stalin's lessons from Russia's past and his belief in communist doctrine.

With Western assistance and the control of strategic points, either through incorporation or dependency and fear, Stalin could establish his international security scheme. Therefore, his postwar planning evolved as he tried to figure out the best way to obtain what he deemed was necessary for the establishment of this security scheme.

⁷⁰ Geoffrey Roberts, *Stalin's War*, 245. April 1944 Stalin letter to Tito.

⁷¹ Gabriel Gorodetsky, *Grand Delusions: Stalin and the German Invasion of Russia* (New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 1999), 209.

⁷² Zubok, *Failed Empire*, 19. The lands he tried to acquire were the Russian lands held during Alexander's reign. Plus, the territories he wanted to dominate were in the sphere of influence of said Russian empire.

⁷³ Charles Bohlen, *Witness to History* (New York: Norton, 1973), 60.

The main person tapped to assist the dictator's postwar planning was V.M. Molotov, the Foreign Commissar. It is hard to discern whether he agreed with the direction of Stalin's planning. As Cadogan noted, Molotov was opaque because "his technique [was] stubbornly and woodenly to repeat his own point of view and to ask innumerable questions of his interlocutors."⁷⁴ Furthermore, the Commissar's only postwar comments were a series of interviews with Felix Chuev. He kept the Stalinist line, but it is unclear if it was due to his own heartfelt beliefs or fear of further repression.⁷⁵ Still, unlike the rivalry between Eden and Churchill, "For Stalin, Molotov was a perfect choice, having no greater ambition than to serve his master faithfully," declares Mastny.⁷⁶ Therefore, the two men worked towards the same consistent ends at all times, which gave Russian planning greater uniformity than their Western counterparts, an often overlooked aspect of WWII diplomacy.

Roosevelt

Franklin D. Roosevelt (1882-1945) also used lessons from the past to guide his future actions. His education under the tutelage of Endicott Peabody and the events surrounding the failure to ratify the League of Nations Covenant guided his thoughts about the postwar order. Peabody was the headmaster at Gorton where FDR was boarded as a youth. The headmaster preached civil service and the duty of the Christian community, especially those born into prosperous circumstance, to help the less fortunate – Noblesse Oblige. Roosevelt remembered fondly, "It was a blessing in my life to have the privilege of [Peabody's] guiding hand."⁷⁷ The headmaster's beliefs heavily influenced all of FDR's thinking about state-to-state relations.

Peabody's teachings were fundamentally important in the formation of the President's postwar plans; still, "There was not a motivating force in all Roosevelt's wartime political policy stronger than the determination to prevent repetition of [Wilson's] mistakes," remembered Robert Sherwood.⁷⁸ George Herring notes, "Like Wilson, [FDR] firmly

⁷⁴ Cadogan and Dilks, 189.

⁷⁵ After the war, Molotov was expelled from the party because Stalin thought he was too cozy with Western diplomats and that the Molotovs were pro-Jewish. His wife was even imprisoned.

⁷⁶ Mastny, *Russia's Road*, 24.

⁷⁷ James McGregor Burns and Upton Sinclair, *Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1956), 16. Roosevelt quoted.

⁷⁸ Robert Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History* (New York: Harper Brothers, 1948), 227.

believed in the superiority of American values and institutions.”⁷⁹ Furthermore, noted British Ambassador Stanford Cripps, “Roosevelt always [saw] international problems through the spectacles of American domestic politics,”⁸⁰ similar to the former President. Plainly stated, instead of seeing the intricacies of international politics, they believed that the same dynamics existed in all political fields as those that were at work in American politics.

Roosevelt, however, gleaned a crucial lesson from watching the small League-created nations’ – Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the Baltic states – failure to find a niche in interwar Europe. It was not political self-determination that was the problem, as FDR believed the Baltic States’ ‘plebiscite was on the whole one of the few successful outcomes of the Versailles Treaty.’⁸¹ Instead, it was the failure of the small European states to find economic viability that was at the heart of their problems. “For many years after the World War blind economic selfishness in most countries” argued Roosevelt, “resulted in a destructive mine-field of trade restrictions which blocked the channels of commerce among nations. This policy was one of the contributing causes of [the] existing war.”⁸² The lack of economic independence allowed these small states to be manipulated by the major powers and eventually overrun by the Germans. Therefore, unlike Wilson’s desire to spread American political institutions, FDR felt he needed to instill American economic concepts, in particular his New Deal program worldwide – an International New Deal. Thus, Rooseveltian Americanism – the desire to reshape international institutions along American institutional forms – was focused on economics.

The Roosevelt administration concluded, “[T]he next peace must take into account the facts of economics; otherwise, it will serve as the seed bed for aggression.”⁸³ The President felt the implementation of the New Deal was what allowed American economic stability to reassert itself after the Great Depression. Furthermore, the same unregulated self-interest that destroyed American economic foundations – ‘destructive trade restrictions,

⁷⁹. George Herring, *From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 546.

⁸⁰. Richard Stafford Cripps and Gabriel Gordestky, *Stafford Cripps In Moscow, 1940-1942: Diaries and Papers* (London: Vallentine Mitchell, 2007) 179.

⁸¹. Kimball, Warren. *The Juggler: Franklin Roosevelt as a Statesman* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), 27. FDR quoted.

⁸². FO: North American, vol. I, 39. July 2, 1940 FDR Speech.

⁸³. Alfred E. Eckes, *A Search for Solvency: Bretton Woods and the International Monetary System, 1941-1971* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1975), 34. Wallace quoted.

born largely of greed and unreasoning fear’ – was plaguing the world.⁸⁴ He, therefore, “desired to export to all of the world the economic and social goals and techniques that had done so much to raise standards of living, cultural as well as material, in the United States,” declared William Range.⁸⁵ FDR believed these techniques would unlock the world’s latent productive potential as the New Deal had done throughout the US.

The goal of the International New Deal was to export what Charles Maier has termed the “politics of productivity,” which promoted “a supposedly impartial efficiency.” The plan was “to transform political issues into problems of output,” which could be more readily visualized and solved.⁸⁶ New markets and greater world purchasing power would result from the tapping of the world’s latent potential, which would increase its economic stability and, therefore, promote worldwide security. At the same time these countries would orient themselves towards the US increasing America’s economic vitality. Thus, the underlying interest guiding FDR’s postwar planning was spreading his concepts of liberal capitalism typified by the New Deal.

His major foreign-policy initiative prior to the war – the Good Neighbor Policy – was Roosevelt’s guide for the process instilling the New Deal’s economic foundation worldwide. ‘If ever a policy paid dividends the Good Neighbor policy had,’ stressed US Ambassador Adolf Berle.⁸⁷ Under-Secretary Sumner Welles proclaimed, “The practical application of the Good Neighbor Policy had worked a material change in the sentiments of the other American Republics toward the United States.”⁸⁸ The Good Neighbor Policy was the first application of what Roosevelt wanted to do at the end of the war: create a climate where the Great Powers aided the advancement of the lesser powers of their region – Noblesse Oblige. FDR told Churchill, ‘I am firmly of the belief that if we are to arrive at a stable peace it must involve the development of backward countries.’⁸⁹ Furthermore, he argued, “The policy of the Good Neighbor has shown success in the hemisphere of the Americas,” which made “its extension to the whole world seems to be the logical next

⁸⁴ FO: General, vol. I, 376. May 17, 1941 Roosevelt speech.

⁸⁵ William Range, *Franklin D. Roosevelt’s World Order* (Athens GA: University of Georgia Press, 1959), 137.

⁸⁶ Charles Maier, “The Politics of Productivity: Foundations of Americans International Economic Policy after World War II” in *International Organization*, 31, no. 4, (Autumn 1977), 607.

⁸⁷ Fredrick B. Pike. *FDR’s Good Neighbor Policy: Sixty Years of Generally Gentle Changes* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1995), 257. Adolf Berle quoted.

⁸⁸ Sumner Welles, *The Time for Decision* 9th ed. (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1944), 207.

⁸⁹ Elliott Roosevelt, *As He Saw It* (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1946), 36.

step.”⁹⁰ The influence of Peabody’s teachings is readily visible; the greater country’s duty was to assist the economic modernization of the lesser countries instead of exploiting their greater standing to impose trade regimes advantageous only to themselves.

The implementation of American free-trade, an international Export-Import Bank, and American control of relief and rehabilitation would lay the foundation for the International New Deal. American institutions and socio-economic principles would provide the guide for the great powers to act as Good Neighbors. The Good Neighbor Policy had shown the success of Export-Import loans, especially in facilitating the establishment of American-styled institutions. Fomenting the creation of similar economic foundations meant the aided country would orient their economy towards the United States. As the State Department noted, “American aid ... would not only gain the good-will of the populaces involved, but would also help bring about conditions which would permit the adoption of the relatively liberal policies of this nation.”⁹¹

In Brazil, for instance, loans from the Bank helped create a steel plant as well as increase rubber and oil production. All three of these greatly benefited the country while orienting Brazil towards America.⁹² As the President of Brazil, Getulio Vargas claimed, ‘Brazil would follow the lead of the United States,’ emphasizing, ‘on all matters.’⁹³ Vargas became quite close to FDR as both men realized the benefits of working together. Brazil was the shining example of the Good Neighbor Policy’s successes and the potential of an International New Deal. In 1936 Roosevelt even “declared Vargas the co-author of the New Deal,”⁹⁴ highlights Frank McCann.

Vargas throughout most of his time in power was a dictator; however, FDR slowly weaned him away from these policies, and near the end of the war, the Brazilian leader called an election without himself as a candidate.⁹⁵ In Vargas, Roosevelt saw a dictator he had molded into something akin to a liberal capitalist. Roosevelt’s success in transforming Vargas’ thinking gave the President hope that through the use of American resources and his

⁹⁰ FO: North American, vol. III, 224. FDR Speech to Congress September 17, 1943 quoted.

⁹¹ FRUS: Yalta, 235. January 1945 Yalta briefing book on the Poland and the Balkans. This concept was the way the Americans envisioned for instilling Americanism abroad during the reconstruction period.

⁹² Frank D. McCann, *The Brazilian-American Alliance, 1937-1945* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1974), 79-81.

⁹³ Ibid, 342. November 1944 Vargas memo to FDR.

⁹⁴ Ibid, 9.

⁹⁵ Vargas came back as president in the 1950s through a democratic election, which further exposed the impact of FDR's relationship.

own personable style he could mold other totalitarian leaders, especially Stalin, into liberal capitalists. As Edward Stettinius related, “President Roosevelt was well aware of the nature of the Soviet society.” However, “[h]e knew that no society was static, and he believed that the United States could do much, through firmness, patience, and understanding, over a period of time in dealing with the Soviet Union to influence its evolution away from dictatorship and tyranny in the direction of a free, tolerant, and peaceful society.”⁹⁶ This belief was helped by a report by the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) prior to Teheran which saw “proof” of “fundamental changes in Russian communism.”⁹⁷ Still, FDR was not naïve enough to believe the Russian leader would be as amenable as the Brazilian President.

Neither the British nor Russians would be particularly enthusiastic about the establishment of American-styled institutions or socio-economic principles. It would make it more likely that governments who followed this course would orient themselves to the Americans, further accelerating British decline and forestalling Russian growth. The President felt that he could, like he had with domestic friends and foes alike, “persuade, cajole, and manipulate people rather than browbeat or intimidate them” into acquiescing to his plans, notes H.W. Brands.⁹⁸ At first, FDR thought the British would work with him towards his economic aims. However, their natural desire to protect the Empire, specifically colonialism and discriminatory trade coupled with the Soviet Union’s entrance into the anti-Axis coalition, caused an alteration of his planning. Therefore, the International New Deal had to be established by directing the victorious coalition’s transition into the postwar.

During WWII Americans held a romantic view of China and its place in the world, encouraged by years of propaganda about its Christian and democratic potential. It was not, however, this mythic China that appealed to Roosevelt. He considered “relations with China to be one of utmost importance to this country” because it could be a bulwark against Anglo-Soviet expansion in the Far East.⁹⁹ More importantly, they would be a dependent vote in the victorious power directorate, at first the Big Four, later the UNO’s Executive Council. The President felt he would always have China’s vote in his pocket whenever he

⁹⁶ Edward Stettinius, Jr., *Roosevelt and The Russians: The Yalta Conference* (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1949), 324. Stettinius was the first Lend-Lease administrator and the second wartime Secretary of State.

⁹⁷ Gellately, 74. Summer 1943 OSS memo quoted.

⁹⁸ H.W. Brands, *Traitor to His Class* (New York: Doubleday, 2008), 670.

⁹⁹ Franklin D. Roosevelt, *F.D.R.: His Personal Letters* [1st ed.], ed. Elliott Roosevelt (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1947), 1529-30. April 18, 1944 FDR memo to Donald Nelson.

needed it. As US Ambassador to China Charles Gauss wrote, “In the matter of world problems, China is disposed to follow our lead.”¹⁰⁰ It was for this reason as well as the fact “the American Chiefs of Staff were convinced that support of China was essential to [US] security and [the] success of the Allied cause” that caused Roosevelt to spend much of the war promoting and propping up the Chinese Nationalist Government and their leader Chiang Kai-shek.¹⁰¹ From 1942 onwards, FDR focused on placing the Sino-American combination atop the anti-Axis coalition. The evolution of his postwar planning reflected this overriding concern.

Besides being a dependent vote, the main role the Chinese were to play in FDR’s planning was leading the trusteeships for Southeast Asia. Through leading the region’s trusteeships, China would become “the principle stabilizing force in the Far East.”¹⁰² The President’s concept was different than the League of Nations’ mandates, which were controlled by a single power with no international oversight. Roosevelt’s trusteeship idea vacillated and is hard to define. Yet, they were always designed to “foster progress toward a higher standard of living” and “the right to independence,” declared Stettinius.¹⁰³ International control (a cover for US oversight) was the mechanism to make sure these goals were achieved. “There is no question in my mind that the old relationship ceased to exist 10 or 20 years ago and that no substitute has yet been worked out except the American policy of eventual freedom for the Philippines,” contended the President.¹⁰⁴ The “treatment of the Philippines” was the “desirable type of attitude toward dependent areas” and was the basis of the trusteeships.¹⁰⁵ Also, “certain trusteeships to be exercised by the United Nations where stability of government for one reason or another cannot be at once assured” could provide structure temporarily, which FDR thought would be needed during the transitory period.¹⁰⁶

The President was working under the assumption “everything should have relation to [an] interim or emergency period of unspecified duration, during which permanent

¹⁰⁰. United States Department of State, *Foreign relations of the United States. Diplomatic papers. China: World War II* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1947), (hereafter referred to as FRUS: China), 561.

¹⁰¹. William D. Leahy, *I Was There* (New York: McGraw, Hill, 1950), 202.

¹⁰². FRUS: Yalta, 353.

¹⁰³. FO: North American, docs, vol. V, 100. Stettinius speech to San Francisco Conference quoted.

¹⁰⁴. Churchill, Roosevelt, and Kimball, 400.

¹⁰⁵. FRUS: Yalta, 74. January 13, 1945 Pasvolsky memo on meeting with Gromyko.

¹⁰⁶. Roosevelt, *F.D.R.: His Personal Letters*, 1372. November 24, 1942 FDR letter to General Smuts.

structures could be shaped and built,” Churchill told Eden.¹⁰⁷ FDR declared, “The central idea involve[d] a situation where there should be four policemen in the world – the United States, Britain, Russia and China – charged with the responsibility of keeping peace,” during the transition period, which later developed into the permanent members of the UNO’s Executive Council.¹⁰⁸ If everything worked out as hoped, FDR would establish the International New Deal throughout the world during this period.

The most influential member of Roosevelt’s cabinet in regards to postwar planning was the first wartime Secretary of State, Cordell Hull. “That Hull was a minor figure under Roosevelt is a myth without basis in fact,” emphasizes Gabriel Kolko.¹⁰⁹ As Kimball states, “At Moscow,” the Premier wartime meeting for the Big Three’s diplomatic corps, “Hull represented not only his views on the questions of organizing the postwar world, he spoke for Franklin Roosevelt as well.”¹¹⁰ More importantly Roosevelt’s planning was based on postponement; however, the Secretary wanted agreements to be reached before the end of the war. His drive allowed the Americans to use their leverage at its greatest point. The decision to pursue their agenda earlier is Hull’s greatest legacy. His principle concern was establishing free-trade worldwide – the Americans’ commercial policy.

During the war, Hull gave a number of speeches on how protectionism, especially in its extreme nationalistic form, was the root cause of WWII. In one such speech, he proclaimed, ‘Extreme nationalism must not again be permitted to express itself in excessive trade restrictions. Nondiscrimination in international commercial relations must be the rule.’¹¹¹ Roosevelt was in agreement on the need for free trade. He declared, “The United States must continue its leadership in the preservation and promotion of liberal economic policies. Only through that leadership can this country fulfill its responsibility in the rebuilding of a world economy from the chaos into which it has been plunged by destructive trade restrictions.”¹¹² The Secretary’s other goal was to produce a beneficial arrangement

¹⁰⁷. Churchill, Roosevelt, and Kimball, 448-49. Churchill memo to Attlee and Eden.

¹⁰⁸. Roosevelt, *F.D.R.: His Personal Letters*, 1366-67.

¹⁰⁹. Gabriel Kolko, *The Politics of War: The World and United States Foreign Policy 1943-1945* 2nd ed. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1990), 244.

¹¹⁰. Kimball, *Juggler*, 93.

¹¹¹. Paul Preston, Michael Partridge, and M. L. Dockrill. *British Documents On Foreign Affairs--Reports and Papers From the Foreign Office Confidential Print. Part III, From 1940 Through 1945. Series A The Soviet Union and Finland*, 6 Vol. (Bethesda, MD: University Publications of America, 1998), (hereafter referred to as FO: Russia), vol. 1, 375. Halifax memo to Eden on a speech by Hull.

¹¹². FO: General, vol. I, 376. Roosevelt Trade Speech quoted.

between raw material countries and producing countries where the latter did not exploit the former, which aligned perfectly with Rooseveltian Noblesse Oblige.

The British were the main impediment to the implementation of Hull's concept of free trade due to England's desire to uphold the Imperial preference. It was designed to benefit the nations inside the Empire by providing free trade inside the Empire and erecting tariffs on non-Empire goods. "[The] United States['] policy of multilateralism and [the] United Kingdom[']s policy of bilateralism were in conflict," lamented the Secretary, "and the United States was the sufferer."¹¹³ As Welles claimed, 'the acceptance of the role of nondiscrimination' through ending the 'application of the most-favored-nation principle' was needed for a 'multilateral functioning of commercial operations.'¹¹⁴ Thus, only through the removal of the Imperial Preference could America's version of free trade be established. The Imperial Preference and American free-trade would be at the forefront of the first major diplomatic issue of wartime diplomacy – Lend-Lease.

Before discussing Lend-Lease, it is important to mention two other highly influential advisers – Harry Hopkins and Henry Morgenthau. Secretary Morgenthau was able to expand Treasury's role in foreign affairs because of his close friendship with FDR. "Roosevelt was the older brother Morgenthau never had," notes Beschloss.¹¹⁵ As a result, noticed Grace Tully, the President's personal secretary, "[Morgenthau] probably had more personal appointments with the Boss than any other Cabinet member."¹¹⁶ He took the lead on monetary policy, which was the other side of the coin needed to implement FDR's International New Deal. According to Treasury Official Harry Dexter White, America wanted to coordinate worldwide monetary policy to prevent 'economic warfare' and 'foster sound monetary policies throughout the world.'¹¹⁷ The implementation of American monetary policy would reestablish a currency standard (foundation) so as to avoid the volatile currency swings endemic in the 1930s caused by purposeful or forced currency depreciation as the market collapsed and WWI reparations payments became untenable. The latter problem was heavily influential on the Treasury Department's planning for postwar

¹¹³. FO: North America, vol. I, 46.

¹¹⁴. FO: General, vol. I, 212. Welles quoted.

¹¹⁵. Beschloss, 47.

¹¹⁶. Grace Tully, *F.D.R., My Boss* (New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1949), 192.

¹¹⁷. *Benn Steil, The Battle of Bretton Woods: John Maynard Keynes, Harry Dexter White, and the Making of a New World Order* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013), 302. White quoted.

Germany – the Morgenthau Plan. In 1942 and 1943 the State Department was the department in control of postwar planning, 1944 saw Treasury assume this role with their victory at Bretton Woods, until Morgenthau overreached with the his German plan, allowing State to reassert itself.

Hopkins was FDR's Molotov, a devoted mouthpiece who always toed the President's line, constantly advancing his ideas and policies. "Roosevelt's personal involvement in policy was often," notes Kimball, "channeled through his closest adviser and aide, Harry Hopkins – a man who shared or accepted most of the President's assumptions."¹¹⁸ Along with Hopkins, Hull, and Morgenthau, FDR appointees Harriman, Stettinius, as well as the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS: George Marshall, Ernest King, Hap Arnold, and William Leahy) were the President's closest advisors during his postwar planning. Though they would argue their points, they always deferred to Roosevelt. As Leahy points out, "There were two men at the top who really fought out and finally agreed on the major moves that led to victory. They were Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill. They really ran the war. Of course, they had to have some people like us to help them, but we were just artisans building definite patterns of strategy from the rough blueprints handed to us by our respective Commander-in-Chiefs."¹¹⁹ Thus, FDR, like Churchill and Stalin, was in complete control of American postwar planning up to and including Yalta.

¹¹⁸. Kimball, *Juggler*, 9.

¹¹⁹. Leahy, 106.

Chapter Two: Unequal Partners

A major factor that affects every aspect of a negotiation is the contracting parties' standing – the status of a party vis-à-vis the other party(s) with whom it is negotiating. Obviously, greater standing leads to more leverage. However, leverage, or power, has other benefits. “[P]ower,” declares de Cremer and Pillutla, “is associated with a greater feeling of freedom” to maneuver and make deals because there exists “a sense that fewer obstacles are placed in [the party’s] way.”¹ The British were unable to increase their standing in any meaningful way during the war. Once they realized the implications of their weaker position, Britain had to find a way to overcome the greater number of obstacles (lack of available options) they faced in comparison to their allies.

In a wartime coalition, men and resources dictate the standing a country or group occupies inside said coalition. To ascertain the Big Three’s respective positions inside the Grand Alliance, it is necessary to determine who could place the most soldiers and supplies into the field. Quickly after the fall of France, the British realized that “our resources and strength [manpower],” wrote Churchill, “unaided will not be sufficient to produce a world-result of a satisfactory and lasting character.”² Sympathetic to their plight, the Roosevelt administration had tried throughout late 1939 and 1940 to aid the British cause. Hopkins ‘was impressed by the determination to resist,’ recalled Harriman, ‘but [was] appalled by their lack of means to do so.’³ Besides Britain’s internal lack of resources, arming England was hampered by America’s ineffective and detrimental neutrality legislation. In early 1941, however, the President concocted a scheme to add the full resources of the United States to the war effort: Lend-Lease.

Lend-Lease

Dubbed “An Act to Further Promote the Defense of the United States” and denoted H.R. 1776, once Lend-Lease passed, the Americans became the main supplier of Allied matériel. “[T]he obvious” reason for the bill was “to keep Britain in the war,” emphasizes Brand, but equally important, it helped the Americans become “the arsenal of

¹ De Cremer and Pillutla, 123.

² Churchill, Roosevelt, and Kimball, 115.

³ Harriman and Abel, 12.

democracy,” with the leverage and standing that entailed.⁴ Once the US took over as the main supplier, they permanently altered the balance of power within the anti-Axis coalition.

Britain’s chief economist and lead economic negotiator John Maynard Keynes was worried about the effect of the bill on British geo-political standing. He feared “the fact that the distribution of effort between ourselves and our allies has been of this character” meant the Lend-Lease setup “leaves us far worse off, when the sources of assistance dry up, than if the roles had been reversed.”⁵ Recall, providing money and matériel was England’s traditional role in coalition warfare, granting them leverage inside the alliance and increasing their diplomatic options. In previous wars, their aid had made up for the fact that the island nation alone could not provide soldiers in the same numbers as their Continental allies. In this war, however, the British were desperate for supplies. They had accrued huge debts during the first two years of the war. Making matters worse, the Empire’s resource networks were shut down due to Axis pressure. Axis threats forced many colonial armies to stay in their colony, particularly in India, depriving Britain of these men while consuming much-needed resources. Thus, the coalition dynamics changed in a manner unfavorable to the maintenance of their geo-political standing through England’s traditional means.

While Roosevelt was using the analogy of lending a neighbor a hose to save his house, Hull wanted to make sure Lend-Lease would usher in his concepts of free trade (multilateralism). “The State Department,” remembered Halifax, “sees American economic collaboration with the rest of the world as an essential stabilizing feature in the post-war era,” i.e., the American belief that economic vitality was the basis for international security.⁶ According to Welles, “International commerce can only fulfill this role effectively if it allows each nation to have normal access to the resources of the whole world.”⁷ They believed that the British Commonwealth system based on the Imperial Preference had blocked American business from lucrative markets and key resources. The Imperial system, according to Hull, was “the greatest injury that was done to this country in a commercial way.”⁸ It had,

⁴ Brands, 577.

⁵ Peter F. Clarke, *The Last Thousand Days of the British Empire: The Demise of a Superpower* (London: Penguin Books, 2007), 29. Keynes quoted.

⁶ FO: General, vol. IV, 226. June 8, 1944 Halifax memo to Eden.

⁷ FO: General, vol. I, 12. March 9, 1940 Welles memo to Paul Reynaud.

⁸ FO: North American, vol. I, 58. Hull quoted.

however, sustained and expanded the vast trade networks that helped to maintain the Empire's great power status during the chaos of the previous half-century.

Differences over commercial (trade) policy remained a point of division between the parties throughout the war. The State Department felt "an essential condition" of the postwar economic system was "the full backing and partnership of Britain in any plans to prevent autocratical (sic) tendencies from reasserting themselves."⁹ To induce the British to adhere to American policy, Hull made sure to include Article VII, "the elimination of all forms of discriminatory treatment in international commerce," in the Master Lend Lease Agreement.¹⁰ This article was aimed directly at ending the Imperial Preference and to institute multilateralism. "Keynes knew that Article VII" was "an end to Imperial Preference," notes Steil.¹¹ Still, the British were in desperate need of supplies, increasing American leverage, and the negotiations were bilateral, eliminating the use of Britain's preferred intra-coalition tactics – framing and acting as its intermediary.

At first, the English were elated when news of the passage of Lend-Lease hit their shores. Churchill famously stated, "The lend and lease bill must be regarded, without question, as the most unsordid act in the whole of recorded history."¹² Furthermore, "once it was accepted," he claimed, "it transformed immediately the whole position. It made us free to shape by agreement long-term plans of vast extent for all our needs."¹³ However, once Whitehall realized what was to be included in the agreement, they began to push back.¹⁴

The PM had "always been opposed or lukewarm to Imperial Preference," having fought for free trade as an MP.¹⁵ The FO and Cabinet, on the other hand, were adamantly against any deal that removed the Imperial Preference. "I found the Cabinet at its second meeting on the subject," Churchill cabled FDR, "even more resolved against trading the principle of Imperial Preference as a consideration for lease-lend."¹⁶ They believed the policy was non-discriminatory. Hull, however, "has never been willing to regard the Ottawa

⁹ FO: General, vol. IV, 226. June 8, 1944 Halifax memo to Eden.

¹⁰ United States Department of State, *Foreign relations of the United States. Diplomatic papers. Conference Series: 1942* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1942), British Master Lend-Lease Agreement, Article VII.

¹¹ Steil, 23.

¹² FO: General, vol. I, 532.

¹³ Churchill, *Finest Hour*, 569.

¹⁴ Shipments under Lend-Lease were delivered before the Master Agreement was finalized.

¹⁵ Churchill, Roosevelt, and Kimball, 351.

¹⁶ Ibid.

Agreements (Imperial Preference) as a permanent exception to the rule” of nondiscrimination, bemoaned Halifax.¹⁷ They also realized its importance for the Empire. Thus, Keynes wanted the agreement to allow for the possibility of some trade regime as a mechanism to restart Britain’s economy. ‘My so strong reaction against the word ‘discrimination,’ the economist told US diplomat, Dean Acheson, ‘is the result of my feeling so passionately that our hands must be free to make something new and better of the postwar world.’¹⁸ Churchill was able to overcome these objections, and the British did adhere to the Master Agreement. However, their adherence was based on a dubious understanding, the second such misinterpretation, which exposed how the PM willfully overlooked traditional Anglo-American differences during the early stages of the war.

Prior to the Lend-Lease negotiations, the first postwar discussions took place at Placentia Bay. FDR and Churchill met and signed the Atlantic Charter, which “was an American effort to insure that Britain signed onto its liberal democratic war aims.”¹⁹ Sherwood recalled, “The agreement that Churchill hoped for was definitely not the Atlantic Charter.”²⁰ Included in the Charter was language that struck the PM as a way to “pry open the Empire.”²¹ He had reason to worry.

The State Department, who wrote the charter, was trying to end colonialism, which they felt was part and parcel with the economic causes of WWII. FDR held the same view, “that if we are to arrive at a stable peace it must involve the development of backward countries,” which was the genesis of his trusteeship idea. At the meeting, Roosevelt told his son Elliott, ‘America won’t help England in this war simply so that she will be able to continue to ride roughshod over colonial peoples.’²² Yet, by the time the charter was formally issued, Churchill had come to believe the anti-colonial passages did not apply to the Empire. “We had in mind, primarily,” he told the Commons, “the states and nations of

17. FO: General, vol. I, 544. May 28, 1941 Halifax cable to Eden.

18. Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department* (New York: Norton, 1969), 30.

19. Ikenberry, 173. The Russians would sign the Atlantic Charter after they entered the war. By the time the Americans had been drawn into the war, all of the members of the United Nations had signed the Atlantic Charter.

20. Sherwood, 350.

21. United States Department of State, *Foreign relations of the United States. Diplomatic papers. The Atlantic Conference* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1942), 71. Churchill quoted.

22. Roosevelt, *As He Saw It*, 25, 36.

Europe now under the Nazi yield,” not the “people’s which owe allegiance to the British crown.”²³ Similarly, the PM came to believe Article VII also did not apply to them.

“I did not agree to Article 7,” Churchill told the Commons, “without having previously obtained a definite assurance from the President” that we were not “committed to the abolishment of the Imperial Preference.”²⁴ FDR led the PM to this belief, writing him, you believe we want to know “that Imperial Preference will be abolished. We are asking for no such commitment, and I can say that article 7 does not contain any such commitment.”²⁵ Eden was skeptical, believing correctly that this insinuation was a ruse. In both instances, the President had purposefully misled Churchill about his true intentions towards the Empire.

The other argument that resonated with the pro-Imperial Preference faction was that a deal was necessary for American cooperation and supplies. This argument revealed England’s lesser standing in comparison to the US. Keynes’ decision was in line with his policy towards America, emphasizes Harbutt, which accepted “whatever sacrifice he had to make in his Washington negotiations, to yoke the United States firmly to Britain so that their future collaboration” would be assured.²⁶ The economist was part of the camp that felt it was imperative to have American backing in the maintenance of the Empire for it to survive into the postwar. Keynes held out hope that America “would do the right thing by Britain in the end.”²⁷ He was right, ultimately, but it would be a number of years until America found it in their interest to aid the British economy. Beforehand, Britain suffered its major wartime diplomatic defeat: the acceptance of American postwar commercial and monetary policy, which was anathema to the reestablishment of the Empire as it functioned prior to the war. The Anglo-American negotiations on these policies revolved around Britain’s attempts to recreate the Empire’s trade networks under the changing circumstances dictated by America’s – the superior party – economic preferences.

The debate over commercial and monetary policy would continue throughout the remainder of the war. However, England had to deal exclusively with the Americans due to the British economist’s maneuvering and the skillful tag team of the State Department on commercial policy and the Treasury Department on monetary policy. As Keynes himself

²³ FO: General, vol. I, 507.

²⁴ Steil, 123. Churchill address to the House of Commons (1944).

²⁵ Churchill, Roosevelt, and Kimball, 357.

²⁶ Harbutt, 243.

²⁷ Steil, 4.

acknowledged in regards to monetary policy in a letter to White, “When agreement has been reached” by “our two Governments” then “it shall be communicated” to the “important Governments of the United Nations.”²⁸ The British, therefore, could not frame the discussion by entering into agreements with the Russians and were forced to choose from America’s options in trying to restart their war torn economy, especially the Empire’s trade networks.

Britain’s first concession on the path to accepting American multilateralism was Article VII’s inclusion in the Master Agreement. After it was signed, Hull proudly declared, “[T]he foundation was now laid for all our later postwar planning in the economic field.”²⁹ Still, it would take the rest of the war for British to fully accept the tenets of Article VII, revealing that a deal is not finalized until it is implemented.³⁰

The Roosevelt administration was faced with another daunting task in trying to include Russia in Lend-Lease. Eventually, the President was able to include the Soviets but only after an exhausting administration full-court press. This effort was made because FDR deemed Russian shipments vital to both the war effort and to America’s bargaining position, as supplies were his main source of leverage with the Soviets. “Roosevelt’s basic objective,” according to Harriman, was to use “the wartime relationship to attempt to develop postwar agreements.”³¹ FDR hoped supplies could make up for American inability to quickly place large numbers of troops on the Continent. Under this policy, notes Robert Dallek, “Roosevelt demanded no concessions from the Russians for the aid because he believed the Red Army was the benefit received.”³² Thus, he could equalize Soviet-American standing, like supplies had leveled Anglo-French standing in previous wars.

Convoys

The major problem for Roosevelt’s plan was shipping. As he was well aware, “The meeting of the Russian protocol must have a first priority in shipping.”³³ After the Nazi

²⁸ FO: North American, vol. IV, 39.

²⁹ Cordell Hull, *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull 2* (New York: Macmillan, 1948), 1153.

³⁰ Ibid, 1476. The final agreements on commercial policy were reached, with a date for the implementation, on February 23, 1945. As Hull bemoaned, “After long negotiation we had induced the British to sign the Lend-Lease Agreement of 1942, of which Article VII pledged them in effect to give up preferential arrangements in the British Empire after the end of the war. Thereafter, however, it frequently became apparent to me that Prime Minister Churchill, despite this pledge, was determined to hold on to imperial preference.”

³¹ Harriman and Abel, 169-70.

³² Robert Dallek, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-45* (New York: Oxford Press, 1979), 296.

³³ Edward R. Stettinius, *Lend-Lease: A Weapon for Victory* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1944), 205.

conquests of 1940-1, the Germans closed off the two major routes – Baltic Straits and Eastern Mediterranean – into Russia. The German threat left open only three other routes. One route, Vladivostok, forced Allied shipping to go through Japanese waters. The Soviets had signed a neutrality pact with the Japanese so war matériel could not be shipped through this route without ending Soviet- Japanese neutrality. Another route, the Trans-Persian, was antiquated and took until 1943 to be fully operational. This meant during the first trying years of the war, a solitary route was viable for massive amounts of matériel to be delivered – the northern route.³⁴

The northern route started in Scotland, extended north of Scandinavia, and finished in the ports of Archangel and Murmansk. It was patrolled heavily by U-boats due to a German installation in northern Norway. Plus, being so far north, the route was also in perpetual daylight for months at a time. These factors had terrible repercussions. Many convoys were deemed infeasible by the Combined Chiefs of Staffs (CCS).³⁵ In one such instance, Churchill cabled Stalin “Had it not been for the German concentration” of forces in northern Norway, we would have sent “you a convoy of thirty ships.”³⁶ These suspensions infuriated the Russians who were deeply dependent on this matériel.

Stalin sent this heated message to FDR, “I would like to emphasize the fact that at the present moment when the peoples of the Soviet Union and its armies are exerting all their powers” against “Hitler’s troops, the fulfillment of American deliveries” on time “is of the utmost importance.”³⁷ The Russians “took the attitude that since they were doing all the fighting in Europe, Americans should contribute whatever was needed,” stated Bohlen, and non-fulfillment “was due to ill will.”³⁸ As Gromyko proclaimed, “There were American politicians who wanted the Soviet Union and Germany to bleed each other white, clearly hoping the USA would be able to have the last word in settling the terms of the eventual

³⁴ Roger Munting, “Lend-Lease and the Soviet War Effort” in *Journal of Contemporary History* 19, no. 3 (July 1984), 497-98.

³⁵ Stettinius, *Lend-Lease*, 205.

³⁶ Winston Churchill, C. R Attlee, Franklin D Roosevelt, and Joseph Stalin, *Correspondence Between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. and the Presidents of the U.S.A. and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain During the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945* (Salisbury, N.C.: Documentary Publications, 1978), 111.

³⁷ Franklin Roosevelt and Arthur Schlesinger (Fwd), *My Dear Mr. Stalin: The Complete Correspondence between Franklin Roosevelt and Joseph Stalin*, ed. Susan Butler (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), 60.

³⁸ Bohlen, 125.

peace.”³⁹ The ill will generated by the delays had a lasting impact on the Grand Alliance, especially Soviet-American relations.

“The effect of making estimates which were not realistic was to deepen Soviet suspicion that the policy of the Western Allies was to bleed Russia white,” emphasized Bohlen.⁴⁰ Roosevelt was clearly worried about Stalin’s suspicions when he sent this memo: “Frankly if I were a Russian I would feel that I had been given the run-around in the United States. Please get out the list and please, with my full authority use a heavy hand,” finishing with, “Step on it!”⁴¹ Each time shipments went undelivered or under-filled, the Soviets’ misgivings about Western intentions increased. Greater standing had a downside; the Russians were ready to assume the US, as the superior Western party, was willingly complicit with the attitude taken by the British in regards to the shipment delays.

The Americans’ attempt to compensate for troops via supplies was undermined because the British felt no similar desire. “[O]ur past efforts to affect closer liaison with the Russians,” lamented a frustrated Hopkins, ‘have always been sandbagged by the British.’⁴² They took a harder line, believing that supplies were assistance from an ally, not a contractual obligation. The Marshal cabled Churchill fuming, “[Y]our statement that this intention to send northern convoys to the USSR is neither an obligation nor an agreement, but only a statement” that “can at any moment [be] renounce[d]” is unacceptable.⁴³ The decisions about convoys/supplies were delivered to Stalin personally by Churchill at the Second Moscow Conference (Aug. 12-17, 1942), as well as the decisions about the second front and Operation Torch (discussed momentarily).

The PM had used his role as the intermediary to make it seem to Stalin that shipments would be sent when feasible, as he desired, not at whatever cost as Roosevelt wished. This framing meant the Americans would not gain the leverage from supplies they had hoped to acquire. This result was not Churchill’s intention, simply an outcome of the process. The President, worried about being lumped in with the British, sent this memo to Morgenthau, “I do not want to be in the same position as the English ... Every promise the

³⁹ Andreï Andreevich Gromyko, *Memoirs*, (New York: Doubleday, 1989), 37. Andreï Gromyko was the second Soviet wartime Ambassador to the United States.

⁴⁰ Bohlen, 125.

⁴¹ Roosevelt and Schlesinger, *My Dear Mr. Stalin*, 39. August 2, 1941 FDR memo to Wayne Coy.

⁴² Stoler, 225. Hopkins quoted.

⁴³ Churchill, *Closing the Ring*, 267.

English have made to the Russians, they have fallen down on.”⁴⁴ The first sets of shipments were under-filled, and it is important to note this before considering the next negotiations – the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of 1942.

Anglo-Soviet Treaty

The Soviets were the first to put forth their initial position, typical of the senior party. Their proposal included three points: acceptance of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact boundaries, a landing on the Continent in the fall of 1942, and a twenty-year defensive pact. The first two positions were seen as unacceptable to the British. The expeditionary force was deemed impossible. As Churchill told FDR, “No responsible British military authority has so far been able to make a plan for September 1942 which had any chance of success.”⁴⁵ However, the more contentious issue at the time was the first position, the acceptance of territorial changes before the end of the war.

Worried about a repeat of WWI, when secret treaties had adversely affected the peace settlement at Versailles, Roosevelt had made sure the PM understood adherence to the Atlantic Charter meant no territorial changes prior to the peace conference. Churchill and the pro-American camp were adamant in upholding this pledge to the US. Cadogan highlighted this belief, “We shall make a mistake if we press the Americans to depart from principles, and a howler if we do it without them.” Eden, nevertheless, was “quite prepared to throw to the winds all principles, lamented Cadogan.”⁴⁶ The Foreign Secretary “feared,” observes Eubanks, “that a refusal of Stalin’s frontier demands could eventually mean the end of all prospects of Soviet cooperation.”⁴⁷ This is the first time the Eden’s desires contradicted Churchill’s strategy. Still, the Americans’ stance was so adamant and relations too important; Eden conceded to the Cabinet’s wishes. As Cadogan happily claimed, “Glad to find [Eden] realizes we can at least go no further, and [it is] no use haggling.”⁴⁸ Plus, the Anglo-American understanding on boundaries gave the British cover when discussing the issue with the Russians.

⁴⁴ J.M. Burns, *Roosevelt: The Soldier of Freedom* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1970), 248. FDR quoted.

⁴⁵ Churchill, Roosevelt, and Kimball, 515.

⁴⁶ Cadogan and Dilks, 437.

⁴⁷ Eubanks, 37.

⁴⁸ Cadogan and Dilks, 449.

Eden traveled to Moscow in December 1941 to negotiate the treaty. The positions he put forth did not please the Russians. Molotov related the nature of the relations at the time, ‘When Eden visited us Stalin constantly wounded his vanity, taunting him that he could not resolve the territorial question on his own.’⁴⁹ The Foreign Secretary left with the treaty unsigned. The Russians felt empowered enough at the time, due to forestalling Operation Barbarossa (the Nazis’ initial invasion), to push for acceptance of all of their positions. They held that even a futile effort on the Continent would help ease the pressure on the Eastern front. Plus, ‘We had never officially renounced for all time the territories that were temporarily part of the Polish state,’ declared Khrushchev.⁵⁰ Therefore, they assumed these boundary changes did not violate the Atlantic Charter. Both sides knew they needed each other, and this kept the negotiations alive. Molotov traveled to London the following May, with both parties hoping to come to a satisfactory conclusion.

When the Foreign Commissar arrived in London, the Cabinet had hardened in their position against an expeditionary force in 1942 and that any territorial decisions should be included in the treaty. ‘If Mr. Molotov, on arrival, proves unwilling to meet us on the above two points, it will, I believe, be of little use to embark upon prolonged discussion of alternative formulae for getting over the difficulty,’ declared Cadogan.⁵¹ Why the Russians ultimately accepted a mutual defense pact and not their other two points is often misunderstood.

Molotov signed the treaty, with only a defensive pact, upon his arrival in London (May 26, 1942). It is commonplace to argue that the Russian’s decision was a result of an offer from Roosevelt. Prior to the diplomat’s departure for London, FDR had written Stalin that he wanted to have the Foreign Commissar visit to discuss ‘a military matter of grave importance,’ a clear hint about a second front.⁵² With this knowledge in his back pocket, Molotov thought he might travel to Washington and obtain a better decision on the second front and force Britain’s hand.

The second front is the name given to the Anglo-American landing in Western France (Operation Overlord), on June 6, 1944. ‘The main problem,’ stated Maisky,

⁴⁹ Chuev, 48.

⁵⁰ Khrushchev, 237.

⁵¹ Cadogan and Dilks, 452.

⁵² Roosevelt and Schlesinger, *My Dear Mr. Stalin*, 71.

“dominating all other diplomatic questions” through the fall of 1943 “was that of a second front.”⁵³ The Americans were far less reluctant to embark on a second front in 1942, partly because before 1944 the British would supply more men. FDR, however, primarily believed “that if such a front does not materialize quickly, and on a large scale, [the Russians] will be so deluded in their belief in our sincerity of purpose ... that inestimable harm will be done to the cause of the United Nations.”⁵⁴

Many historians and Soviet officials contend that during Molotov’s meeting, Roosevelt and/or Hopkins insinuated that a second front would be opened in 1942. This insinuation is cited as the reason the Foreign Commissar was content with only a defensive pact with the British. However, what Roosevelt actually put forth was a symbolic gesture – a statement of intentions, not an obligatory act. Molotov later stated Stalin and he “understood it was impossible.” Still, they “needed that paper agreement! It was of great importance for the people, for politics, and for future pressure on the Allies.”⁵⁵ The Soviets used shaming techniques to put additional pressure on their Allies. Maisky learned that if he brought up the second front before a matériel request, it was fulfilled more quickly and completely. He passed this up the ladder.⁵⁶

It must be noted, Churchill felt the need upon Molotov’s arrival back in London to hand him an aide-memoire detailing why the CCS believed it was impossible to launch the second front in 1942. This action and Roosevelt’s gesture are the source of the confusion over what caused the Russians to sign only a defensive pact. Nevertheless, the actual reason was the events on the Eastern Front in the winter of 1941-42, exposed by the signing of the treaty before Molotov left for Washington. It would have been tactically more astute to have secured American commitment *prior* to signing the treaty; Molotov was returning to London after his meeting in Washington.

⁵³ Ivan Maisky, *Memoirs of a Soviet Ambassador* (New York: Scribner’s and Sons, 1967), 246.

⁵⁴ Harriman and Abel, 139. Roosevelt quoted.

⁵⁵ Chuev, 45-46. Molotov told Chuev, “In 1942 I took part in all the negotiations for a second front in Europe. From the first I didn’t believe they would do it. I remained calm and realized this was a completely impossible operation for them. But our demand was politically necessary, and we had to press them for everything. I don’t doubt that Stalin too believed they would not carry it out. But we had to demand it! For the sake of our people. They were waiting for some kind of Allied military aid. For us that piece of paper had vast political significance. It raised our spirits, and in those days this meant a lot.”

⁵⁶ Maisky, 187-88.

Barbarossa is correctly portrayed as an overreach. However, it was not the overreach that Napoleon had made to which it is so often analogized.⁵⁷ Under the defense by depth policy, the Red Army planned to break down the invading force through attrition. The main mechanism for this policy was counter offensives, which were to take place after the initial thrust was repulsed. The Russians did not have the same success in 1941 with their counter offensives as they had in the Napoleonic Wars. As Stalin told the people, despite the winter counter attacks, “The Germans were nevertheless able to take the initiative in military operations this year,” something that the *Grande Armée* could not have done in 1813.⁵⁸ Consequently, they knew the German offensive in 1942 would be larger than anticipated in the winter of 1941-2, when the defense by depth policy seemed to be working. Thus, the Soviets were more intransigent about their desired inclusions in the treaty earlier in its formation than in May and June of 1942.

Molotov remembered, “[W]hen we dropped our demand,” it “was of course necessary at the time – they were astonished.”⁵⁹ It was the Nazi 1942 summer offensive, which coincided with Molotov’s London and Washington trips (May-June 1942), that caused the evolution of the Russian position. “The Soviets agreed to postponement of the territorial concessions” due to “a sudden reverse of their military fortunes,” relates Craig.⁶⁰ “The Russian counterattacks had not driven [the Nazis] out of the important road and railways” of the USSR, noted the official British historian.⁶¹ Amidst the setbacks, the Soviets were wary of doing anything that could affect their supplies, such as taking a hard-line stance over inclusion of territorial demands. As Maisky told Eden, “his Government knew that the moment the weather improved they would be engaged in intense hostilities ... Therefore, any equipment which reached them before the campaigning season would be especially

⁵⁷ Stoler, 51-2 and Zubok, *Failed Empire*, 6-9. American Mark Stoler and Russian Vlad Zubok are just two of a number of modern scholars who also question the validity of analogizing Napoleon’s and Hitler’s invasions. The former does so to give a better assessment of the battles on the Eastern Front, whereas Zubok makes a similar claim to the one made above.

⁵⁸ Joseph Stalin, *The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1969), 61. November 8, 1942 Stalin’s October Revolution Speech (Russians calendars were not in-sync with Western ones at the time. The October Revolution actually took place in November).

⁵⁹ Chuev, 42.

⁶⁰ Craig, 190.

⁶¹ Sir Llewellyn Woodward, *British Foreign Policy in the Second World War 2*, 3d ed. (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1971), Vol. II, 256 and Max Hastings, *Inferno* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2011), 294. Furthermore, “The New Year (1942) offensive ... petered out even before the spring thaw arrested movement,” notes Hastings. As a result the Nazis broke into the Crimea, just one week before the treaty was signed.

welcome.”⁶² Since the Americans, the main supplier, were against territorial demands, coupled with Britain framing it as a joint stance, the treaty was only a mutual defense pact.

Eden misinterpreted what facilitated Molotov’s position change. He falsely concluded that the Russians, with patience, could make arrangements with him amenable to all parties concerned and that “no ill effects seemed to have been produced by the” refusal “to commit Great Britain to the Russians demands.”⁶³ Eden told the Commons, “I attach such importance to the Anglo-Soviet ‘Treaty’” because it revealed the possibility of an Anglo-Soviet understanding.⁶⁴ His belief in a workable understanding with the Russian guided his actions at the Moscow Minister’s Meeting.⁶⁵

Second Front

Just because the issue of the second front was left in abeyance during the treaty does not mean it shrank from the scene. Stalin and his military leaders believed “the chief reason for the Germans tactical successes on our front (in 1942) [was] the absence of a second front in Europe [that] enabled them to transfer to our front all their available reserves and to create a big superiority of forces.”⁶⁶ The second front remains one of the most hotly debated aspects of the war. Whether it could have been opened prior to June 1944 has been debated since the Nazis launched Barbarossa. That discussion is far too complex for this work to offer a proper analysis of it. What is important is the effect it had on the evolution of WWII postwar planning negotiations.

Each of the Big Three had their own ideas about the second front, influenced by their leaders’ beliefs regarding their countries’ national interests. The British were reluctant to launch a premature invasion. They feared the “price we had had to pay in human life and blood for the great offensives of the First World War.”⁶⁷ Churchill constantly pushed for a Balkan foray instead or at the cost of the Western European invasion. Many have argued about whether his intransigence was purely military. As FDR told his son, “Whenever the P.M. argued for [an] invasion through the Balkans, it was quite obvious ... what he really meant ... he was anxious to knife up into Central Europe, in order to keep the Red Army

⁶² FO: Russia, vol. III, 24. February 26, 1942 Eden cable to Ambassador Baggaley.

⁶³ Woodward, vol. II, 236.

⁶⁴ FO: North American, vol. II, 285.

⁶⁵ Eden, 382ff.

⁶⁶ Stalin, *Great Patriotic War*, 62. November 8, 1942, Stalin’s October Revolution Speech.

⁶⁷ Churchill, *Closing the Ring*, 582.

out of Austria and Rumania, even Hungary, if possible.⁶⁸ Military considerations were more than likely the chief concern; however, political considerations must have been in Churchill's mind as well. As Carl von Clausewitz famously stated, "War is merely the continuation of politics by other means."

The Russians felt, especially in 1943, that the West could launch an expeditionary force but were holding back for ulterior reasons. Stalin told his confidants, "The Allies felt insufficiently prepared to open a second front," and he added that "they were really not interested in the swift defeat of Hitler because they were afraid of the Red Army."⁶⁹ The second front was his test of Western intentions towards the Soviet Union. For Churchill's Balkan strategy was seen, relates Stoler, as "relegating to the Soviet Union the brutal task of fighting the bulk of the Wehrmacht while London reaped political benefits in the eastern Mediterranean and Balkans, an area of historic Anglo-Russian rivalry."⁷⁰ The Marshal told Roosevelt the lack of "a second front in France causes me concern, which I cannot help expressing."⁷¹ Each delay further heightened his suspicions of the West because the manner in which the PM had presented the decision over when to launch the invasion. Instead of a reluctant choice by FDR based on exigent circumstances, Churchill presented this decision as a jointly held Western position over when to launch the invasion during his meeting with Stalin at Moscow.

The Americans wanted the second front opened as quickly as possible; however, other factors were at play greater than just the desire to launch the invasion. These aspects reveal how seemingly disparate issues can reduce options and contextualize those choices, in a way looking at a singular decision such as whether to open the second front in 1943, could not incorporate. Three issues need to be understood when discerning why America's second front planning seemed chaotic: the setup of the Big Three's military planning, troop numbers vis-à-vis the British in Europe, and the war in the Pacific.

Tripartite negotiations by their very nature try to take on a bilateral form – its process – that further helps the method of framing. Recall, even with "the presence of

⁶⁸ Roosevelt, *As He Saw It*, 184.

⁶⁹ Ilya Ehrenberg, *The War, 1941-1945* (London: McGibbon & Kee, 1965), 119.

⁷⁰ Stoler, *Allies*, 111.

⁷¹ Roosevelt and Schlesinger, *My Dear Mr. Stalin*, 121-22.

several parties,” a negotiation wants to “become bilateral encounters.”⁷² This process is demonstrated by the planning divisions on the military side of the Grand Alliance. A single Allied command did not coordinate nor direct the entire war. Instead, the Anglo-American CCS and a separate Soviet High Command existed. Soviet and American joint pressure, like at Teheran, could have limited British options and possibly opened the second front earlier. However, Britain was able to use the bilateral Anglo-American military discussions, their initial superior troop numbers, and the momentum of earlier choices to limit American options, delaying the second front with a focus on the Mediterranean.

Churchill had been able to obtain a fair hearing for his Mediterranean schemes because prior to 1944, “the operation (Overlord) would have to be almost entirely British,” which the PM concluded meant until such point “the enterprise was therefore one on which British Staff opinion would naturally prevail.”⁷³ The Americans being the main suppliers, though, mitigated British ability to assume complete control. It was not until after D-Day that the Americans surpassed British troops in the European field. Churchill takes time to mention this event in his memoirs, further demonstrating the impact of soldiers on standing. “We now passed the day ... when for the first time... the great American armies[.]” numbers were “greater than our own.” He further noted, “Influence on Allied operations is usually increased by large reinforcements.”⁷⁴ The stationing of American troops in England, in preparation for D-Day, revealed this outcome was preordained.

At the First Québec Conference (Aug. 17-24, 1943; Québec I), the Americans took over as they made their first forceful push for D-Day in 1944. These decisions laid the foundations for the second front discussions at Cairo and Teheran. Québec I began the British decline to the junior partner in Anglo-American military endeavors.

In the Pacific, the situation was different. The Americans, after Pearl Harbor, took the lead as the main fighting force. Politically and militarily, the quick defeat of Japan was in the interest of American planners. A desire for vengeance coupled with traditional American East Asian aspirations gave voice to a constant cry for a Pacific instead of a European focus

⁷² Zartman and Kremenjuk, 80.

⁷³ Churchill, *Hinge of Fate*, 323.

⁷⁴ Winston Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1948), 71.

to the war. Many Americans saw opportunities in the Pacific, such as new markets, they did not see in Europe. A vast majority of the administration's critics held this view.⁷⁵

Roosevelt was always adamantly a Europe-first backer, but in the early days of the war when setbacks seemed so numerous, it was hard to ignore the Pacific-first supporters. An early second front, assuming victory, would help silence these critics, most importantly the administration's ally Admiral King and their chief antagonist General MacArthur.⁷⁶ It was in this vein that Roosevelt had sent his letter to Stalin requesting Molotov visit during the Anglo-Soviet Treaty negotiations. Due to similar thinking, when 1942 was deemed impossible for a second front, the President altered his thinking and bought into Churchill's idea for an invasion of North Africa – Operation Torch. Thus, Roosevelt was forced to choose from a reduced set of options dictated by the momentum of events and the British desire to focus on the Mediterranean.

Operation Torch and the Free French

Operation Torch was launched in November 1942. By January 1943, the West held a firm grasp on the North African coast. With their success, a whole host of new problems greeted them, based on what to do with a defeated foe and the administration of liberated territory. Actions deemed necessary to a successful operation triggered Russian fears that the West might make a separate peace with Germany. Recall, “[U]nderlying Soviet fears was a belief that in important matters the capitalist nations would join despite their rivalries, to preserve the economic system.”⁷⁷

When planning the invasion of North Africa, the CCS decided they needed help from the Vichy regime. Vichy is the name given to the Nazis' puppet regime in France during WWII. The Roosevelt administration had “continued relations with the Government at Vichy solely for the advantages derived from having representatives in Vichy France, French Africa, and elsewhere,” Hull told Halifax.⁷⁸ Leahy (along with the influential Col. Robert Murphy) was able to persuade the Vichy Admiral, Jean Darlan, and other

⁷⁵ Richard E. Darilek, *A Loyal Opposition in Time of War: The Republican Party and the Politics of Foreign Policy from Pearl Harbor to Yalta* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1976), 26-28.; William Appleman Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1972), 173-74.

⁷⁶ Stoler, 30-31.

⁷⁷ Bohlen, 60.

⁷⁸ Hull, 1158.

opportunistic or anti-German members of the regime to not impede Torch.⁷⁹ This policy was successful. “[I]f the French had put up any real resistance the landing could not have been carried out,” declared Alanbrooke⁸⁰ In doing so, however, they granted Darlan administrative powers over North Africa under the aegis of the Allied Commander. This was troublesome because the admiral was seen as a quisling, a term derived from the name of the Norwegian general who ruled the country as Hitler’s crony.

Stalin outwardly supported Roosevelt, telling him, “I think it a great achievement that you succeeded in bringing Darlan and others into the war” on the Allied side.⁸¹ Still, the President knew the deal was problematic. Even after Darlan’s assassination ended the controversy surrounding him, questions still arose about whether the West would, in an effort to speed up victory, continue to make deals with fascists. With Britain’s successful use of the negotiational process to limit American military options and their framing of the delays in shipments as reflecting a Western stance on the terms of Lend-Lease, another suspicious maneuver might wreck any prospects FDR had of winning over Stalin.

FDR devised a solution he believed addressed the problem of dealing with defeated foes – unconditional surrender. He drew on a confused analogy that “[t]he story of Lee’s surrender to Grant is the best illustration” of surrender terms.⁸² At Fort Donaldson, during the American Civil War, General U.S. Grant had demanded from his former West Point friend unconditional surrender when he asked for terms.⁸³ Instead, at Appomattox, Grant had asked for Robert E. Lee’s surrender, and once acquired, he granted Lee and his men a number of concessions, the key being *after* the surrender. FDR confused these two events and combined them into one amalgamation. He used this as the explanation for what unconditional surrender would entail.⁸⁴ Plainly stated, once a defeated foe surrendered unconditionally, the Allies would be magnanimous in their peace terms. It was hoped that this would forestall a similar end to WWII as had taken place after the Great War.

⁷⁹. Leahy was the US Ambassador to Vichy until diplomatic ties were severed in May 1942, whereupon he was appointed the Chairman of the JCS.

⁸⁰. Alanbrooke, 367.

⁸¹. Roosevelt and Schlesinger, *My Dear Mr. Stalin*, 104.

⁸². Roosevelt, *F.D.R.: His Personal Letters*, 1485-86.

⁸³. Public Domain, Unconditional Surrender Grant, 1854, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YB8KapC6y6o>, accessed 3/17/2014. Due to this famous proclamation and the lucky happenstance of his first two initials, the General became known as “Unconditional Surrender” Grant; it even became a wartime song.

⁸⁴. Kimball, *Juggler*, 76-77.

The administration believed after WWI, “[t]he German people were sure that they had not been defeated by Allied military might.” Instead, they lost “because of the breakdown of morale within their own borders.”⁸⁵ Only unconditional surrender would make sure to imprint defeat on the German mind. Also, FDR felt, “It could serve to offset the mistrust created by the deal with Darlan,” related Hebert Feis, “by inferring no other deals of the kind would be considered.”⁸⁶ The policy was “a promise to the USSR that the Anglo-Americans would fight to the end and not negotiate with Germany,” emphasizes Kimball.⁸⁷ Still, the fear of a separate peace never left the Russians’ minds. Even “the slightest hint of tampering with [the policy] threw Stalin into a rage,” observes Gellately, which was exposed during in the Italian surrender discussions (detailed momentarily).⁸⁸

Following Darlan’s assassination, a power vacuum was created on the French side of the administration of North Africa. It was Churchill’s hope that this opening would give him a chance to foster better relations between FDR and the Free French. The Free French were the resistance movement formed after the fall of France by the officers and men who had escaped the Nazi occupation. They reconstituted themselves in the French overseas empire and quickly consolidated around General Charles de Gaulle. Unfortunately, he was a flawed leader. His arrogance and hubris angered friend and foe alike. As Alanbrooke bemoaned, de Gaulle “had the mentality of a dictator combined with a most objectionable personality.”⁸⁹ Early in the war he ran afoul of the administration when the Free French invaded Vichy-held islands off the Newfoundland coast. “Comparatively unimportant though the islands were,” Hull irritably recalled, “their forcible occupation by the Free French was greatly embarrassing to us.” He fumed “many months spent carefully developing closer and substantial relations” with the Vichy regime were put in jeopardy.⁹⁰ At Casablanca (Jan. 14-24, 1943), Churchill wanted de Gaulle and the President to sit down to see if they could work past their differences.

The FDR-de Gaulle meeting, though successful in that it created a new administrative regime, did not achieve the reconciliation between the two men that Churchill

⁸⁵. Welles, 10.

⁸⁶. Herbert Feis, *Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin: The War They Waged and the Peace They Sought* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957), 110.

⁸⁷. Kimball, *Juggler*, 76.

⁸⁸. Gellately, 166.

⁸⁹. Alanbrooke, 363.

⁹⁰. Hull, 963, 1130.

had hoped. “I could, I think, have made a good arrangement at Casablanca,” he told the Commons, “but, as my colleagues know, this was frustrated by the preposterous conduct of General de Gaulle.”⁹¹ Roosevelt left the meeting with the conviction, “de Gaulle is out to achieve a one-man government in France,” and “I can’t imagine a man I would distrust more.”⁹² Conversely, “As for the future,” de Gaulle lamented, “[t]he President was anything but convinced of the rebirth and renewal of our regime.”⁹³ These differences would undergird Franco-American relations for the remainder of the war. Roosevelt would never change his opinion of the general, but his thoughts on France’s role in the postwar world did evolve, and it is important to take note of when and why as this work progresses.

Operation Torch ultimately led to a precedent, unconditional surrender, which resonated into the postwar. Similarly, three other major contests – Stalingrad, Kursk, and Italy – took place prior to the fateful conferences of 1943 that set enduring precedents.

Stalingrad and Kursk

The city of Stalingrad was not nearly as important as the cities of Leningrad, Kiev, and especially Moscow. Still, the city’s symbolic value was immeasurable having been named after the Russian ruler. In planning for their 1942 invasions, the Nazis deemed Stalingrad a secondary target. However, it became the turning point of the European war because of Hitler’s decision not to allow his army to retreat from the city, but more importantly due to the bravery of the people of Stalingrad. These men and women held the city, and because of their heroics, the Nazis’ Eastern invasion was broken, as the German’s elite 6th Army was decimated and eventually submitted to encirclement. Afterwards, the Nazis did not possess a force capable of breaking into the Russian heartland.⁹⁴

Prior to Stalingrad, many in the West “believed that the war would weaken the Soviet state,” noted Berezkov, to the benefit of “Britain and the United States.”⁹⁵ After Stalingrad, this thinking began to dissipate. With the victory, the Red Army finally initiated the full-scale counter offensives called for under the defense by depth policy. It was also due to Stalingrad that Stalin felt secure enough to close the Comintern, which further exposed the security and

⁹¹ Churchill, *Closing the Ring*, 177.

⁹² Roosevelt, *As He Saw It*, 173.

⁹³ Charles de Gaulle, *The Complete War Memoirs of Charles De Gaulle* 1st Carroll & Graf ed. (New York: Carroll & Graf Publishers, 1998), 575.

⁹⁴ Stoler, 264-85.

⁹⁵ Berezkov, 119.

prestige this battle granted the Soviet state.⁹⁶ As was common of his actions, the Marshal had ulterior motives as well. “Dissolving the Comintern would strengthen the national [communist] parties,” reveals Gellately, because “they could no longer be accused of being ‘agents of a foreign power.’”⁹⁷ Still, “Although the Russians realize that they are now accepted as a powerful world power, they are still suspicious of the underlying attitude of most nations towards them,” noted Harriman.⁹⁸ The interplay between their fears and newfound power would be a mainstay in Russian postwar planning moving forward.

As the Red Army pushed forward, they were able to drive the Germans out of Russia and into the Ukraine, where the next major fight on the Eastern front – the Battle of Kursk – was held. The Red Army’s forward thrust around Kursk, a large open plain, created what is known as a salient, a protruding area in the military front into the opposing side’s perimeter with the enemy on three sides of this front. The Germans hoped to capitalize on this ability to attack from three directions at once and to employ their favorite tactic – encirclement. The Russians were able to turn the tables, however, and after what is generally referred to as the greatest tank battle in history, it was the Germans who were encircled on the plains of Kursk. The battle destroyed the offensive striking power of the Wehrmacht. The Nazis’ overextended resources could not rebuild these lost forces.⁹⁹

After the battle, “[I]t was almost inevitable,” observes Reynolds “that [the Russians] would end up deep in Eastern Europe” and most likely Central Europe, as well as the Balkans.¹⁰⁰ As the liberators of Eastern Europe, they would control the region’s transition to peace. After the battles the Russians were a great power. “The massive scale of these events,” relates Gellately, “made Stalin more willing to meet the Western leaders.”¹⁰¹ Churchill felt the same way. “The advance of the Soviet Armies ... made it urgent to come to a political arrangement with the Russians about those regions.”¹⁰² Herein lies the impetus for the meetings in the fall of 1943.

⁹⁶ Spriano, 193.

⁹⁷ Gellately, 75.

⁹⁸ FRUS: Yalta, 65. December 28, 1944 Harriman cable to Stettinius.

⁹⁹ Stoler, 154-67.

¹⁰⁰ Reynolds, *Summits*, 107.

¹⁰¹ Gellately, 76.

¹⁰² Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy*, 72.

Italian Surrender Precedent

In September 1943, just one month before the start of Cairo and Teheran, the Anglo-Americans achieved their greatest military success to date when the Italians ousted Mussolini and surrendered to the Allies. The Italian's capitulation improved the military situation, but it increased the political headaches, as another power vacuum was created. From this vacuum, each of the Allies wanted a government to emerge that followed their political system. Slowly over the next year, groups formed that represented what each ally wanted – Churchill's monarchy, Roosevelt's liberals, and Stalin's communists.

Churchill wanted to see King Victor Emmanuel III returned to power. He told the British Representative in Italy, Harold McMillan, "Be careful that nothing is done to make the King and Badoglio weaker than they are. On the contrary, we must hold them up and carry them forward with our armies."¹⁰³ The PM achieved initial success when, in a bilateral understanding, Roosevelt acquiesced to the first post-surrender government being created under the direction of the King. The Badoglio government, named for the Italian cabinet's PM, was the arrangement Churchill hoped would survive into the postwar. He, like FDR and Stalin, realized the initial postwar governance style would have advantage over the other possibilities. However, they did not want this government to last. The Americans are, noted Halifax, "irritated with the Prime Minister's leaning towards Badoglio-Victor Emmanuel regime."¹⁰⁴ Anglo-American bickering provided an opening for Stalin to insert himself into the Italian debate.

Motivated by a desire for greater prestige, vengeance against a defeated foe, and fear of a separate Western peace, Stalin forcefully included the Russians into the discussions on the formation of the new Italian government. "The Soviet Union received information about the results of the agreements between the two countries just as a passive third observer. I have to tell you that it is impossible to tolerate such a situation any longer."¹⁰⁵ The Italian Communist Party was one of the strongest communist parties in all of Europe. The leaders of the party, who had spent a number of years in Moscow, were known to Stalin personally.¹⁰⁶ These two facts gave Stalin leverage in the discussions over the future Italian

¹⁰³. Churchill, *Closing the Ring*, 201. October 23, 1943 Churchill cable to McMillan.

¹⁰⁴. FO: North American, vol. IV, 164.

¹⁰⁵. Roosevelt and Schlesinger, *My Dear Mr. Stalin*, 155.

¹⁰⁶. Miller, 94.

government, especially since the communists were more numerous in the north where major fighting was still taking place. The Soviet leader played his hand well and forced the reluctant Western allies to bring him into consultation instead of merely being informed about the situation.

Italy was in the Anglo-American military sphere, and the conquest of Italy was primarily an Anglo-American endeavor.¹⁰⁷ In their view, this meant that they alone would deal with the interim government in Italy and in particular its makeup. Churchill felt, proclaims Sainsbury, “The Allies could not tolerate a ‘Soviet Veto’ on Eisenhower’s control.”¹⁰⁸ Under the argument that controlling the interim government in Italy was militarily significant, the West believed that they should decide who formed the new government. The PM was particularly in favor of this view because Britain was taking over the Italian command. After Eisenhower transitioned to Overlord command, British General Alexander would assume control over the Mediterranean theater. Thus, Italy “was a British-led military theater” and “Churchill and the Foreign Office took up [a] proprietary view” of the country, contends Harbutt.¹⁰⁹

Stalin accepted the lesser role in Italy but not without taking account of the precedent set. “The Anglo-American stance on the Italian occupation backfired,” according to Geoffrey Roberts, because “it established a precedent for occupation regimes in the Axis countries of Eastern Europe.”¹¹⁰ As the FO feared, “The Declaration at Moscow on Italy [the Italian surrender precedent], which originated with the Soviet Government, may be taken as an indication of Soviet desires elsewhere ... they have drawn a distinction between the countries to the east of Germany, which they consider should” follow their lead and “the countries of Western Europe who should” be “led by Great Britain.”¹¹¹ Later the State Department noted, “The Commission [in Romanian and Bulgaria] are organized on the same general pattern as the Allied Commission in Italy, with Russia playing the leading role

¹⁰⁷ Aussies, Indians, New Zealanders, Poles, and even Brazilians played a role in the liberation of Italy.

¹⁰⁸ Sainsbury, 37. Dwight Eisenhower was the commander of Anglo-American forces in Italy; later, he was named Commander of Overlord.

¹⁰⁹ Harbutt, 204.

¹¹⁰ Geoffrey Roberts, *Stalin's War*, 175.

¹¹¹ FO: Russia, vol. IV, 45; FO: Russia, vol. V, 27. The text of the Moscow Declaration on Italy reads: “In making this declaration the three Foreign Secretaries recognize that so long as active military operations continue in Italy the time at which it is possible to give full effect to the principles set out above [democratic rule] will be determined by the Commander-in-Chief.”

which Great Britain and the United States have in Italy.”¹¹² Due to this precedent pushed by the British and written by the Soviets, the West conceded input on the formation of provisional governments in Eastern Europe. These provisional governments were the basis of the countries’ postwar governments, thus allowing the Russian to establish their “friendly” governments in the territories surrounding their Western perimeter.¹¹³

Besides, the use of similar terminology Stalin’s actions in early 1944 revealed an implicit Anglo-Soviet understanding on European affairs that would lead to the percentage deal. As part of his larger game plan the Soviet leader recognized Badoglio’s Government in March of 1944. “[T]he Russian action was advantageous to us in relation to our policy of retaining the King and Marshal Badoglio until the occupation of Rome.”¹¹⁴ Britain was a greater obstacle to his plans in Europe than the US. Similar to the Marshal’s later use of Greek communists as a check to maintain British adherence to the percentage deal by recognizing their preferred Italian government, Stalin could thereafter threaten the Italian arrangement with local communists if England tried to block his use of the same precedent in Eastern Europe. “The objective of Stalin’s diplomacy ... was to trade off Soviet concessions,” notes Miller, “over Italy [and later Greece] for Western recognition of the emerging Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe.”¹¹⁵ As 1944 unfolds, it became more and more in Britain’s interest to not interfere with Russian actions in the countries on the USSR’s border. With the US displaying little concern for the region, the foundation of Stalin’s security ring was taking shape.

Standing

In the description of how tripartite negotiations unfold, it was indicated that negotiations tend to have an ebb and flow. Negotiations are not linear in that everything flows to the final endpoint. Instead, a country’s standing can wax and wane amidst the lifespan of a coalition, even if ultimately they are moving in one direction. British standing eroded throughout 1942-1943, but at points, their standing actually improved, such as when Britain took the lead in Italy and placed the King back in power. Standing inside the Grand

¹¹² FRUS: Yalta, 238.

¹¹³ The creation of the Declaration on Italy actually took place at the Moscow Minister’s Meeting. However, due to a desire to remain congruent, this aspect of Big Three diplomacy along with the following paragraph that defines the precedent was related in this section instead of the next chapter which deals with the meeting itself.

¹¹⁴ Woodward, vol. II, 532.

¹¹⁵ Miller, 71.

Alliance continued to be fluid throughout the remainder of the war, though the British were always the junior partner.

A recent work by David Edgerton argues “that Britain was a first-class power” during the war.¹¹⁶ He makes a convincing case, yet it is not important whether statistics placed them in this position but rather if they were perceived to hold this position. Though it is “useful” to look at “objective reality,” relates Fischer and Ury, “ultimately the reality as each side sees it” is what is important “in a negotiation.”¹¹⁷ As Halifax lamented, “[T]he concept has steadily gained ground in this country that Great Britain has come to occupy a position on the world stage which in terms of power and influence is inferior to that of the United States and the USSR.”¹¹⁸ Churchill also felt this loss of standing. As Alanbrooke noted at Cairo, the PM was upset “since the strength of the American forces were now building up fast and exceeding ours. He hated having to give up the position of dominant partner” in military matters.¹¹⁹ Thus, the negotiational reality was that Britain was the junior partner, in all matters, by the time the vast majority of the decisions affecting the postwar world started to take place – the conferences of 1943.

It is harder to assess the standing between the Russians and Americans. This assessment is made more difficult because the Russians based their thinking about standing on military prowess. The Americans, on the other hand, saw it through an economic lens. “[C]ommonly the parties” have “different interpretations or perceptions of the same facts,” observes Mnookin.¹²⁰ (For the record, the British took a third view and felt geo-political aptitude defined a country’s position in the world.)

The Russian superiority in troops gave them the top slot amongst the Big Three. However, the Red Army could only fight with supplies from the Americans.¹²¹ Still, after 1943 the Russians became less dependent on American aid, ironically at the moment that shipments were finally being fully delivered. The best way to view Soviet and American standing, therefore, is to think of them as 1 (the Russians) and 1a (the Americans), superior

¹¹⁶. Edgerton, 2.

¹¹⁷. Ronald Fisher, William Ury, and Bruce Patton, *Getting to Yes*, 25.

¹¹⁸. FO: North American, vol. V, 321.

¹¹⁹. Alanbrooke, 473.

¹²⁰. Mnookin, Peppet, and Tulumello, *Beyond Winning*, 110.

¹²¹. Munting, 496-502. The Red Army received all of its wartime aluminum from the US, which was the main metal used in their airplanes and the T-34 tank (the most prolific Soviet Tanks). Plus, 1 in 3 meals eaten by their forces were part of American aid. Finally, the Red Army’s maneuverability was wholly dependent on American Jeeps.

to the British but with a distinct advantage for the Soviets. They were dependent on either soldiers or supplies that the other possessed but the Americans more so and the Russians less so as the war progressed. With anger, not credit, accrued from the first years of supplying aid due to Britain's maneuvering, the leverage amassed by the Americans was far less than Roosevelt had hoped to achieve.

The disparity between the two parties increased before Yalta, especially after China failed to be a viable military force in East Asia. Their military failure caused the Americans to look to the Red Army for help clearing the Japanese out of Manchuria (detailed in Chapter 4, China's Fall). America's need for Russian participation in the Pacific meant a clear separation in standing existed amongst the countries. The Russian dependency on supplies, however, kept them from being in a superior position to the Americans as they were to the British (or as the US was to the UK). Standing will be discussed only slightly throughout the rest of the work; however, it is important to take note of a country's ability to place soldiers and supplies into the field moving forward, since these two aspects would remain the defining factor that dictated the amount of say a Big Three member possessed.

Chapter Three: Divergent Visions

Prior to the conferences of 1943 – Moscow, Cairo I & II, Teheran – Halifax filed a report on the attitudes prevalent inside the Roosevelt administration. He noted many US officials feared “that the British Government entertain[s] a desire to mediate between Russia and the United States. This was interpreted in some quarters as an attempt by Britain to recreate her traditional position as the manipulator of the balance of power between Russia and the United States as formerly between France and Germany.”¹ By acting as an intermediary and framing a number of their positions as joint positions between them and one of the senior parties, Britain had protected most of their interests, to this point, in spite of challenging circumstances. Important British trade routes in the Mediterranean were being cleared of Axis troops, British soldiers were saved by the postponement of the second front, the delays in the shipments protected Britain’s vital shipping, and a pro-British government was establishment in Italy – all beneficial to the reestablishment of the Empire as it was set up in the interwar period.

The Russians were forced to accept convoys being sent when feasible, as Churchill desired, which protected Britain’s vital shipping that was needed to move the men and resources from the Empire to England. Roosevelt desired that these shipments be sent at all cost to better Soviet-American relations, since this was what Stalin demanded. The PM who delivered the message about convoys to the Soviets – acted as the intermediary – was able to define these conditions, therefore framing the Western stance. Similarly, Stalin had no choice but to accept the Mediterranean focus of the Western Allies’ military strategy in 1942-3 because Britain had reached a bilateral understanding with the Americans. The understanding had come about through Britain’s use of the exigent military circumstances and the momentum of the negotiation process by eliminating the options available to the US. The British were already engaged in the region and thus able to field more soldiers during the period. So, they were able to use their superior troop numbers as leverage as well as harness FDR’s need to place troops into Europe to assuage Pacific-firsters to launch Torch and later the Sicilian as well as Italian mainland operation.

Russia accepted these decisions because Britain had obtained agreement beforehand from America or Churchill had insinuated the positions were jointly held, i.e., they limited

¹ FO: North American, vol. III, 78.

the options available to the non-consulted party. Recall, “[v]arious studies have shown that the process of framing can have a significant impact on the final outcome of the negotiations.”² Stalin had determined he would only work with the West if his “minimal conditions” were met – supplies and the second front. These conditions were not met in the manner the Marshal wanted; as a result, his suspicions of Western intentions were quite high in the fall of 1943.

On the other side of the coalition, the pro-British Badoglio Government was maintained in Italy when Stalin backed traditional British European interests – the Mediterranean basin – in return for a precedent to protect traditional Russian European interests – Eastern Europe. The Americans begrudgingly acknowledged the Anglo-Soviet decision on the Italian Government because they needed to keep the momentum going towards Overlord. They could not afford any Italian turmoil or military adventures in the region that would cause “further diversions of forces or matériel which will interfere with the coincident mounting of [it],” notes Stimson.³ The tactics – framing and acting as a liaison – were British attempts to found postwar geo-politics on the principle of balance of power, like the Concept of Europe. The decisions and outcomes produced by the early use of these tactics were aimed at reestablishing the interwar setup of the Empire, whose resources and men would help them maintain their great power status.

The underlying interest that informed all British decision-making was the maintenance of their great power status. There exists a “difference between expressed positions (demands) and underlying interests (actual needs),” declares Cohen.⁴ It is important to remember the underlying interests of the Big Three. Their positions flowed from these interests; they guided the evolution of these positions and why they choose certain options. Plus, the Big Three’s underlying interests revealed how seemingly unrelated positions were actually linked. For instance, FDR’s reaction to the fears detailed above can be interpreted in multiple ways. However, if his underlying interest is ascertained, what the President and his subordinates were actually trying to address is exposed.

Roosevelt wanted to usher in long-term peace by remaking international institutions, especially world commerce, along American institutional lines based on American socio-

² Cohen, *Negotiate This*, 84.

³ FRUS: W/Q, 452. August 10, 1943 Stimson memo on overseas trip.

⁴ Cohen, *Negotiate This*, 290.

economic principles – the International New Deal. Directing the victorious allies' transition to peace would offer the President the opportunity to install these institutions. When FDR's underlying interest is taken into account, it is clear he wanted to decrease British influence on American planning and Soviet perceptions of said influence on US planning to accomplish this goal.

Britain would try to undermine the multilateral trade and decolonization aspects of the International New Deal. Plus, the American version of the UNO would forestall a balance of power setup. Equally important, FDR felt he had to make it “clear to Stalin that the United States and Great Britain were not allied in one common bloc against the Soviet Union.”⁵ Alleviating Russian fears cultivated by the delays in supplies and the second front was essential to obtaining Russian adherence to the American vision of the postwar world. Halifax detailed to the FO this sentiment as well, “[T]he Administration has set out to free itself from the charge that it follows dictation from Whitehall.”⁶ The US needed unfettered hands because the Russians would never enter into a postwar alliance where they were isolated like they had been in the League of Nations.

The Americans' desire for independence in the formation of their positions and Churchill's need for these decisions to be formed jointly caused tensions to rise between the Western powers. The PM wanted an American partnership, but he also wanted to sustain the prewar setup of the Empire and a regional UNO. He thought the Anglo-American “natural kinship” and fears of communism could bind the countries together, but Roosevelt was not afraid of and in fact needed the Russians. These tensions were at the heart of Anglo-American differences over the next eighteen months leading up to Yalta. In hindsight, especially using Cold War patterns, Anglo-American differences seem trite and that they could and should have been overcome; however, FDR and Churchill held divergent visions of how the postwar world should be formed. These different outlooks shaped how the two men sifted through and decided amongst the choices available.

Stalin also contextualized his options through the viewpoint of his underlying interest – the preservation of his power. Plus, as will be detailed, he “certainly did not intend to allow Britain to act as an intermediary between her and the United States of America.”⁷

⁵ Roosevelt, *As He Saw It*, 207.

⁶ FO: North American, vol. III, 78.

⁷ FO: Russia, vol. VI, 136.

The Marshal's determination to separate Anglo-American planning was born of the suspicions created as a result of British maneuverings. These misgivings caused Stalin to evolve his positions. Now, on top of his minimal conditions, Western concurrence with the establishment of his security sphere on his Western and Northeastern frontiers was desired. He would pursue Anglo-American agreement to his security sphere throughout the conferences of 1943. Roosevelt's similar desire to separate Western planning would help facilitate Soviet and American movement towards one another during these meetings.

Eden entered these conferences with the belief that an amicable setup in Eastern Europe could be established with the Russians. Recall, after the Anglo-Soviet Treaty discussions, he concluded with patience and understanding that the Russians could make deals acceptable to all. "I was given to saying at this time that the failure of the British Empire and Russia to agree [on] their policies in advance had made possible three great conflicts, the Napoleonic war and the world wars," wrote the Foreign Secretary.⁸ Furthermore, "I would say bluntly that on the maintenance of that co-operation lies the best chance of building a new and better international security after the war."⁹ His main aim, at this point, was "Anglo-Soviet consultation and agreement" over the treatment of liberated territories to avoid postwar conflicts, notes Sainsbury.¹⁰ Eden planned to secure Russian adherence to a self-denying ordinance. The ordinance was an attempt to avoid 'a competitive scramble to secure the allegiance of small powers.'¹¹ If it was signed, it would preclude the Big Three from making unilateral treaties with provisional governments in the liberated territories.

The problem, as Stalin would tell Stettinius, was, 'A freely elected government in any of these countries would be anti-Soviet, and that we cannot allow.'¹² The Marshal had revealed his intentions during the Anglo-Soviet Treaty discussions. However, it was not what Eden had perceived; instead, Stalin exposed his goal of dominating the territory surrounding the USSR and that he would only pursue this ambition when he felt secure. The Red Armies' victories at Stalingrad and Kursk provided this security. "The more clearly you understand the other side's concerns, the better able you will be to satisfy them at minimum cost to

⁸ Eden, 368.

⁹ FO: North American, vol. II, 289.

¹⁰ Sainsbury, 81.

¹¹ Ibid. Eden quoted.

¹² Stettinius, *Roosevelt and the Russians*, 310.

yourself,” declares Fisher, et al.¹³ Misunderstanding his partner’s intentions and fearing that this meeting was his last chance to conclude amenable agreements led to a less-than-ideal performance for the Foreign Secretary. As a result, the conferences of 1943 would alter his belief in an Anglo-Soviet understanding and radically change Eden’s postwar planning.

Moscow Ministers’ Meeting

The Western Allies desperately wanted a meeting of the Big Three heads of state, especially after the repercussions of the Russians victories in Stalingrad and Kursk (Aug. 1943) were understood. Eden wrote later, discussions with the Russians “seemed all the more necessary in view of what I felt was growing evidence of Soviet power.”¹⁴ Stalin, however, claimed ‘that things are now so hot that it is impossible for me to be absent myself for even a single day.’¹⁵ The West, who wanted the meeting more than the Russians, therefore had to settle for a tripartite meeting of the Foreign Ministers, at first.

The Foreign Ministers coming “to them, to negotiate, with the USSR on its own ground,” observes Sainsbury, “marked a change in status for the Soviet Union.”¹⁶ Having an international summit in Moscow signified what their victories in the field had implied – they were now a great power. Molotov “showed increasing enjoyment in being admitted for the first time into the councils as a full member,” noticed Harriman.¹⁷ Two other outcomes of the meeting and their implications would also reverberate throughout the remainder of wartime diplomacy – the Four-Power Declaration and the results of the Eden and Molotov discussions.

Four-Power Declaration

The Americans’ top priority for the conference was to obtain “the agreement of Russia and Britain to the principle of postwar international cooperation,” notes Sainsbury.¹⁸ Agreement on the directorate that would lead the UNO was the first step towards the International New Deal. The organization was the main mechanism in which Roosevelt believed that American principles could be instilled but only if they led the association.

¹³ Ronald Fisher, William Ury, and Bruce Patton, *Getting to Yes*, 188.

¹⁴ Eden, 369-70.

¹⁵ Eubanks, 59. Stalin quoted.

¹⁶ Sainsbury, 48.

¹⁷ United States Department of State, *Foreign relations of the United States. Diplomatic papers. The Conferences at Cairo and Teheran 1943* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943), (hereafter referred to as FRUS: C/T), 152.

¹⁸ Sainsbury, 12.

“China was going to be America’s postwar counterweight to Russia – and perhaps Britain as well,” observes Brands.¹⁹ The Americans, therefore, needed China to be a major player in the UNO since they were a dependent vote on America’s side against colonial Britain and expansionist Russia. Prior to the conferences, Hull and the State Department had drafted a plan that made the Big Four – Britain, China, US, and USSR – the leading countries of the anti-Axis coalition (the foundation of the UNO): the Four-Power Declaration. Anglo-Soviet adherence to this document was the Americans’ only hard position at Moscow.

Hull’s singular focus on obtaining agreement on the Declaration with China’s inclusion in the UNO directorate at Moscow perturbed Harriman and angered Eden (discussed momentarily). The ambassador felt the Secretary did not press Molotov hard enough to maintain the original language of the declaration, especially clause 5.²⁰ Hull concluded, however, that he had to seize this opportunity despite the cost because the Americans’ plans depended on “having China included in the four power declaration.”²¹ As a result of Soviet adherence, the Secretary was ecstatic about the outcome of the conference. He told T.V. Soong, the Chinese Foreign Minister, “[T]hroughout the conference all the Russian officials had been exceedingly cordial” and that this was “a splendid state of mind with which to launch our great forward movement of international cooperation.”²² Still, a number of changes were made to the original draft. The changes to clause 5 were the most damaging as they limited Anglo-American options for Eastern Europe.

Clause 5 of the Four-Power Declaration was designed to deal with defeated enemies and liberated territories. It was also designed to alleviate suspicions arising out of the Italian surrender and the Darlan deal as well as provide a check on Russia’s Eastern European ambitions. The aim was to put into writing the need for “joint action in imposing surrender terms” and “subsequent joint action” in these areas as well as in the liberated territories.²³ Instead of realizing this clause was similar to the self-denying ordinance, Eden was worried about the implications of this clause on British colonial possessions. “I sensed that even the

¹⁹ Brands, 729.

²⁰ Sainsbury, 48.

²¹ Roosevelt, *F.D.R.: His Personal Letters*, 1468. Nov. 8, 1943, FDR letter to Lord Mountbatten.

²² Hull, 1312-13. Nov. 1, 1943 Hull conversation with T.V. Soong.

²³ FRUS: C/T, 366-67. Clause 5 of Draft I Four-Power Declaration.

future of Hong Kong was in question with them,” recalled the Foreign Secretary.²⁴ Both Britain and Russia had reasons to check self-determination.

Eden’s and Molotov’s separate aspirations to limit self-determination created a basis for understanding that undermined America’s plans via clause 5. Therefore, the clause’s impact was restricted.²⁵ Recall, the Moscow Declaration on Italy (Italian surrender precedent), which was advantageous to Anglo-Soviet interests and based on military necessity not joint consultation, had just been worked out. Thus, through both actions, Britain maintained its options in regions of traditional interest to them – the Mediterranean and the Far East – but at the same time the Foreign Secretary had aided the Russians by removing restrictions on their actions in Eastern Europe.

Molotov wanted the clause rewritten because it would limit the Soviets’ options for Eastern Europe. At Moscow, “[I]t was indicated that although [the Russians] will keep us informed they would take unilateral actions in respect to these countries,” wrote Harriman.²⁶ Therefore, the Russians needed to remove any language that triggered “joint actions.” The stronger language was removed, leaving only ‘consult with one another with a view to joint action.’²⁷ Unless the Russians wanted to implement this decision as the West desired, the clause was worthless. Once again British interests were protected by siding with a senior party at the expense of the other senior party. Hull was forced to choose between the draft with strong language or risk losing China’s inclusion as a leading member of the UNO. Since the latter option was part and parcel with the Americans’ underlying interest, the Secretary of State signed the declaration with a watered-down clause 5.

The Eden and Molotov Discussions

The Russians were “determined to have no semblance of the Old ‘Cordon Saintaire.’”²⁸ Therefore, they were “violently opposed to the creation of any federations in eastern, southeastern and central Europe,” recollected Bohlen.²⁹ Plus, Stalin felt Russia had to dominate Eastern Europe to protect his power through the USSR “build[ing] its own

²⁴ Eden, 492.

²⁵ Sainsbury, 117-23.

²⁶ FRUS: C/T, 154-55. November 4, 1943 Harriman cable to FDR.

²⁷ FRUS: C/T, 366-67. Clause 5 of Final Draft of Four-Power Declaration.

²⁸ FRUS: C/T, 154-55.

²⁹ FRUS: C/T, 847.

sphere of influence.”³⁰ The Foreign Secretary did not fully realize what Russian positions had entailed - the protection and expansion of the Marshal’s power – during the prior Anglo-Soviet discussions. By drawing the wrong conclusion from the Anglo-Soviet Treaty negotiations, Eden did not recognize until it was too late that concessions on Eastern Europe would not lead to the amenable solution of problems he hoped. Additionally, the concessions would forestall the use of the region as part of his refashioning of the interwar period collective security and Churchill’s reworking of the Concert of Europe.

Eden hoped to establish a European Advisory Commission (EAC) in London. The EAC would have the dual purposes of creating “machinery for consultation between the Allies on European questions,” sans Italy, and reestablishing the balance of power with England playing the role of intermediary between Washington and Moscow. Furthermore, if it had a wide remit, the Commission would make London “the site,” proclaimed the Foreign Secretary, “to deal with planning for peace,” with the standing that would afford the English.³¹ Eden was not unfounded in this belief; Roosevelt feared the Commission might make Britain ‘leaders in Europe of the Anglo-Saxon countries.’³² To obtain agreement on a broad-based EAC, Eden conceded a hard British position (self-denying ordinance) and a major desire (confederations) during his meetings with Molotov, whereas the Foreign Commissar conceded only soft positions (EAC in London and with a greater remit). The events surrounding these concessions reveal the effects of context, standing, as well as process in reducing options and creating the outcome of a negotiation.

During the conference, the Foreign Secretary had become frustrated with Hull’s lack of concern in regards to Eastern Europe. “I found him most unwilling to make any move” in respect to the region, especially Poland.³³ The Secretary of State had told Eden ‘it was more of a British problem.’³⁴ The Americans still felt these decisions were “matter[s] which should come within the purview of the general settlement.”³⁵ The British, as noted, felt the Russian advances in Eastern Europe meant they had to come to terms with them on the region – a time crunch. The Foreign Secretary was concerned that any further Red Army

³⁰ Stettinius, *Roosevelt and the Russians*, 310. September 19, 1944 Harriman memo to Stettinius.

³¹ Eden, 493.

³² Woodward, Vol. III, 64. FDR quoted.

³³ Eden, 482.

³⁴ Sainsbury, 80.

³⁵ FRUS: C/T, 186. State Department memo on Germany.

advancements meant “our negotiating power, slender as it was anyways, would amount to very little.”³⁶ Cohen notes, “All evidence show that the [party] that feels most constrained by time limits will make more substantial concessions”³⁷ Hull and the Americans bear some responsibility for Eden’s poor showing by abandoning him, without prior warning, to deal with the Russians on Eastern Europe. Still, the Foreign Secretary continued in spite of Hull’s intransigence, due in large part to the perceived time crunch; thus, Eden had no ability to act as an intermediary or frame positions like he had during the Anglo-Soviet Treaty negotiations.

Eden met privately with Molotov because he felt it was possible “to discuss a number of European problems with Molotov and to establish ... a common policy.”³⁸ The Foreign Secretary wanted to discuss four interrelated issues: the Czech-Soviet Treaty (the written version of the Faustian bargain Czechoslovakian President Benes had made thinking he was protecting his country discussed in Chap. 1), the EAC, federations, and the self-denying ordinance. In the end, Eden received definitive answers about all four, but only one was what he had hoped for at the outset.

Amidst the tripartite discussions, Eden had achieved his first measure of success. Initially, “Molotov accepted that [the EAC] should be in London,” relates Sainsbury, “but made it clear that he did not” want it “to have a wide remit.”³⁹ If London was going to take the lead on the EAC, Molotov concluded the EAC should deal with Germany and Western Europe exclusively. The Foreign Minister was sticking to the Russian line that “the countries to the east of Germany” should follow Russia’s lead and “the countries of Western Europe” should be “led by Great Britain,” laid out in the Declaration on Italy.⁴⁰ Still, by acquiescing to one of the Foreign Secretary’s desires, Molotov fostered a need to reciprocate. “Someone who is rewarded” for their concessions, notes de Cremer and Pittutla, “will be more inclined to view your future requests in a more positive light.”⁴¹ When a party concedes a point, they alter the balance sheet, and the other party typically feels the need to normalize it – reciprocal norm.

³⁶ Eden, 482.

³⁷ Cohen, *Negotiate This*, 191.

³⁸ Eden, 476.

³⁹ Sainsbury, 77.

⁴⁰ FO: Russia, vol. V, 27.

⁴¹ De Cremer and Pillutla, 119.

The Foreign Secretary met the Foreign Minister alone with a desire to reciprocate. He now lacked the ability to use American sensibilities as cover. Plus, he was anxious to conclude agreements.⁴² As Eden wrote home, 'I want to get on as fast as I can.'⁴³ "Time," declares Cohen, "adds pressure, producing stress and forc[es] decision making."⁴⁴ The Foreign Secretary had told the Cabinet he was against the Czech-Soviet Treaty because it excluded the Poles and his self-denying ordinance was designed to forestall these types of treaties. Yet, after Molotov had agreed that the EAC should be in London, Eden decided not to oppose the treaty and thus abandoned the self-denying ordinance.

The Foreign Secretary thought, like the previous year, he could mitigate Russia's more untenable demands with patience and understanding. The Cabinet was not sympathetic to this plan. They "prefer[red] to maintain the 'self-denying ordinance.'" Eden felt, however, "that further opposition to [the treaty] would cause distrust and suspicion," which would undermine the understanding he was trying to foster. The USSR "had a right to make agreements," argued Molotov, "with 'neighboring' Allied Governments without consulting the British or seeking their approval."⁴⁵ In the end, Eden removed the objections, notes Eubanks, "because Molotov accepted the British-sponsored European Advisory Commission."⁴⁶ It is clear Eden acted on his own, which was possible due to the greater authority possessed by the British Minister vis-à-vis his counterparts.

Concessions tend to have a domino effect; one concession leads to reciprocation, which then itself is reciprocated and so forth. After Eden removed British objections to the treaty, not surprisingly, the Foreign Commissar backed away from his previous position about a small remit for the EAC. As a result, Molotov recommended a number of issues – French policy, German dismemberment and occupation, administration of liberated territories, as well as peace-keepers – to the EAC. The latter two dealt with Eastern Europe, but decisions on them were restricted by military exigencies, i.e., the Italian surrender precedent. A similar pattern of reciprocal concessions will occur during Teheran. Nevertheless, the Russian's concessions were bought at a steep price, revealing the impact of

⁴² Eubanks, 120-21 and Sainsbury, 95-96, 98-102. It is notable that both of the Teheran scholars (Eubanks and Sainsbury) who are most often quoted in this article also made it a point to highlight Eden's feelings about the slow progress of the meeting and its effect on his actions.

⁴³ Eden, 476. October 18, 1943 Eden memo to the Cabinet.

⁴⁴ Cohen, *Negotiate This*, 199.

⁴⁵ Woodward, vol. II, 595-96, 598, 599.

⁴⁶ Eubanks, 120.

a time-crunch on decision-making. These concessions also increased the cost of future deals over Eastern Europe.

Another consequence of Eden's acquiescence on the Czech-Soviet Treaty, proclaims Sainsbury, was that "the policy of federation in Eastern Europe, which Britain had been encouraging and working on for the past two or three years, received its death blow."⁴⁷ Once the treaty was signed, the Russians would have a say over whether or not the Czechs and Poles would be able to form a federation together – a mainstay of Churchill's confederal plans. The PM also failed to realize, initially, what had been conceded. He felt "the importance of" the Moscow agreements "lay in the additional machinery of cooperation which was about to be setup," overlooking the concessions it revealed.⁴⁸ He believed that this furthered his aims of a British-led balance of power setup, not that it eliminated a number of options available to the British, such as a Czech-Poland combination.

To achieve a free hand in Eastern Europe, the Russians preferred to set up the region with small disjointed states. "Their idea of a friendly government," recalled Byrnes was "a government completely dominated by them."⁴⁹ Only disunity would afford the Russians the opportunity to secure "friendly" relations with the countries along their borders. Therefore, they would never allow the Czechs to enter into a confederation with other Eastern European states. The FO was well aware that "there is little evidence that the Soviet Union will be prepared to agree to federations in Eastern Europe after the war."⁵⁰ Without the self-denying ordinance or language triggering "joint action," the Russians, under the Italian surrender precedent, were now free to conclude treaties with the provisional governments in Eastern Europe they set up without Western oversight or input.

These concessions meant the issues of Eastern Europe were not substantially addressed, yet the Russians had gained greater leverage over future decisions regarding the region and reduced potential options. "It was the high tide" of Anglo-Soviet relations, but "the Soviet attitude," wrote Eden, "would harden with the growing certainty of victory."⁵¹

⁴⁷. Sainsbury, 90.

⁴⁸. Churchill, *Closing the Ring*, 298.

⁴⁹. James F. Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1947), 31.

⁵⁰. *The Foreign Office and the Kremlin: British Documents on Anglo-Soviet Relations 1941-45*, ed. Graham Ross (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 112.

⁵¹. Eden, 484.

Once the actual implications of the decisions reached at Moscow become apparent to Eden, he discarded his Anglo-Soviet understanding strategy.

Cairo I

Shortly after the Moscow meeting, a date and time for the much anticipated and sought after meeting of the Big Three leaders was finally established. Instead of a single meeting, however, FDR would embark on an elaborate multi-act diplomatic mission. The impetus for this long and winding road trip was not the President but the PM.

Once the date for the first tripartite heads of state meeting was established, Churchill decided it was “necessary that the British and United States staffs should consult together before any triple conference with the Russians takes place.”⁵² He wanted to form joint plans for both the political as well as military aspects of Teheran. Additionally, his doctor, Lord Moran, noticed since Québec I the PM “ha[d] grown more and more certain that an invasion of France as planned [May 1944] must fail.”⁵³ However, Harriman had alerted the President, “It is clear [the Russians] never like to be faced with Anglo-American decisions already taken.”⁵⁴ As a result, the President did “not want to give Stalin the impression we are settling everything between ourselves before we met him.”⁵⁵ FDR, therefore, balked at the idea.

Roosevelt had been trying to arrange a meeting with Chiang Kai-shek for some months. The President thought he could kill two birds – meet with Chiang and allay Soviet fears – with one stone by including the Chinese in the pre-Teheran meeting. China’s inclusion in the First Cairo Conference would forestall the creation of joint positions, provide an opportunity for Roosevelt to meet Chiang, and undermine British attempts to further delay the second front.

The President concocted a convoluted Shakespearian-style getaway: the first act, a Sino-Anglo-American meeting with a Russian military presence (Cairo I); the second act, an Anglo-Soviet-American tripartite meeting (Teheran); and the third act, a bilateral Anglo-American meeting, which would finalize the military decisions from the first two conferences (Cairo II). To induce Churchill to acquiesce to this schedule, relates Eubanks, “Roosevelt had agreed there would be ‘many meetings’ between the American and British

⁵² Churchill, Roosevelt, and Kimball, 579.

⁵³ Lord Moran, *Winston Churchill: The Struggle for Survival, 1940-1945* (London: Constable, 1966), 160.

⁵⁴ FRUS: C/T, 65. November 4, 1943 Harriman cable to FDR.

⁵⁵ Eubanks, 58. Roosevelt quoted.

Chiefs before either the Russians or Chinese arrived.”⁵⁶ These meetings never materialized because Chiang arrived first.

The British had two goals at the Cairo conferences: push back the date for the second front and undermine the growing Sino-American partnership. Churchill was worried about China’s role in “future attempts to dismantle the British Empire,” declares Hilderbrand.⁵⁷ Additionally, he felt that China’s status “as one of the world’s four Great Powers [was] an absolute farce.”⁵⁸ During these conferences (and 1944) Britain worked under the assumption, “If China fails to emerge as a strong and dependable factor in the maintenance of stability in the Far East, the need for British co-operation may become more evident than it is at present.”⁵⁹ With greater participation in the Pacific, Britain ‘would not,’ the PM concluded, ‘become so a junior partner in the Anglo-American effort.’⁶⁰ Furthermore, Churchill wanted “to make sure that no agreements would be reached,” declares Ronald Heiferman, “that would in any way prejudice British colonial interests.”⁶¹ If the Americans had another partner in the Far East, they would have little need to support the British Empire.

The Americans, on the other hand, wanted exactly what the PM feared: a Sino-American partnership to usher in a new anti-colonial era in the Pacific. For instance, immediately after initiating his correspondence with Chiang, FDR asked the generalissimo for his opinions on Indian independence. Chiang revealed Roosevelt’s meddling during his visit to India in 1942, which angered the British, especially Churchill. After the President drew the PM’s ire, Roosevelt “shifted his attack on colonialism to French Indochina,” notes Herring.⁶² The President proclaimed, ‘I will work with all my might and main to see to it that the United States is not wheedled into the position of accepting any plan that will further France’s imperialistic ambitions.’⁶³ Subsequently, FDR focused his planning for China’s role in decolonization on French Southeast Asia.

⁵⁶ Eubanks, 135.

⁵⁷ Hilderbrand, 59.

⁵⁸ Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy*, 701.

⁵⁹ FO: North American, vol. IV, 258. May 2, 1944 Halifax to Eden.

⁶⁰ Edgerton, 289. Churchill quoted.

⁶¹ Ronald Heiferman, *The Cairo Conference of 1943: Roosevelt, Churchill, Chiang Kai-Shek, and Madame Chiang* (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland, 2011), 2.

⁶² Herring, *Colony to Superpower*, 572.

⁶³ Roosevelt, *As He Saw It*, 116.

The two non-second front discussions at Cairo – the Burma campaign and trusteeships – stemmed from the American need to foster a close Sino-American partnership. With China in the fold, FDR felt the US was “going to be able to bring pressure on the British to fall in line with our thinking, in relation to the whole colonial question.”⁶⁴ The Burma campaign would help the Chinese play a greater role in the defeat of Japan, which would elevate Chinese prestige. It would also signify an American commitment to the country. Finally, this plan meant, “China would carry the main burden of liberating the mainland of East Asia,” reveals Odd Arne Westad.⁶⁵ FDR hoped the Nationalist Army would drive the Japanese out of Southeast Asia. Though their soldiers’ presence meant that China would direct Southeast Asia’s transition to peace, akin to Russia in Eastern Europe, the Chinese dependence on America meant that the US could dictate how that process unfolded. The President, as a result, could establish his trusteeship program throughout Southeast Asia in the wake of Chinese forces, thus unlocking the region’s latent productivity and resources, he felt were bottled up by the colonial powers.

The typical retelling of Yalta does not delve into Anglo-American differences in the Pacific enough to reveal the suspicions created on both sides. “The war with Japan exposed differences between London and Washington more protracted than any which affected policy in Europe,” declares Max Hastings.⁶⁶ Without understanding their differences over the Pacific theater and when they started to foment – Cairo – discerning the events and in particular their effects on the formation of American and British strategies for Yalta is impossible. The issues created in the Pacific were a major impetus in Churchill’s movement away from the Anglo-American partnership in 1944.

The debates at Cairo, observes Sainsbury, were “one of the bitterest strategic arguments of the war between Britain and America.”⁶⁷ Eden echoed this point, “This conference was among the most difficult, I ever attended.”⁶⁸ As noted, Roosevelt wanted the Chinese to participate in the liberation of Southeast Asia, which a spring 1944 Burmese campaign would afford. Plus, proclaimed Leahy, “The American Chiefs of Staff were

⁶⁴ Ibid, 224.

⁶⁵ Odd Arne Westad, *Cold War and Revolution: Soviet-American Rivalry and the Origins of the Chinese Civil War, 1944-1946* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 21.

⁶⁶ Max Hastings, *Retribution: The Battle for Japan, 1944-45* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2008), 59.

⁶⁷ Sainsbury, 287.

⁶⁸ Eden, 493.

convinced that support of China was essential to our own security and success of the Allied cause.”⁶⁹ Recall, the Americans also wanted the Nationalist Army to drive the Japanese out of Manchuria. Opening the Burma Road by liberating Burma would give the US a route to supply the Chinese the matériel to accomplish these tasks.

Churchill, on the other hand, felt the main British prize in the Pacific was Singapore. A Burma campaign would, in his eyes, needlessly distract from this objective. The PM wrote, “Certainly we favored keeping China in the war, but a sense of proportion and the study of alternatives were needed.”⁷⁰ Due to these differences, the Burma campaign became a political issue more than a military one.

FDR and Churchill each had their own operation they wanted as the main priority for the 1944 spring campaign season in Southeast Asia. The Prime Minister “preferred ‘Culverin’ – an attack on Sumatra – to the U.S. sponsored ‘Buccaneer,’” emphasizes Sainsbury. American General Joseph Stillwell and the Chinese were planning an offensive against North Burma in the spring. “The Generalissimo said,” noted the CCS, “the success of operations in Burma” were dependent “on the simultaneous coordination of naval actions with the land operations.”⁷¹ Buccaneer – a British-led amphibious assault on South Burma – would coincide with this action easing pressure on the North Burma campaign. Culverin, however, envisioned using the North Burmese attack as a distraction while the British recaptured their main Southeast Asian prize: Singapore.

The Anglo-American differences were over priorities. “The Americans wanted to build a road to China while the British wanted to beat a path to Singapore,” proclaims Heiferman.⁷² Besides as a supply route, the Burma Road was important to FDR’s plans for China because Chiang saw it as “a symbol of the future.”⁷³ The British, however, had “decided upon Singapore as the best site,” recalls General Ismay, “to exercise control of sea communications in the Indian and Southern Pacific Ocean.”⁷⁴ With both sides divided, the Burmese issues hung in the air for much of the conference.

⁶⁹ Leahy, 202.

⁷⁰ Churchill, *Closing the Ring*, 560.

⁷¹ FRUS: C/T, 3. CCS minutes of November 23 Cairo plenary session.

⁷² Heiferman, 101.

⁷³ Kai-shek Chiang and George Kao, *The Collected Wartime Messages of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek, 1937-1945* (New York: Kraus Reprint, 1969), 638.

⁷⁴ Ismay, *Memoirs*, 237.

The first real movement came after the President and Chiang met for the first time. The two men struck some type of a bargain aimed at assuring him of American support in return for liberalizing Chiang's government.⁷⁵ What is certain is that the Cairo Declaration stated, 'Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores shall be restored to the Republic of China.'⁷⁶ Plus, the President "had given [Chiang] a promise of a considerable operation across the Bay of Bengal [Buccaneer]," recalled Ismay.⁷⁷ After the meeting, the American military displayed a more forceful resolve in regards to Buccaneer. Heiferman relates, "The vehemence with which Marshall, Leahy, and King" now "supported Buccaneer" took "their British counterparts by surprise."⁷⁸ It won out over Culverin. Still, the Americans conceded to Britain's request that Buccaneer should "be considered in relations to other operation to be undertaken."⁷⁹ This concession would come back to haunt Roosevelt's plans to increase Chinese military prestige.

FDR also revealed to Chiang, during their meeting, the role China was to play in the President's trusteeship concept. He perceived "the Generalissimo was 'cheered' by his attitude toward the dismantling of colonial empires," reveals Heiferman.⁸⁰ Roosevelt's plan meant, "American power, allied with China, would then replace the Europeans as the stabilizing force in Asia," proclaims Leffler.⁸¹ Coupled with the clauses about Chinese territory, FDR hoped that Chiang's and China's prestige would be elevated by these actions. This was just what Churchill feared – a Sino-American decolonization plan – and he was hell

⁷⁵ Roosevelt, *As He Saw It*, 164. The conversations are not recorded so it is hard to tell what bargain was struck. All we have is Elliott Roosevelt's memories of what happened at the meeting. According to Elliott this conversation transpired:

FDR: 'Before it came up, I'd been registering a complaint about the character of Chiang's government. I'd told him it was hardly the modern democracy that ideally it should be. I'd told him he would have to form a unity government, while the war was still being fought, with the Communists in Yen-an. And he agreed. He agreed, contingently. He agreed to the formation of a democratic government once he had our assurance that the Soviet Union would agree to respect the frontier in Manchuria. *That part of it is on the agenda for Teheran* (itals, MMG).'

Elliott: 'So, then if you're able to work out that end of it with Stalin, Chiang has agreed to form a more democratic government in China. And in return...'

FDR: "In return, we will support his contention that the British and other nations no longer enjoy special Empire rights to Hong Kong, Shanghai, and Canton."

⁷⁶ FRUS: China, Annex 33. The Cairo Declaration.

⁷⁷ Ismay, 331.

⁷⁸ Heiferman, 109.

⁷⁹ FRUS: C/T, 320.

⁸⁰ Heiferman, 103.

⁸¹ Walter Lafeber, "Roosevelt, Churchill, and Indochina: 1942-1945," *The American Historical Review* 80, no. 5 (Dec., 1975), 1277.

bent to rock that boat. The PM “was adamant,” notes Sainsbury, “he would have nothing to do with ‘Buccaneer.’”⁸² Before he could upset the Sino-American applecart, the second act of Roosevelt’s convoluted trip took place – Teheran.

Teheran

The Teheran Conference lasted four days (Nov. 28 - Dec. 1, 1943). The first three days were taken up mostly by military discussions. During these talks, each party achieved some successes and suffered some setbacks. Militarily, the Russians secured most of what they wanted out of these meetings. They were relieved by the Americans’ attitudes towards the second front and the priority they placed on it. Stalin “saw the second front as a critical factor in the military equation,” relates Geoffrey Roberts.⁸³ The lack of a second front would have resulted in a dire reduction of the Marshal’s military prowess, through greater losses in men and matériel, and as a result, the USSR’s standing in the world. Though, Stalin did worry that without an established commander ‘nothing would come of the operation.’⁸⁴

The Americans received an estimate for the cost of Russian participation in the Far East. They also were able to undercut any diversions of matériel and manpower from ‘Overlord,’ especially in the Mediterranean. FDR believed “the way to save American lives” was not “wasting landing craft and men and matériel in the Balkan mountains.”⁸⁵ Saving American lives was the main military priority moving forward, especially in the Far East.

The British managed to come to an agreement on a more flexible date for the invasion (finalized at Cairo II). Their other military desire, however, did not come to fruition. “Britain had propped up the ‘sick man of Europe’ throughout the 19th century, and this strategically vital country was still a primary British ally and client,” relates Harbutt.⁸⁶ This time, though, they were unable to secure their partners’ help in trying to draw Turkey into the war, thus raising their prestige before the Russians made demands of them. Not coincidentally, “Molotov showed no enthusiasm for the idea” of incentivizing Turkish entry into the war effort. He “was content to leave the matter in my hands,” recalled Eden.⁸⁷ The British knew that the Turks “demanded that the Allies should equip the Turkish Army,”

⁸² Sainsbury, 222.

⁸³ Geoffrey Roberts, *Stalin’s War*, 135.

⁸⁴ Sainsbury, 243. Stalin quoted.

⁸⁵ Roosevelt, *As He Saw It*, 185. FDR quoted.

⁸⁶ Harbutt, 85.

⁸⁷ Eden, 484.

relates Sainsbury, “before they could take that risk.”⁸⁸ Acquiescing to this demand would divert resources from ‘Overlord.’ The US – the arsenal of democracy – was adamant that Turkish entry should not cause “diversions of resources.”⁸⁹ Therefore, these supplies would not be forthcoming. If Turkey was not going to fight coupled with the Americans’ and Soviets’ resolute stance about Mediterranean diversions, any hope for a Balkan offensive was becoming desperate.

The FDR and Stalin Talks

While the military debates were unfolding, the President had his first (second and third) chance to meet the Soviet Premier. The first two conversations focused on Roosevelt’s pet projects – the UNO and China. He had his first opportunity to unveil to Stalin the details of his Big Four plan during these discussions. Roosevelt explained how central the Russians were to his planning, part of his attempt to overcome the distrust created by Britain’s previous maneuverings. “His conversations with Stalin [at Teheran] revealed” that FDR wanted “a universal world organization,” according to Robert Divine, only as “a sop to the small powers.”⁹⁰ De Gaulle recollected, “In [the President’s] mind, a four-power directory would settle the world’s problems.”⁹¹ This concept fit perfectly with Stalin’s view of geo-politics. “It was noticeable in our meeting with the Russian[s],” recalled Leahy, that they “showed no interest whatever in any use we might desire to make of the smaller Allied Nations.”⁹² However, the Marshal preferred a regional instead of a worldwide basis for the UNO. The autocrat feared “that a European state would probably resent China having the right to apply machinery to it.”⁹³ The President now knew he had to overcome Stalin’s reservations.⁹⁴

Roosevelt understood he needed the Russian ruler’s adherence to the package he had offered to Chiang for it to be effective. Plus, he wanted to gauge “the price” of Red Army participation in the Pacific. Well aware of the fact that the Soviet Premier would want something in exchange for these agreements, the President asked what he (and tacitly Chiang) could offer Stalin. The Soviets wanted control if not outright possession of the

⁸⁸ Sainsbury, 288.

⁸⁹ FRUS: C/T, 210. November 18, 1943 JCS memo on Turkey.

⁹⁰ Robert A. Divine, *Roosevelt and World War II* (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1970), 65.

⁹¹ De Gaulle, 573.

⁹² Leahy, 303.

⁹³ FRUS: C/T, 53. Bohlen Minutes of Second FDR/Stalin conversation.

⁹⁴ FRUS: C/T, 483-5; 529-32.

Ports of Arthur and Darien. They also needed access to these ports. Land access would go through Manchuria, so they required Chinese agreement to Russia's unfettered access to the region. For sea access to the ports, they wanted to take control of the Japanese held Kurile Islands and the Southern Sakhalin Islands. FDR was amenable to these concessions and insinuated he could obtain the generalissimo's agreement as well. Additionally, his Far Eastern plans were given an added boost when Stalin revealed he was opposed to restoring "Indochina to French colonial rule."⁹⁵ With this *quid pro quo* established, both men were quite pleased and planned to meet again the following day.⁹⁶

The third meeting was devoted to Stalin's chief concerns. His major interests were the treatment of Germany, Polish territorial changes, and his desire to incorporate the Baltic States into the Soviet Union. The topics were addressed to the satisfaction of the Soviet Premier because Russian cooperation was essential for American leadership of the Big Four-controlled UNO. Furthermore, none of these issues affected Roosevelt's ability to instill American socio-economic principles world-wide, except Germany, but FDR also desired a harsh treatment of Germany after the war. He believed that only "[i]f Germans were punished and the country was permanently weakened through dismemberment, disarmament, and economic controls, then there would be peace," relates Gaddis Smith.⁹⁷ Finally, evolving his positions towards the Soviet stances would be the last step in assuaging Stalin's misgivings about working with the Americans.

The President gave the Soviet leader assurances that he would support the Russians' desired boundary changes along the Soviet-Polish border – the Curzon Line. The one concern was "to avoid an open concession to Russia, largely because he was sensitive to the political power of several million Polish-Americans," notes Smith.⁹⁸ He was not worried enough to alter his planning, revealing public opinion was a factor, not an influence, for the President. Therefore, he told the Russian ruler that he needed to wait until after the election, at least, to proclaim any territorial changes, but Roosevelt preferred to hold off until the peace conference convened. Similarly, he wanted the Soviets to make some "gesture" to

⁹⁵ Eubanks, 247.

⁹⁶ FRUS: C/T, 483-5, 529-32.

⁹⁷ Gaddis Smith, *American Diplomacy during the Second World War: 1941-1945* 2nd ed. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1985), 118.

⁹⁸ FRUS: Yalta, 207 and Smith, 69. Harriman later wrote to FDR "[A]t Teheran you had indicated that you considered that the Curzon Line was right although you did not consider advisable to make your position public."

world opinion in regards to Baltic self-determination – a plebiscite – before incorporating the territory. Stalin knew how to “run” an election coupled with the Russians’ advantageous position in Eastern Europe; he saw potential for this arrangement. The President would see just how well his first two meeting with the Marshal had gone when this meeting ended.⁹⁹

Stalin ended the discussion by telling Roosevelt “he had come to agree with the President that [the UNO] should be world-wide and not regional.”¹⁰⁰ This deal making during the FDR/Stalin conversations was another instance where reciprocity dictated action – reciprocal norm. In the final meeting, the American leader felt an obligation to meet some of the Marshal’s needs in Europe since the Soviet Premier had met some of Roosevelt’s concerns in regards to the UNO and the Far East. Once Stalin realized the President was willing to work with him on his main concerns, he felt obliged to reciprocate. Therefore, the Soviet leader supported FDR’s version of the UNO.

If, as typically portrayed, wartime diplomacy was dictated by Soviet-American priorities with the British forced to accept these dictates, then more *quid pro quo* agreements like those that transpired during the FDR/Stalin talks should have occurred. The two countries’ underlying interests were not necessarily at odds. However, before and during the conferences, the British had reduced the options available to the senior parties through framing and by acting as the Grand Alliance’s intermediary. Even the context for the FDR/Stalin talks – FDR’s desire to eliminate Soviet fears over what Western positions entailed and Stalin’s determination to separate western planning – was generated by British machinations. Their actions had and would continue to cause the two senior parties’ positions to evolve.

Churchill Enters the Fray

Stalin’s final concession was an ominous sign for Churchill, who preferred balance of power set up based on a regionally based UNO. The PM had set out for Cairo and Teheran hoping to establish a united front with the Americans and present joint positions on the touchy issues of wartime diplomacy – his Anglo-American partnership. As the conference unfolded, however, Churchill realized “that the Americans had deliberately set out to make the British seem the ‘odd man out,’” notes Sainsbury, and to paint them as “the main

⁹⁹. FRUS: C/T, 594-5.

¹⁰⁰. FRUS: C/T, 596. Bohlen minutes for third Stalin/FDR meeting.

obstacle to Soviet wishes.”¹⁰¹ Before the final day, which would cover the topics dear to the PM, he wanted to meet with Stalin and try to set the record straight.

This meeting is of import not because of what was discussed, since they rehashed well worn Anglo-Soviet debates. Instead, it was the first time since the formation of the Grand Alliance that Churchill did not try to frame British positions as Western ones; this time, he staked out unilateral positions. Most detrimental to the President was the PM’s understanding with Stalin that the Big Three (Four) should hold, unilaterally if necessary, strategic points around the globe. This plan was a direct threat to FDR’s trusteeship concept but was ideal for the dominance of a region or protecting colonial interests.¹⁰² As the percentage deal reveals, when working with the Russians, Churchill found a convenient overlap between his desire to maintain European colonialism and Soviet expansion through the concept of holding strategic points unilaterally.

Churchill continued his unilateral stance during the final tripartite meeting, which was the main meeting to discuss political issues. During the meeting he tried to ingratiate himself to Stalin by undermining Roosevelt. For instance, after FDR tried to work out an agreement with the Russian ruler to allow Finland to remove itself from the war, the PM undercut the President. Churchill declared “that the British Government was not insistent on anything regarding the Finns.”¹⁰³ This attitude foreshadowed his movement towards Russia, which would slowly take place over the next nine months. However, it was not out of the blue that the PM reacted this way.

On the final day, the British were confronted with a Soviet-American axis. Ironically, the PM had caused it to come into existence by convincing Stalin that an Anglo-American bloc existed. The positions created by the new axis were unfavorable to the aims to which Churchill was working. For instance, the Danubian federation, the PM’s idea for the treatment of Germany after the war, was deemed to be insufficiently harsh in comparison to the understanding on postwar Germany – dismemberment, disarmament and economic controls – reached by FDR and Stalin. Similarly, Churchill’s ideas on reparations, peace

¹⁰¹. Sainsbury, 258.

¹⁰². FRUS: C/T, 553-55, 836-37.

¹⁰³. FRUS: C/T, 532.

feelers, and the treatment of defeated enemies and liberated territories were also met with a lukewarm reception. The worst blow for the British was over Poland.¹⁰⁴

Britain hoped “to get assurances from the Russians to allay Polish fears,” specifically that “diplomatic relations out to be restored.” Additionally, they wanted to recoup the federation plans with “the Polish Government encouraged” by the Russians “to accede to the Soviet-Czech Treaty.”¹⁰⁵ The plan revealed that the British had realized the implications of the concessions made at Moscow. “However, our plan now received an unexpected setback,” recalled Eden, “at the hands of President Roosevelt” since he had already conceded the Curzon Line.¹⁰⁶ Unable to use the frontier as a bargaining chip, Churchill was still able to make a bad situation a little better by securing Soviet acceptance of movement in Poland’s favor on their western (German) border. Yet, Stalin would not move from the opinion that only when “the London Poles were prepared to be reasonable about frontiers” would he “consider resuming relations with them.”¹⁰⁷

The Curzon Line was the Soviet-Polish border established at Versailles but was superseded by the Treaty of Riga (the peace treaty drawn up after the post-WWI war between the USSR and Poland), which established the countries’ prewar boundaries. If accepted, it would reduce the viability of the Polish state, under the guise of reconnecting ethnic Ukrainians and White Russians with their Soviet brethren. Eubanks emphasizes, “Stalin had concluded that security against a revived Germany required a Poland which the Soviet Union could dominate. The Curzon Line was the first step in achieving this goal.”¹⁰⁸ Churchill reluctantly accepted these terms, stating he wished to see ‘a Poland which was strong and independent, but friendly to Russia.’¹⁰⁹ Thus, instead of a resumption of Soviet-Polish relations, the PM now had to convince the Poles to accept the territorial changes.

“My feelings at the close of the conference were less easy than they had been in Moscow,” recalled Eden.¹¹⁰ In the end, only a few of the outstanding issues facing the Big Three were resolved; most were left in abeyance. A number of options, however, were removed at the conference, which meant the price for Soviet movement on Eastern Europe

¹⁰⁴. FRUS: C/T, 596-604.

¹⁰⁵. Eden, 489.

¹⁰⁶. Ibid.

¹⁰⁷. Sainsbury, 276.

¹⁰⁸. Eubanks, 373.

¹⁰⁹. Sainsbury, 276. Churchill quoted.

¹¹⁰. Eden, 497.

was increased. The Poles were in a weakened position due to these decisions because Britain's best bargaining chip – the Curzon Line – was conceded. Similarly, the countries in Eastern (and possibly Central Europe) were now dependent on Russian goodwill since the West had few, if any, checks on Soviet power in the region. Yet, each country achieved some positive results.

Despite the setbacks, Britain achieved a modicum of success in regards to France. The President and Stalin spent the conference belittling France, yet no action was taken to limit their role in postwar Europe due to British pressure.¹¹¹ Britain would spend the next year trying to build up French prestige. The Soviets maintained their free hand in Eastern Europe and laid the foundation for their security scheme in the Far East. The Americans convinced Stalin to adhere to the UNO with a worldwide instead of regional basis. Plus, they established a reasonable price for Red Army participation in the Pacific and adherence to FDR's Chinese package. Neither the US nor the Russians had conceded a hard position; they in fact furthered their chances of having their hard positions adopted. Each member of the Big Three had something to bring home, though the Americans' success in regards to China would take a major hit before they arrived.

Cairo II

The Second Cairo Conference resulted in mostly negative decisions for the participants. However, the decisions were not negative in a military sense, which was the main theme of the conference; instead, they were detrimental to FDR's and Churchill's political aims. The paradoxical nature of Cairo II was that by accepting political setbacks the two leaders actually produced a more sound military strategy.

Recall, at Cairo I the Americans agreed to the British condition that Buccaneer be considered in relations to 'other operations.' At Teheran, a new operation, Anvil, was concocted and given priority over other operations in 1944, sans Overlord.¹¹² Churchill gave way on Anvil, which would preclude any Balkan operations, because of greater American standing due to their superior number of soldiers in both Anvil and Overlord.¹¹³ Still, "Anvil and Overlord," relates Heiferman, "necessitate[d] the cancellation or postponement of

¹¹¹. FRUS: C/T, 485, 510, 514, 568-570.

¹¹². 'Anvil,' later Dragoon, was the name given to the landings in the South of France that took place shortly after D-Day.

¹¹³. Ismay, 363.

Buccaneer.”¹¹⁴ Anvil was of greater benefit to the ultimate victory than either of the operations that were abandoned to achieve it. As General Ismay noted, “[F]rom a military point of view, Dragoon was fully justified.”¹¹⁵ Plus, “Marseilles was to prove an invaluable asset,” notes Hastings.¹¹⁶ Still, this setback was detrimental to the President’s planning.

By the third day of the conference, Roosevelt had come to the realization that ‘no further resources could be found for ‘Buccaneer.’¹¹⁷ Roosevelt cabled Stilwell, “The British just won’t do the operation, and I can’t get them to agree to it.”¹¹⁸ He reluctantly informed Chiang that ‘Buccaneer’ was off.¹¹⁹ FDR’s plan of increasing Chinese standing by having their forces liberate Southeast Asia would now be left to the Chinese and their US military advisors alone. Unfortunately, this decision meant the contentious Chiang/Stilwell combination had to find a way to produce the military victories in Burma. This task would be too much for their fragile working arrangement (discussed in Chap 4.). Still, for the time being, FDR had reason to hope. As he said in an address to the nation shortly after Cairo, “Today we and the Republic of China are closer together than ever before in deep friendship and in unity of purpose.”¹²⁰ The other side of the Atlantic had much less hope.

The major setback for Churchill’s political planning was the loss of any possibility of major operation in the Eastern Mediterranean. Anvil took the remaining landing-craft available in the Mediterranean, which would have been needed for actions in the Near East. As noted, without an operation in the region and/or supplies to give Turkey, the country would not enter the war. Together, these developments meant no third front in the Balkans. Therefore, unless Churchill’s last hope – an aggressive campaign in Italy – occurred, the Soviets would liberate all of Central and Eastern Europe with the previously discussed repercussions. A larger campaign in Italy than planned at Cairo and Teheran could move “first to Istria and Trieste and ultimately upon Vienna,” and perhaps even Budapest and

¹¹⁴. Heiferman, 130.

¹¹⁵. Ismay, 364.

¹¹⁶. Max Hastings, *Armageddon* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004), 23.

¹¹⁷. Sainsbury, 288. FDR memo to Chiang quoted.

¹¹⁸. Joseph Warren Stilwell and Theodore H White, *The Stilwell Papers* (New York: Schocken Books, 1972), 251.

¹¹⁹. Sainsbury, 288. FDR memo to Chiang quoted.

¹²⁰. FRUS: China, 37. FDR Speech, December 24, 1943.

Prague, the PM wrote Roosevelt.¹²¹ It is important to take note when the Churchill's final Mediterranean adventure is eliminated as this story unfolds.

The other major decision coming out of Cairo II was the appointment of Eisenhower to the command of 'Overlord.' As noted, Stalin believed the appointment of a commander necessary before the operation would move forward. This was the culmination of very successful series of conferences for the Soviet Premier. Stalin had managed to emerge with the greatest available options, especially in regards to the issues close to his heart – Eastern Europe, Germany, and the Northern Far East. Yet, options are only valuable if finalized in a manner upholding one's interests, i.e., one's positions (choices) are implemented.

The problem with hard bargaining tactics is that they have diminishing returns. Parties tend to harden their positions over time when confronted with hard bargaining, and worse, they start to devalue a hard bargainer's concessions. Research has shown, observe Mnookin et al., "a party may devalue a proposal received from someone perceived as an adversary, even if the identical offer would have been acceptable when suggested by a neutral or ally." Furthermore, "[a]lthough some bargainers can start off playing" hardball "and later move on to a problem-solving approach" most "have so thoroughly poisoned their relationship" this move "becomes impossible."¹²² Most negotiators prefer not to deploy these tactics in negotiations that are trying to tie the parties to a long-term arrangement.

The wartime diplomacy under discussion in this work was a negotiation aimed at building a foundation for the postwar. Therefore, using tactics typical of one-off negotiations (negotiations in which the parties will never again interact) would invariably have a negative effect moving forward. The way to identify hard bargaining is the use of tactics such as: extreme claims, followed by small, slow concessions; belittling the other side's arguments or alternatives; good cop, bad cop; and personal insults.¹²³ These tactics

¹²¹. United States Department of State, *Foreign relations of the United States. Diplomatic papers. The Second Conference at Québec 1944* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1944), (hereafter referred to as FRUS: Québec II), 25. Aug. 31, 1944 Churchill cable to Roosevelt.

¹²². Mnookin, Peppet, and Tulumello, *Beyond Winning*, 165, 213.

¹²³. Ronald Fisher, William Ury, and Bruce Patton, *Getting to Yes*, 22. It is interesting to note that Herb Cohen chose to label all pure adversarial bargainers in his best-selling books *Negotiate This* and *You Can Negotiate Anything* as Soviet-style negotiators, which shows both how prolifically they used these tactics and how detrimental these tactics can be in negotiations whose aim is establishing a long-term working partnership. Cohen, like Roger Fisher and Robert Mnookin, three of the most cited authors on negotiations in this work, presuppose most non-one-off negotiations benefit from approaching them as "problem-solving" endeavors.

were displayed by the Russians during these conferences and would be a part of their repertoire moving forward. As the conferences and meetings of 1944-5 unfold, remember the diminishing effects of hard bargaining because it undermined Western faith in deals with the Russians and whether they could be trusted at all.

Fisher states, "It is important to carry on each negotiation in a way that will help rather than hinder future relations and future negotiations."

Chapter Four: “When I Have to Choose”

Positions tend to develop quickly because they have been “constructed to meet some underlying need, concern, want, or fear,” notes Fisher et al., which can be construed before the issues are fully realized. This process has a downside, however; “The more that a position is worked out in detail and the more often it is repeated, the more committed to it a party becomes.”¹ The parties are thus dissuaded from trying to find collaborative solutions because they are now more committed to their positions. It was only natural, with the Big Three divided on how the postwar world should be shaped, that 1944 was a year of very contentious negotiations. Instead of laying the foundation for postwar cooperation, these negotiations tested the Grand Alliance and altered the Big Three’s strategies for Yalta.

The British tactics – framing and acting as an intermediary – worked initially, in particular protecting shipping and soldiers, instilling a pro-British government in Italy, as well as focusing the Western military effort on the Mediterranean. Yet, Churchill’s and Eden’s plans, the Anglo-American partnership and Anglo-Soviet understanding respectively, had failed to protect British interests during the 1943 conferences. Both statesmen aimed at having the states of Europe aligned with and looking towards London for leadership. With this setup, Britain’s prestige would increase; it would provide them a method in which to act as the Big Three’s intermediary, as well as afford them the clout to resist America’s attempts to break up the Empire. Eden’s focus on securing Russian agreement and Churchill’s desire for a Western partnership, while effective at first, backfired when all the parties met because they worked at cross purposes, which built up momentum unfavorable to a beneficial outcome for the British.

Acting as an intermediary worried the Americans and more importantly threatened Roosevelt’s underlying interest – instilling American economic principles worldwide: the International New Deal. As a result, the EAC was given a lower-level diplomatic presence because the Americans wanted to put an end to Britain’s tendency to act as a go-between. Roosevelt appointed his Ambassador to Britain, John Winant, as the American representative on the Commission. “Who your side sends to the table can depend on, and influence, who the other side sends,” declares Mnookin et al.² The EAC, therefore, was

¹ Roger Fisher, Elizabeth Borgwardt, and Andrea Kupfer Schneider. *Beyond Machiavelli: Tools for Coping with Conflict* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994), 35, 36.

² Mnookin, Peppet, and Tulumello, *Beyond Winning*, 88.

headed by ambassadors, not ministers, reducing its ability to increase British prestige. Plus, Britain's view of the Commission "conflicted," recalled George Kennan, "with FDR's aversion to anything that might commit him in advance or restrict his freedom of action."³ The EAC negatively affected FDR's underlying interest; therefore, he diluted its potency but only after Eden had traded away the possibility of a Czech-Polish confederation, a mainstay of the PM's European security planning, to acquire Molotov's adherence to the Commission.

Similarly, framing British stances as Western viewpoints scared the Russians into thinking the West was "ganging up on them." Stalin was concerned about Anglo-American intentions due to the delays in supplies and the second front – his preliminary minimal conditions. He believed that these decisions were Western stances because Churchill had framed, during the Second Moscow Conference (Aug. 1942), the decisions to delay both forms of assistance as reflecting the Anglo-American intentions towards the Soviet Union. The Soviet Premier concluded these delays were an attempt to "bleed them white" and to exclude Russia from the rewards of victory. Again the British tactics had affected their counterpart's underlying interest, in this case Stalin's need for postwar security through military prowess. The PM's successful framing caused Molotov's insistence on Soviet unilateral action in Eastern Europe, which prompted the price Eden had to pay for his London-based EAC to increase because the price reflected the Russians' new minimal conditions. It also produced the Marshal's desire to break up what he perceived as a burgeoning Anglo-American axis.

Also wanting to separate Western planning and determined to alleviate Stalin's fears, Roosevelt went to Teheran determined to work with the Russians. The Soviet and American leaders' similar wishes led to a constructive series of talks. Symbolized by FDR's acceptance of the Curzon Line and Stalin's agreement that the UNO should be formed on a worldwide basis; however, these talks were detrimental to British interests. As a result of working at cross purposes, both Churchill's and Eden's strategies had been frustrated at the end of 1943. Only working towards the same ends could the British use their tactics effectively.

The setbacks in the fall of 1943 caused the two primary architects of British postwar planning to alter course. It also drew the two statesmen together and started the process of them working towards the same ends instead of opposing ones. A way to overcome the

³ George Kennan, *Memoirs 1925-1950* (Boston: Brown Little, 1967), 164.

country's shrinking standing was the most important diplomatic task. A counterweight to the Russian expansionism in Europe and American decolonization efforts in the Pacific was necessary. Independently, the pair came to the same conclusion. Eden was wary about US commitments to policing Europe, and Churchill was concerned over America's recent attitude towards the Empire. Plus, both now thoroughly distrusted the Soviets' postwar intentions. These factors caused the two British statesmen to look towards the restoration of France.

An Anglo-French combination could be the intermediary between the US and Russia, thus recreating a balance of power setup the British had been aiming for throughout the war. It would also create the means to reestablish and protect the Empire with its much-needed men and resources. Both aspects would play a role in the maintenance of the British standing as a great power. As Eden wrote, "We wish to see, indeed we needed, a strong France after the war."⁴ Lafeber notes that, "For the sake of British interests in both Europe and Asia, London officials felt they had no choice but to fight for a fully restored France."⁵ Thus, the Anglo-French combination could be a bulwark against an expansionist Russia in Europe and a united colonial front against the Sino-American decolonizing partnership.

Restoring France meant reestablishing the French Empire, which, like the British Empire, would provide the French with soldiers and supplies. Additionally, the French Empire would assist in protecting British interests in and the stabilization of the Far East, Mediterranean, and the Middle East. Churchill knew FDR's decolonization plan focused on French territory in the Far East as a precursor to his attempts to wrest away British colonial possessions, especially in China. With the Anglo-French combination liberating Southeast Asia, not the Chinese, the pair could control the region's transition to peace. Furthermore, China would lack the prestige to make demands on the British. However, the US, recollected Leahy, was determined that "no French political authority should be permitted by the Allied Powers in areas controlled by them outside of continental France."⁶ American opinion on France was important because, with Britain lacking the financial wherewithal, the US would finance and equip any French forces that might combine with Britain to re-colonize

⁴ FO: North American, vol. III, 164.

⁵ Lafeber, 1280.

⁶ Leahy, 135.

Southeast Asia. Thus, British dependence on American assistance would frustrate any attempts to restore France.

Britain would have large negative trade imbalances after the war, meaning they would need assistance to fix their economy. Only the US could grant the postwar aid necessary to offset these imbalances. Cadogan feared, “Without such aid there was no hope of” creating “equilibrium in the balance of payments.”⁷ American aid, however, was tied to the acceptance of their ideas on colonialism and free trade, both of which undermined the reestablishment of the Empire as set up in the interwar period. Having already accepted anti-Empire commercial pledges in Article VII of the Master Lend-Lease Agreement, British options for restarting their economy were limited. Only an equitable Anglo-American arrangement on monetary policy could assist in reinvigorating British trade and in turn create the economic prosperity necessary to prop up France as well as themselves. As 1944 dawned, the FO felt, “[T]he extent to which [US] policy expands or restricts British trade opportunities” will “determin[e] the course of Anglo-American relations.”⁸ Bretton Woods – the major monetary conference of the war – would be Britain’s opportunity to turn the tide and secure a better postwar economic footing that was necessary to restore the Empire and their great power status.

Bretton Woods

The main salvos of Bretton Woods (July 1 – 22, 1944) actually took place before the conference. The Americans and British each wanted the plan drafted by their chief economists adopted, the White Plan and Keynes Plan, respectively. Anglo-American monetary talks had been ongoing since the Lend-Lease discussions. However, when the Treasury Department sent the Cabinet the final draft of the White Plan, the discussions turned to negotiations. The problem was that these talks were bilateral, which did not allow the British to employ either of their main diplomatic tactics.

The White Plan, created by Harry Dexter White, aimed to make the US Dollar “the de facto currency in the system” and replace “the bilateral diplomacy of the 1930s” that was the basis of the Sterling bloc (the Empire’s monetary setup) with “broad international

⁷ Cadogan and Dilks, 782.

⁸ FO: North American, vol. IV, 235.

agreements” on currency valuations, proclaims James M. Boughton.⁹ With the implementation of the plan, America would have “veto over exchange variations and access to international resources” that had been locked up by British trade practices, declared economist Alfred Eckes.¹⁰ Plus, it would create “the basis for a successful penetration of global markets by American business,” observes Georg Schild.¹¹ White had designed the plan to aid FDR in installing American economic principles worldwide. For instance, it was agreed that “the Bank should assist in providing capital ... for projects which will raise the productivity of the borrowing country.”¹² Furthermore, “other countries would sign up to the scheme in order to get vital emergency access to dollars.”¹³ Thus, it was readily visible that the plan was drawn directly from FDR’s desire to combine the New Deal with the Good Neighbor Policy – the International New Deal – with its focus on what Maier termed the “politics of productivity.”¹⁴

Keynes’ initial concern was “the part played by gold.”¹⁵ “The White Plan,” noticed economist John Williams, sought “to preserve as much as possible the previous role of gold.”¹⁶ According to White, “the trouble in the ‘30s” happened when “country after country went off of gold and their currency began to depreciate,” which had led to “floating exchanges.”¹⁷ Keynes wanted floating exchanges to incentivize creditor nations to aid debtor nations in ending depreciations by reducing the value of creditor nations’ holding of the debtor nations’ currency. White felt, however, a fixed rate – gold – was needed to end the trend of nationalistic depreciations emblematic of the interwar period, which the Roosevelt administration concluded had been a driving force behind the prewar economic instability and a root cause of WWII. As Hull proclaimed, ‘economic nationalism’ caused the ‘division

⁹ James M. Boughton, *American In the Shadows: Harry Dexter White and the Design of the International Monetary Fund* (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, Policy Development and Review Department, 2006), 6, 8.

¹⁰ United States Department of State, *Foreign relations of the United States. Diplomatic papers. Conference Series: 1944* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1944), (hereafter referred to as FRUS: Conference Series 1944), Bretton Woods, 80, 94. “Each member shall have two hundred fifty votes plus one additional vote for each share of stock held.” Stocks held: US 3.175; Uk 1.3, USSR 1.2 billion. Alfred Eckes quoted.

¹¹ Georg Schild, *Bretton Woods and Dumbarton Oaks: American Economic and Political Postwar Planning In the Summer of 1944* (Houndsmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan, 1995), 186.

¹² FRUS: Conference Series (1944), Bretton Woods, 99. Articles of Agreement Annex C.

¹³ Steil, 135.

¹⁴ Maier, 604.

¹⁵ FO: North American, vol. IV, 38. October 1943 Keynes report to the Cabinet on Anglo-American monetary discussions.

¹⁶ John H. Williams, “Currency Stabilization: The Keynes and White Plans” in *Foreign Affairs* 21, no. 4 (July 1943), 650.

¹⁷ Schild, 124. White quoted.

and weakening and final breakdown, of the necessary international foundation on which peace is based.’¹⁸

The difference between the two economists over gold reflected the main divergence between their plans: whether imbalances should be corrected solely by the debtor (White) or by both the creditor and debtor (Keynes). The differences were indicative of the two countries’ wartime economic positions, with the Americans being the Premier creditor nation and the British being a major debtor nation. A dual system would help the British eliminate their trade imbalances more quickly; decreasing their dependency on American aid. Floating exchanges were part of Keynes’ plan to assist debtor nations, but his chief mechanism was the Clearing Union.

The Clearing Union was designed to stabilize capital flows, which envisioned “creditors as well as debtors would be pressured to take corrective action to reduce imbalances,” relates Steil.¹⁹ A reserve fund would be established into which creditor nations would be incentivized to deposit funds. The debtor nations could draw from this fund to correct imbalances and end depreciations. White felt that the International Monetary Fund should provide “some measure of intelligent control of the volume and direction of foreign investment is desirable.”²⁰ However, with America being the largest creditor nation, they did not want “the Fund’s resources to meet a large or sustained outflow of capital.”²¹ Therefore, White’s plan envisioned only debtor nations would correct imbalances. The differences on capital flows and floating exchanges meant their plans differed too much to be melded together, though Keynes thought and more importantly argued otherwise.

The Joint Statement

America’s economic leverage played a major role in the victory of the White Plan. However, this influence was made insurmountable when Keynes proposed the idea of a Joint Statement (issued April 1944). Steil notes that the Englishman felt, “[I]f the two could agree the other Allies would have little leverage and quickly fall in line.” The idea of a joint Anglo-American statement on monetary policy was not received well by the Cabinet, whereas the Americans were quite thrilled by the proposal. The Cabinet’s objections were

¹⁸ FO: NA, vol. I, 409. May 18, 1941 Hull speech quoted.

¹⁹ Steil, 144.

²⁰ Harry Dexter White, *The French International Accounts, 1880-1913* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1933), 311-12.

²¹ FRUS: Conference Series (1944), Bretton Woods, 37.

quelled by the argument that to “reject the joint statement,” since the US had latched onto the idea, would “place nonmilitary American aid in dangerous jeopardy,” which revealed the effects of British dependency on American assistance. Yet, while Keynes was trying to overcome the Cabinet’s objections, he failed to realize he was being outfoxed by White. He “outmaneuvered his far more brilliant but willfully ingenuous British counterpart,” declares Steil, because the British economist failed to comprehend he was being tactically bested by the Treasury official in his scheme to make the White Plan, the Joint Statement.²²

Keynes’ hope of influencing the makeup of the Joint Statement was ended when it was decided to issue it prior to Bretton Woods. This decision gave White the ability to concoct the statement alone because no Anglo-American meeting to draft the document would occur. Therefore, ‘everything of importance had been discussed and settled in the two years’ leading up to the conference, conveyed Treasury Official Edward Bernstein.²³ In his attempts to force upon the other allies the Anglo-American plan, Keynes had highlighted that the two plans were similar. This maneuver backfired. White used his counterpart’s statements about the similarities of the two plans to include in the Joint Statement a gold-convertible exchange and the quota system, his version of exchange rate determination and capital flow decisions, respectively. The exchange meant a currency’s value would be based on its relations to the gold convertible exchange currency. The quota system called for every country not just creditors to endow the IMF. Both designs favored American economic principles.

White’s maneuvering was so effective that at the end of the conference Canadian delegation head, Louis Raminisky, stated “the area of agreement on principles was found to be very wide” and “was embodied in the Joint Statement.”²⁴ With the statement codifying a pro-American version of capital flows and currency exchange, the remaining differences between the Anglo-Americans were over the administrative details. White designed an ingenious scheme to control that debate.

The Conference

Bretton Woods took place in two stages. However, the possibility of altering the Joint Statement at either stage was eliminated by the way White set up the committees and

²² Steil, 5, 172, 180.

²³ Ibid, 245. Edward Bernstein quoted.

²⁴ FRUS: Conference Series (1944), Bretton Woods, 101. Commission I Report, Louis Raminisky.

commissions at the steering and drafting meetings, respectively. To give the conference the feel of an international negotiation instead of revealing it as the *fait accompli* it was, he placed foreign ministers atop the committees/commissions. Yet, White placed Americans in the group's second slot tasked with undermining any alternatives to the Joint Statement. The 'one general rule,' Fed official Emanuel Goldenweiser declared, is 'that anybody can talk as long as he pleases provided he doesn't say anything.'²⁵ Steil notes, "a risk of committee debates actually shaping the Fund" or Bank never existed.²⁶ After the steering meeting finished with no major changes to the Joint Statement, the full meeting convened. The commissions for the full conference were tasked with determining the administrative details of the IMF and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development later renamed the World Bank.

The Fund was designed to provide resources to promote and protect financial stability and let loose blocked trade channels. It was emergency funding, whereas the Bank would provide long-term credits, i.e., postwar reconstruction lending. Unlike the Keynes Plan, which had built-in mechanisms to cause needed readjustments, the Fund's members would determine when its resources should be used to correct international financial problems. The quota-based voting system followed Roosevelt's desire to place the Sino-American partnership atop the postwar power structures. The two countries' votes in the IMF, determined by a nation's quota, could outvote the rest of its members, sans the other US dependents in Latin America.²⁷

The crafty American economist even kept the various drafts of the Articles of Agreement hidden from other delegations so they could not understand its full broad strokes. Keynes was kept busy by heading the Bank's commission. It, however, "mainly played the role of providing incentives [reconstruction loans] for the states to join the Fund," relates Schild, which then tied the country to American economic principles.²⁸ Yet, chairing the commission gave Keynes the confidence that he was working with the

²⁵. Steil, 211. Emanuel Goldenweiser quoted.

²⁶. Ibid.

²⁷. FRUS: Conference Series (1944), Bretton Woods, 60. Quotas (in billions): America 2.75 and China .9; Britain 1.3 Russia, 1.2, France .4.

²⁸. Schild, 90.

Americans and could modify the articles “behind the scenes” to include mechanisms to force reluctant creditor nations to assist debtor states.²⁹

The major achievement for White (and the American economy) occurred during the IMF debates on July 13th. British delegation member Dennis Robertson asked, would it not ‘be easier for this purpose to regard the United States dollar as what was intended when we speak of gold convertible exchange [the unit of record for the Bank and the Fund]?’³⁰ Robertson “walked into White’s trap,” observes Steil. White used the term gold-convertible as cover for the Dollar. Once Robertson put forth the motion, the Americans’ quickly gaveled through the modification. Henceforth, all national currency values would be based on their relation to the Dollar. Thus, the Dollar displaced the Pound, and as a result, Washington, not London, would direct global finances. Keynes, still under the impression that he was working with the Americans “behind the scenes,” only realized after the conference the major shift ushered in by Robertson.³¹

One detail not covered in the Joint Statement was the exact location of the Fund and the Bank. The British were adamant to have one in London and the other in the US. This setup would give the appearance that commercial and monetary policies were controlled by the Anglo-American partnership and would “afford a formal link with the United States that would transcend the Grand Alliance,” emphasizes Randall Woods.³² If accepted, the European countries might still look towards the UK for guidance on commercial and monetary policy decisions as part of Churchill’s desire that matters “concerning European economic affairs” be “handled in London.”³³ Having the Bank based in London was the final option Britain had to influence postwar global financial decisions, after the defeats thus far in the conference. However, the Americans were convinced that both institutions had to be located in Washington.³⁴ To ensure they received the votes necessary to locate them in the US, the Americans increased the amounts smaller nations could withdraw from the Bank in return for their votes. This maneuver revealed the power the US had through controlling lending and why it was so important to the implementation of the International New Deal.

²⁹ Steil, 197-99.

³⁰ Steil, 216. Dennis Robertson quoted.

³¹ Ibid, 216, 214-17.

³² Randall Bennett Woods, *A Changing of the Guard: Anglo-American Relations, 1941-1946* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990), 116.

³³ Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy*, 730.

³⁴ FRUS: Conference Series (1944), Bretton Woods, 9.

Keynes reproached Morgenthau in a ‘very combative’ manner about the attempts to bribe the smaller United Nations. The Englishman, relates Steil, threatened “to ‘withdraw’ from the conference.”³⁵ The Secretary had two conflicting priorities forced upon him; Britain’s chief economist’s support was necessary to usher through the Joint Statement, yet Congress had to be appeased to ratify the agreements. Therefore, Morgenthau insinuated that British compliance to American postwar economic planning would be a condition for a postwar aid. This threat scared Keynes, again exposing the impact of Britain’s dependency on American assistance. After the meeting, the British accepted that the US would house both institutions. Even the Anglophile Acheson had to confide to British delegation member, Lionel Robbins, ‘You fellows will have to give way on this matter.’³⁶ Robbins pleaded, ‘We know we will be beaten’ but please help us ‘avoid being humiliated.’³⁷ The Americans accepted the appeal and included the clause, “The Bank may establish agencies or branch offices in the territories of any member.”³⁸ Thus, a regional branch could be located in London.

The British debacle at Bretton Woods meant other methods had to be found to reinvigorate their postwar economy, particularly their export trade. The design of White’s plan forced England alone, not their creditors, to offset their trade imbalances. A major option – pro-debtor nation monetary policy – for restarting the British economy, a prerequisite for reestablishing their Empire as well as France’s, had thus been lost. The more rapidly these imbalances were offset by reinvigorated trade, the less American aid would be needed, with its ramifications on Britain’s planning. The attempts to revive their trade as quickly as possible are an often overlooked aspect of Churchill diplomacy in 1944, which explains a number of his seemingly chaotic maneuvers.

The Russian Stage

“With the primary Soviet task after the war being economic reconstruction, the USSR” was “‘extremely interested’ in American economic assistance,” emphasizes V.O.

³⁵. Steil, 223.

³⁶. Ibid, 225. Acheson quoted.

³⁷. Ibid, 224. Robbins quoted.

³⁸. FRUS: Conference Series (1944), Bretton Woods, 83. Articles of Agreement Annex A.

Petchanov.³⁹ The Bank was just the type of access to funds they needed. As a result, the Soviets resumed the adversarial bargaining tactics that they had displayed throughout the conferences of 1943, sans the FDR/Stalin talks. The West, particularly the Americans, “showed considerable resentment towards the Soviet Union and its negotiational strategy” at Bretton Woods, declares Schild. M.S. Stepanov, head of the Russian delegation, played the role of the good cop. However, he always had to secure Moscow’s (bad cop) assent to move on his two positions: a quota on par with the UK (1.3 billion) and a 50% reduction in their contribution to the Fund.⁴⁰ Their underlying interest was more power in the Fund while decreasing their contribution to it as well as increasing access to the Bank’s credits.

Roosevelt wanted to use the Fund as another mechanism to tie the Soviets to postwar cooperation. Recall his belief, ‘Nations will learn to work together only by actually working together.’⁴¹ Still, the IMF with the Bank as its carrot was the foundation of his ability to instill US economic principles worldwide. The Americans, therefore, were only willing to go so far to obtain Russian adherence to the accords. Thus, Morgenthau countered that the Soviets could have one of the two demands. Days later, Stepanov returned with another counter offer. He emphasized his ability to reduce the amounts to 1.2 billion and only a 25% reduction in their contribution but then added a new demand that, of course, Moscow had forced upon him. The Russians wanted the gold mined during the war to not count towards their gold liability – the data used to calculate a country’s Fund contribution. Morgenthau vented his frustrations, ‘I am shocked that two great nations should begin what we call ‘to horse trade.’⁴² Eden lamented, ‘It was disparaging to negotiate with the Soviet Government when they invariably raised their price at every meeting.’⁴³ By offering movement on one position, the Soviets added a new demand making the negotiation more difficult and lengthy.

Stepanov’s use of hard tactics, especially increasing Russia’s demands, created a time crunch for the Americans. The administration wanted to conclude the conference before the Democratic Presidential Convention. With an agreement in hand, the accords could be a “part of the Democratic Platform, and brand the Republicans rejecting the plan as

³⁹. V.O. Pechatnov, *The Big Three after World War Two: New Documents On Soviet Thinking About Postwar Relations with the United States and Great Britain* (Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1995), 4.

⁴⁰. Steil, 234.

⁴¹. Burns, 429. FDR quoted.

⁴². Schild, 199. Morgenthau quoted.

⁴³. Woodward, vol. II, 248. Eden quoted.

isolationists,” observes Steil. The Americans countered the Russian offer with the removal of their wartime gold liability and a choice of either the reduction or the increase. Stepanov, playing the good cop, implied that he thought the offer reasonable but stated his Moscow bosses were willing to sever the negotiations if these demands were not met.⁴⁴ “[T]hreats can lead to counter-threats in an escalating spiral that can unhinge a negotiation and even destroy a relationship,” emphasizes Fisher et al.⁴⁵ Feeling time restrictions and fearing a ruined conference, the Americans conceded.

The Soviets’ adversarial tactics achieved their desired results, but they were sidelined for the remainder of the conference. Morgenthau told White, ‘You tell Mr. Stepanov I am afraid this is the last time he is going to say thank you at this conference.’⁴⁶ As a result, the Russians, the only country with leverage over the Americans, did not alter the inner workings of the IMF, a decision the Soviets would come to regret. Still, the US did not concede a hard position to gain Russian adherence; FDR could still use the institutions to implement the International New Deal. The next major conference – Dumbarton Oaks – concerned Stalin’s underlying interest – security. He felt “the postwar organization” was the best possible way for the “maintenance of security” after the war, notes Hilderbrand.⁴⁷ Therefore, the Russians adversarial tactics became amplified.

Dumbarton Oaks

The Dumbarton Oaks Conference (Aug. 21 – Oct. 9, 1944) was similar to Cairo and Teheran. The Americans wanted the Big Four – China, UK, US, and USSR – to meet and hash out the details of the UNO. The Russians were still unwilling to meet with the Chinese. Therefore, like the conferences in 1943, Dumbarton Oaks had two phases: first, a Russian phase, and then a Chinese phase.

The Russian Phase

The Russian phase was long and contentious. The two relatively easy parts were regional groupings and France’s role in the organization. Churchill abandoned regionalism for the UNO when the Americans agreed that regional arrangements could be under its auspice, setting the stage for his movement towards the Western-bloc concept (detailed

⁴⁴ Steil, 176, 240-41.

⁴⁵ Ronald Fisher, William Ury, and Bruce Patton, *Getting to Yes*, 139.

⁴⁶ Steil, 241. Morgenthau quoted.

⁴⁷ Hilderbrand, 63.

momentarily). In their attempts to restore France, Cadogan secured American and Russian agreement that a permanent seat on the Security Council – the executive committee of the organization – alongside the Big Four should be given “in due course” to France.⁴⁸ The PM believed the French would be dependent on England after the war in a manner similar to the Sino-American dependency. De Gaulle noticed that Churchill felt, “[I]t would be for the best that France participate [in European Control], but on condition that she does so as a subordinate.”⁴⁹ Therefore, the French could offset America’s Chinese-enhanced voting power in the Security Council but only if she and Britain were not dependent on American economic assistance.

Initially, broad-based agreement seemed possible, but soon this hope dissipated. “The preliminary proposals drawn up by the three powers,” declares Hilderbrand, “revealed a broad base of common ground.” The differences arose over how dominant a role the Big Four would have in the UNO. They all agreed that the Security Council alone could use military force to maintain peace. However, Stalin wanted great power concurrence before its use. “For Stalin, great power unanimity was much more than a voting principle,” notes Hilderbrand. “[I]t was *sin qua non* of any effective peacekeeping organization.”⁵⁰ Gromyko argued “The moment this principle of unanimity breaks down there is war.”⁵¹ The West was divided on the scope of the Big Four’s veto power.

The British and the State Department believed that voting on a matter to which one was a party violated a liberal sense of justice. Others in the Roosevelt administration felt differently, arguing that if the US did not possess a veto over the use of military force, the Senate would never ratify the UNO’s charter. At first, FDR was in the latter camp, since Senate approval was a factor in his thinking. Early in the conference, however, Hull met with the President and convinced him to adopt the State Department’s position that only a super majority in the Security Council should be required, i.e., no veto.⁵² Once again FDR’s vision of American socio-economic principles trumped his desire to placate domestic opinions.

⁴⁸ FRUS: Conference Series (1944), Dumbarton Oaks, 12.

⁴⁹ De Gaulle, 517.

⁵⁰ Hilderbrand, 46, 85.

⁵¹ Stoler, *Allies*, 207. Gromyko quoted.

⁵² Schild, 153.

The new American position was “a shock to the Soviet delegation,” wrote Cadogan.⁵³ Stalin believed the new “stance represented a retreat from the principle of unanimity among the Great Powers set forth ... at Teheran,” relates Hilderbrand.⁵⁴ The Russians wanted the veto provision because they feared “being isolated within the organization,” observes Schild.⁵⁵ Not surprisingly, they reacted to the new American position with a new demand – membership for all sixteen Soviet republics. When an adversarial bargainer’s underlying interest is threatened, as noted, they tend to escalate threats, creating a negative spiraling effect. Stalin “expected his Western Allies to take advantage of their overwhelming number of votes” to “turn [the UNO] against” him, contends Hilderbrand.⁵⁶ The Russians’ new position was understandable; still, it was untenable. These republics were not independent states. During the Soviet period of the Russian Empire, modern nation-states, such as Belarus were considered Soviet republics akin to US states.

FDR feared that “Soviet insistence” over membership “would ruin the chance of getting an international organization approved by the United States Senate,” declares Schild.⁵⁷ The Americans tried to convince Gromyko to quash the demand, but he would not budge without movement on the veto issue. Still, unwilling to grant a uniform veto, Roosevelt tried to appeal to Stalin. However, the Marshal opposed any changes; he worried “that plans for the new organization were moving too far away from Roosevelt’s idea of Four Policemen” unanimity.⁵⁸ Russian intransigence caused a change in the American strategy. Therefore, “[f]rom mid-September on[;] American strategy,” notes Schild, “shifted from seeking compromise with the Soviet Union to postponing the debate” until Yalta.⁵⁹ In the end, emphasizes Hilderbrand, “difficult decisions were deferred.”⁶⁰

The Americans felt that the “settlement of these items could best be handled by the President personally.”⁶¹ The Russians who also desired a successful conference, agreed to wait until the next Big Three meeting to make final decisions on the veto and membership question. In the end, the Big Three decided “the best solution” was “for the delegates to find

⁵³. Cadogan and Dilks, 658.

⁵⁴. Hilderbrand, 195.

⁵⁵. Schild, 71.

⁵⁶. Hilderbrand, 216.

⁵⁷. Schild, 157.

⁵⁸. Hilderbrand, 99.

⁵⁹. Schild, 162.

⁶⁰. Hilderbrand, 196.

⁶¹. FRUS, Yalta, 44. October 27, 1944 Alger Hiss memo to Harley Notter.

‘some general language’ to cover the disputed points.”⁶² The Chinese phase of the conference did not start until Sept. 28th; this is important to note as it is after the next conference – Québec II.

Octagon

The typical narrative of Québec II (Octagon; Sept. 12-16, 1944) portrays, “The quid pro quo [to which] Churchill” had agreed, argues Kimball, was “the Morgenthau Plan” for “a continuation of Lend-Lease to aid British reconstruction.”⁶³ Simply stated, Britain’s weakened standing in the wartime alliance coupled with their poor postwar economic prospects forced the PM to accept the Morgenthau Plan – a treasury scheme to turn Germany into an agricultural instead of an industrial state. The plan aimed to make her “so dependent on imports that Germany [could] not by its own devices reconvert to war production.”⁶⁴ In return, Churchill acquired FDR’s assistance in securing an increase in supplies during Phase II of Lend-Lease.⁶⁵ The PM declared in his memoirs that he was cajoled into accepting the plan, part of the confusion over the way Octagon transpired.⁶⁶ Also, Hull and Henry Stimson, the Secretary of War, both opponents of the plan, also portrayed the agreement in this manner after the war.⁶⁷

The PM’s post-meeting feelings are what matter moving forward since the outcome of Octagon “sen[t] Churchill scurrying off to Moscow,” as Kimball contends.⁶⁸ However, as Michael Beschloss notes, “At crucial moments in his diplomacy, he performed surprising flip-flops, trying to maximize British influence, even if it cost him consistency. The Prime Minister’s overnight reversal on the Morgenthau Plan was” one “such example.”⁶⁹ Furthermore, the PM “played outrageously fast and loose with his facts in his six volumes of *The Second World War*,” contends Andrew Roberts.⁷⁰ The plan appealed to Churchill for other reasons than increased Lend-Lease aid, at the time. Only after the war was this justification

⁶² Hilderbrand, 86.

⁶³ Warren Kimball, “The Two-Sided Octagon: Roosevelt and Churchill at Québec, September 1944” in *The Second Québec Conference Revisited*, ed. David B. Woolner (New York: St. Martin Press, 1998), 11.

⁶⁴ FRUS: Québec II, 97. September 4, 1944 Jimmie Riddleberger memo on postwar Germany.

⁶⁵ Phase II was the stage of the war after Germany’s defeat but prior to Japan’s defeat.

⁶⁶ Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy*, 156-57.

⁶⁷ Hull, 1613-14. There might have been some kind of “quid pro quo with which the Secretary of the Treasury was able to get Mr. Churchill’s adherence to his cataclysmic plan for Germany.”

⁶⁸ Kimball, “Two-Sided Octagon,” 11.

⁶⁹ Michael Beschloss, *The Conquerors* (New York: Simon & Shuster, 2002), 132.

⁷⁰ Andrew Roberts, *Masters and Commanders: How Four Titans Won the War in the West, 1941-1945* 1st U.S. ed. (New York: Harper, 2009), 241.

put forth. These reasons exposed why he “played fast and loose” with the details, and it is important to take into account Britain’s concerns about dependence on American assistance as well as England’s resulting need to restart their trade in understanding the PM’s diplomacy in late 1944.⁷¹

Prior to Octagon, the British had suffered a number of setbacks in their planning for a quick postwar economic recovery, especially trade, which was needed to reestablish the Empire. Recall, “Keynes knew that Article VII” of the Master Lend-Lease Agreement was “an end to Imperial Preference,” and now the Bretton Woods Accords did not assist debtor nations’ attempts to offset trade imbalances, i.e., the two principle options to restart Britain’s economy.⁷² The Americans had shown little desire to help London in this process because American assistance was their leverage to get British adherence to the International New Deal. Instead, Hull and Morgenthau had made it clear that the British needed to restore their trade on their own, though under American economic philosophies. As a result, Britain “must increase its civilian production” to “begin to restore its lost export trade” proclaimed the FO.⁷³ Britain wanted Phase II “written in such a way as to allow her to reduce her production of munitions while reviving her production of civilian goods, a key factor in the recovery of both her domestic and export industries,” relates David Woolner.⁷⁴ This plan was seen as their last resort to revive their economy, or so it was thought prior to Octagon.

It is true that Phase II played a vital role in the restoration of the British economy. However, *Octagon’s Phase II clauses* were only beneficial to British interests after the fact when later events caused a change in American planning. Churchill’s questionable retelling and the implications of the Phase II agreements at Octagon create a need to find a different set of reasons for why he accepted the plan than has typically been presented.

⁷¹ Schild, 132-38. It is somewhat noticeable that the authors who conclude that Churchill agreed to the Morgenthau Plan to acquire FDR’s assistance in increasing the supplies going to Britain in Lend-Lease Phase II fail to mention the economic conference that occurred only weeks before Octagon.

Kimball, “Two-Sided Octagon,” 3-12. B.J.C. McKerber, “Toward the Postwar Settlement: Winston Churchill and the Second Québec Conference,” in *The Second Québec Conference Revisited*, ed. David B. Woolner (New York: St. Martin Press, 1998), 17-40. Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy*, 156-57. However, one author cited, Georg Schild, does connect the two conferences. He has a section titled “Bretton Woods and the Morgenthau Plan.” He cites Roosevelt’s statement to Stimson that he ‘did not intend to make Germany into a purely agricultural country,’ but his ‘underlying motive was the very confidential one that England was broke.’

⁷² Steil, 23.

⁷³ FRUS: Québec II, 159. August 14, 1944 Brand memo on British Economy.

⁷⁴ David B. Woolner, “Coming to Grips with the ‘German Problem’: Roosevelt, Churchill, and the Morgenthau Plan at the Second Québec Conference” in *The Second Québec Conference Revisited* (New York: St. Martin Press, 1998), 81.

The Morgenthau Plan

On the third day of the meeting, Morgenthau introduced his idea to the British. In his war memoirs, Churchill states that “[a]t first” he was “violently opposed to this idea.”⁷⁵ However, before the next meeting, the PM’s treasury advisor, Lord Cherwell, brought Churchill around to the idea. Woolner emphasizes that Cherwell “possessed considerable powers of persuasion,” over the PM.⁷⁶ The British Lord highlighted that due to the plan, the British “foreign exchange position will be strengthened” by the “expansion of her exports” into the former German markets.⁷⁷ As Eden contended, “Cherwell had supported Morgenthau and their joint advocacy prevailed.”⁷⁸ The PM finding the desirability of expanding into new markets calls into question the standard Octagon narrative, as new markets could also restart Britain’s foreign trade. The State Department concluded this was Churchill’s reason for accepting the plan, noting “The proposal apparently appealed to the Prime Minister on the basis that Great Britain would thus acquire a lot of Germany’s iron and steel markets and eliminate a dangerous competitor.”⁷⁹ This scheme, unlike a Phase II increase in supplies, would decrease British dependency on American aid, with its ramifications for the Empire.

The PM claims in his memoirs to have “had no time to examine [the Plan] in detail.”⁸⁰ Yet, both Cherwell’s and Morgenthau’s records of these conversations revealed contradictory evidence.⁸¹ The most conclusive proof that Churchill understood the Morgenthau Plan was that he dictated the Québec Memo, which outlined the plan. “The result is the document,” noted the State Department, “was entirely the Prime Minister’s drafting.”⁸² Amidst his transcription, FDR interrupted and told his friend that deindustrialization “does not apply to the Ruhr and Saar, but the whole of Germany.” Eden was “quite shocked at what he heard” and stated, ‘You can’t do this.’ The PM contended

⁷⁵ Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy*, 156.

⁷⁶ Woolner, “The German Problem,” 84.

⁷⁷ FRUS: Québec II, 137.

⁷⁸ Eden, 552.

⁷⁹ FRUS: Yalta, 134. September 20, 1945 State Department memo on German Economy.

⁸⁰ Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy*, 157.

⁸¹ Following FDR’s preferred meeting style, no minutes were taken during the political meetings at Québec. Instead, FRUS relies on the diaries of Morgenthau, Cherwell, and to a lesser extent, the recollections of White to fill in the blanks of the meeting. All three men, however, tell a similar story that Churchill was quite well informed about the plan with three separate meetings spent discussing it.

⁸² FRUS: Yalta, 135. September 20, 1944 State Department memo on German Economy.

‘what this meant in the way of trade’ was worth it; ‘they would get the export trade of Germany.’ He finished with, ‘the future of my people is at stake, and when I have to choose between my people and the German people I am going to choose my people.’⁸³ The exchange with Eden and dictating the memo exposed that Churchill knew the details of the plan. Plus, the line concerning Germany’s export trade revealed why the PM actually agreed to it. The only major decision regarding Phase II also adds further weight to this contention.

The agreement at Octagon was only “on the creation of the lend-lease committee,” which “will agree and recommend to the Head of their respective Governments the amount of Mutual Aid ... to be provided for the most effective prosecution of the war.”⁸⁴ A link had been established but not between Phase II and the Morgenthau Plan, instead between British participation in the Pacific and the aid they would receive during Phase II. As will be detailed, this linkage further calls into question the typical narration of Octagon. Additionally, this agreement does not seem like enough “quo” to entice the PM to agree to a plan to which he was supposedly “violently opposed.” Morgenthau, though biased, “denied that there was any connection between the Prime Minister’s acceptance of the German policy ... and his eager desire to obtain a commitment on Lend-Lease in Phase 2.”⁸⁵ Instead, the Americans had harnessed the momentum of the negotiation process by eliminating first the Imperial Preference and then a pro-debtor nation monetary policy, Britain’s two main options for restarting their economy. These actions left Churchill a choice between a Phase II agreement, which relied on American goodwill, or it and the Morgenthau Plan, with the latter’s possibility of new markets. The second option was clearly more appealing at the time since new markets would reduce Britain’s dependence on US aid.

At the same time Churchill accepted the plan, he was becoming more convinced of the need to integrate Germany into his planning. Presidential advisor Bernard Baruch “found the British torn between a fear of a resurgent Germany, capable of again waging war, and a desire to rebuild her as a buffer against an aggressive Russia” after his discussions with

⁸³. FRUS: Québec II, 362.

⁸⁴. Ibid, 348, 372, 468. Treasury notes on Roosevelt-Churchill dinner meeting on September 14; Québec Memorandum on Lend-Lease to the United Kingdom.

⁸⁵. FRUS: Yalta, 135, 137. September 20, 1945 State Department memo on German Economy. Backing Morgenthau’s statement is the fact that “the memorandum on lend-lease aid was not drafted until the final day, Churchill had agreed to the policy on Germany prior to the drafting of the memorandum.”

Churchill that summer.⁸⁶ He discarded the Morgenthau Plan in November. Only after the Empire's traditional avenues of trade were granted more security and an economically viable Germany was needed to be part of the British bulwark against Russia was this decision made (detailed below). The PM decision to abandon the plan was made after the President had abandoned it himself, again revealing that Churchill had his own reasons to adhere to the plan. Thus, the only lasting decision at Octagon in regards to Germany was that Britain would safeguard the northwest zone and the Americans the southwest zone during the postwar occupation.

Military Matters

The meeting at Québec was a military meeting despite the fact that the political decisions are often the most discussed outcomes of the conference. The British realized that if they were going to receive a fair hearing from the Americans about postwar economic help, "It was only to be expected that the British Empire in return would give the United States all the help in their power towards defeating Japan," declared Churchill.⁸⁷ However, they had to overcome that "[p]sychologically most Americans," revealed Halifax, "view[ed] the war against the Japanese as their own concern, to be concluded on their own terms."⁸⁸ Plus, the Americans feared that the main British fleet was going "to be employed for political reasons."⁸⁹ This feeling was justified because the PM made it well known that his main concern was that "Singapore must be redeemed."⁹⁰ Singapore was not part of the previously agreed strategy for defeating Japan – the island-hopping campaign – and thus fostered suspicions that the Fleet would be used for political ends.

The President's misgivings were heightened when the State Department warned him that "British policy has swung behind restoration of French authority" in Indochina to "strengthen their claim for restoration of Hong Kong." The link between their postwar planning and military designs was revealed when "reports indicate[d] a British hope to extend the SEAC Theater to include Indochina, most of the Dutch East Indies, Borneo and Hong Kong," plus, a "British desire to create a Southeast federation of Burma, Malaya,

⁸⁶. Benard Baruch, *The Public Years* (New York: Holt, 1960), 350.

⁸⁷. Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy*, 155.

⁸⁸. FO: North American, vol. V, 259.

⁸⁹. FRUS: Québec II, 333.

⁹⁰. Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy*, 146.

Thailand and Indochina under British aegis.”⁹¹ The PM went so far as to tell FDR ‘the interests in this theater are overwhelmingly British.’⁹² These actions had increased US suspicions about British motives but also exposed the united Anglo-French colonial front the Britain was pursuing. In that vein, Britain tried to restore France as a major power during the conference, further alarming the Americans.⁹³

The British envisioned the Anglo-French combination liberating Southeast Asia with the control over the region’s transition to peace that entailed. “[T]he desire to see Britain’s colonial territories in Southeast Asia wrested back from Japan by her own military efforts,” notes Christopher Thorne was “simply one particularly pertinent example” of the British putting political aims above military expediency.⁹⁴ Thus, “Churchill nursed the ill-founded delusion that victory over Japan would enable Britain to sustain its rule in India, and reassert command of Burma and Malaya,” observes Hastings.⁹⁵ The Americans “[i]n principle wished to accept the British Fleet in the Pacific,” but these reports and their actions at the conference created reservations about the implications of British participation.⁹⁶ Therefore, the US put qualifiers on England’s involvement.

It was determined that “[t]he British Fleet should participate in the main operations against Japan in the Pacific, with the understanding that this fleet will be balanced and self-supporting.”⁹⁷ Thus, the implication was the US would support the British efforts if they helped defeat Japan, but if they pursued their political agenda, the Americans would enact the qualifiers placed in this clause as well as the aforementioned Phase II clause, ‘for the most effective prosecution of the war.’⁹⁸ American actions at Octagon were designed to control the direction of British participation in the Pacific, a direct attack on Britain’s underlying interest – the reestablishment of the Empire and the great power status it

⁹¹ FRUS: Québec II, 261. Sept. 8, 1944 State Department briefing memo for FDR on British Pacific Policy.

⁹² Max Hastings, *Retribution: The Battle for Japan, 1944-45* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf Publishing, 2008), 65. Churchill quoted.

⁹³ FRUS: Yalta, 139, 140. September 20, 1945 White memo on his post-Octagon meeting with Hull, Stimson, and McCloy. At the conference the British proposed that France receive a “substantial amount of lend-lease aid ... which seemed to be for purposes of reconstruction rather than for conducting the war.” Hull concluded “that the British were cooking up something with the French.”

⁹⁴ Christopher Thorne, *The Issue of War* (New York: Oxford, 1985), 105.

⁹⁵ Hastings, *Retribution*, 15.

⁹⁶ FRUS: Québec II, 474.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Ibid, 468.

conferred – something Churchill could not overlook.⁹⁹ In his final conversation with Canadian PM Mackenzie King at Québec II, the British leader expressed frustration with the “struggle he had just had in getting the Americans to accept a British Fleet that would work with the U.S. Fleet” and that the role of the fleet was one of ‘sub-participation,’ relates Roger Sarty.¹⁰⁰

The PM achieved some military success at the conference by securing landing-craft for the Italian campaign. As he obtusely told Alanbrooke, the British are “coming to Québec solely to obtain 20 landing ships out of the Americans to carry out an operation against Istria.”¹⁰¹ Admiral King promised “to lend [the British] his landing-craft” for the attack. The JCS, however, repaid the British for Buccaneer by placing certain conditions on the agreement: only if “Kesselring forces [are] routed” then could the Allied forces in Italy embark on “a pursuit towards the Ljubljana Gap.”¹⁰² Unfortunately, as Mckerber details, “The British advance into Southern Austria was blunted by the inability of Allied armies to win a decisive victory in Italy.”¹⁰³ By the beginning of October it was clear, lamented Churchill, that all “hopes of a decisive victory had faded,” which meant Russia would liberate all of Eastern Europe and possibly Central Europe.¹⁰⁴ The Soviet’s potential dominance over Eastern Europe and the recent American undermining of Britain’s underlying interests caused the PM to search out an understanding with the rising Continental power.

The Western-bloc

Still an avowed anti-communist, Churchill concluded that a bulwark against Russia was also essential. Lord Moran wrote, “Winston never talks of Hitler these days, he is always harping on the dangers of communism. He dreams of the Red Army spreading like a cancer from one country to another.”¹⁰⁵ A strong France was the only hope for a barrier between England and Russia. At Octagon, Churchill felt “that the time had not yet come to recognize

⁹⁹ Hastings, *Retribution*, 60. “[M]ost Americans, including the nation’s leader, would have happily foresworn British aid to defeat the Japanese, if they could thus have distanced themselves from the cause of imperialism.”

¹⁰⁰ Roger Sarty, “The Ghosts of Fisher and Jellicoe,” in *The Second Québec Conference Revisited*, ed. David B. Woolner (New York: St. Martin Press, 1998), 162.

¹⁰¹ Alanbrooke, 589.

¹⁰² Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy*, 159; FRUS: Québec II, 472. Conference memo on military operations.

¹⁰³ Mckerber, “Toward the Postwar Settlement,” 40.

¹⁰⁴ Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy*, 225.

¹⁰⁵ Moran, 211. Aug. 21, 1944 diary entry.

formally the [French Committee] as the provisional government of France.”¹⁰⁶ After the setbacks at Québec II and in pursuit of a new strategy, the PM “was now prepared to recommend in concert with our Allies, the official acceptance of this body as the Government of Liberated France.”¹⁰⁷ This decision was part of a turn towards his version of the Anglo-Soviet understanding, based on spheres of influence.

During the first part of the war, the FO had drawn up plans based on British and Soviet spheres in Western and Eastern Europe, respectively. Duff Cooper laid out the plan, our “policy should be directed towards the formation of a group of the western democracies, bound together by the most explicit terms of alliance. That the nucleus of that group should be the Powers that have fought and suffered together – Great Britain, France, Belgium, Holland, Norway, and Denmark. There is no reason why it should not subsequently be extended to Sweden, to Portugal and Spain, and to Italy.”¹⁰⁸ Churchill felt the idea was the best way to work with and bracket the Russians. Yet, he went even further than the FO; the PM wanted Germany attached to the grouping. He told Colville ‘no alternative to the acceptance of Germany as part of the family of Europe after the war’ was possible.¹⁰⁹ Churchill felt it was best if Germany was pro-Western instead of pro-Russian. Recall the American’s agreement about regional groupings under the UNO’s auspice. Thus, the Western-bloc could create the regional European council the PM had always desired. Along with the spheres of influence for which the bloc was designed, the combination could recreate a balance of power set up while allowing Britain to remain the Big Three’s intermediary.

Octagon was the low point for Britain, when no one was helping them to protect the vital trade routes in the Near East and Southeast Asia. Therefore, the PM tried to find a way to reinvigorate trade independent of those routes. American leverage based on economic superiority had allowed them to dictate the options from which Churchill had to choose, hence his acceptance of the Morgenthau Plan. However, the remainder of 1944 provided him other ways to protect the traditional trade avenues for the Empire, lessening the PM’s need for new markets, thus his abandonment of the plan. The key is that Churchill discarded

¹⁰⁶. FRUS: Québec II, 468. Québec II memo On France.

¹⁰⁷. Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy*, 248.

¹⁰⁸. FO: General, vol. IV, 298. May 30, 1944 Cooper memo to Eden.

¹⁰⁹. John Colville. *The Fringes of Power: 10 Downing Street Diaries, 1939-1955* (London: Hodder & Stroughton, 1985), 363.

the Morgenthau Plan in November after the next two major events – the percentage deal and the recognition of France.

Tolstoy

Prior to the Fourth Moscow Conference (Tolstoy, Oct. 9-19), Churchill told FDR that the arrangements made there would only be “a temporary working arrangement for the better conduct of the war.”¹¹⁰ The PM also led Stalin to believe that he spoke for both Western parties, once again acting as an intermediary. The State Department informed FDR, “Apparently the Soviet Government had supposed the whole arrangement had had American approval.”¹¹¹ Hence, Roosevelt “sent a cable to Stalin informing him that Churchill had no authority to speak” on his behalf.¹¹² Still, as Leffler stresses, “The documents now demonstrate beyond any reasonable doubt that the percentage agreement was neither designed as a temporary accord pending the end of the war nor contingent upon American acceptance.”¹¹³ The PM does not even mention the deal in his post-meeting message to FDR.¹¹⁴

Recall that the junior party in tripartite negotiations gains greater leverage for their positions by entering into bilateral understandings prior to a tripartite meeting. At the time of Tolstoy, the Big Three were arranging the meeting that was to become Yalta. British interests in the Near East, particularly Greece, Egypt, and Turkey, were tantamount to their maintenance of the Empire. The region provided the link to India and the Far East (the Suez Canal), protected the Middle Eastern trade routes, and provided raw materials for Britain’s industrial machine. The Americans, however, would not help the British reestablish themselves in the region, as had been revealed throughout the war, most recently in Greece.¹¹⁵ Thus, at Moscow, emphasizes Schild, “the Prime Minister was primarily interested in preserving the British imperial position [in the Near East] by granting the Soviets a limited

¹¹⁰. Churchill, Roosevelt, and Kimball, 202. June 23, 1944 Churchill cable to Roosevelt.

¹¹¹. FRUS: Yalta, 105.

¹¹². Hilderbrand, 228.

¹¹³. Melvyn P. Leffler, “Adherence to Agreements: Yalta and the Experiences of the Early Cold War” in *International Security* 11, no. 1 (Summer 1986), 100.

¹¹⁴. Churchill, Roosevelt, and Kimball, 364. Oct. 22, 1944 Churchill cable to Roosevelt.

¹¹⁵. For months, the British had tried without success to convince the Americans to help them maintain order and reestablish King George II in Greece. The use of heavy-handed tactics and support for a monarchy put Roosevelt in a tough position with the American public. As was usual with FDR, when an issue was difficult, he wanted to postpone decisions until they had to be made, which gave the British an opening to find an understanding with the Russians.

sphere of influence in order to contain them in Eastern Europe.”¹¹⁶ The decisions in 1943 meant that to acquire Russian movement on Eastern Europe – renouncing control over the Greek transition to peace – Churchill needed to move from a hard position – integrating the region into his European grouping.

The Percentage Deal

At their first meeting, Churchill requested of Stalin, “Let us settle about our affairs in the Balkans.” The PM then explained what he thought were the percentages of interest in each of the Balkan countries. Afterwards, he jotted down the numbers and “pushed [the paper] across to Stalin,” who after it was translated “took his blue pencil and made a large tick,” indicating his acceptance of the percentages. Revealing that he knew this agreement was permanent, the PM asked, “Might it not be thought rather cynical if it seemed we had disposed of these issues so fateful to millions of people, in such an offhand manner? Let us burn the paper.” Stalin knowing this would have value later protested, “No, you keep it.”¹¹⁷ Thus, to retain a say in Greece, Churchill had forsaken the Balkan confederation, a major facet of his ideas on European security.

The final percentages were worked out the next two days between Molotov and Eden.¹¹⁸ The Foreign Secretary later defended the agreement as the “only practicable policy to check the spread of Russian influence throughout the Balkans.”¹¹⁹ Their meetings also determined how the Allied Control Commissions for Eastern Europe would function, which revealed the impact of the Italian surrender precedent. Except for Greece, it was decided “during the period before the German surrender” the commissions in Eastern Europe would be under “Russian control.” Only “[a]fter the surrender of Germany, British and American representatives would participate.”¹²⁰ Eden was forced to concur because of the precedent and Britain’s desire to keep the Soviets contained.

The Polish Question

Poland was the only Eastern European country not included in the agreement because of Britain’s close ties to the country. Churchill had “convinced” the Polish Premier Stanislaw Mikolajczyk to come to Moscow and meet with Stalin and the Lublin Poles

¹¹⁶. Schild, 46.

¹¹⁷. Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy*, 227-28.

¹¹⁸. Bulgaria 75/25; Hungary 75/25; Romania 90/10; Yugoslavia, 50/50; Greece, 10/90 (Russia/Britain)

¹¹⁹. Eden, 534.

¹²⁰. Woodward, vol. II, 151.

(Russia's puppet Polish government) with the desire to find a working arrangement between the groups. The PM "made it clear that refusal to take part in the conversations would amount to a definite rejection of our advice and would relieve us from further responsibility" for the London Poles (the legitimate Polish Government).¹²¹ Originally, the Polish PM had wanted to go in the hopes of obtaining Soviet assistance for the now failed Warsaw Uprising. Due to the Russians' intransigence, that assistance came too late.¹²² Plus, "Roosevelt did not see how he could help the Poles against Stalin's will without endangering the larger objective" of postwar Soviet-American cooperation and more immediately Red Army participation in Manchuria, declares Schild.¹²³ Stalin felt the uprising was aimed at keeping the Russians out of Poland and propping up an anti-Soviet government. "The uprising finally convinced him that" a Soviet-London Pole working "arrangement was not possible," notes Geoffrey Roberts.¹²⁴ In the end, Mikolajczyk went because he wanted to secure a *modus Vivendi* with the Russians and if possible with the Lublin Poles.

On Oct. 13th, the first meeting between Mikolajczyk, Stalin, and his sycophants from Lublin took place. The PM felt "[i]t was essential for [the London Poles] to make contact with the Polish Committee and to accept the Curzon Line as a working arrangement." Yet, it quickly became apparent to all "that the Lublin Poles were mere pawns of Russia."¹²⁵ When their leader, M. Beirut, stated, "We are here to demand on behalf of Poland that Lvov shall belong to Russia," Mikolajczyk realized he could not work with them. The Polish leader would accept the line as one of demarcation but nothing more.¹²⁶ Stalin, however, "did not

¹²¹. Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy*, 227.

¹²². The Warsaw Uprising (Tempest) is the name given to a failed uprising in the Polish capital of Warsaw, which took place during the summer and fall of 1944. The uprising was aimed at reinstalling the power of the London Poles before the Red Army crossed into Poland. Tempest seems like a Hail Mary; the record portrays a desperate Polish Government-in-Exile launching the plan prematurely and hoping the final pieces would fall into place. These pieces were dependent on Churchill and the Russians. The PM was unable to act unilaterally, and the Russians were never going to assist the London Poles; therefore, the uprising failed.

¹²³. Schild, 156.

¹²⁴. Geoffrey Roberts, *Stalin's War*, 207.

¹²⁵. Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy*, 235

¹²⁶. FRUS: Yalta, 210, 215; Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, *The Rape of Poland: The Pattern of Soviet Aggression* (New York: Whittlesey House, 1948), 98-99. It must be noted that the Polish PM had held out hope that he would not have to accept the Curzon Line as a permanent boundary because of Roosevelt's statements to him earlier in the summer that he had not agreed to the Curzon Line, which he had but not publically. FDR urged Mikolajczyk to come to a solution on the issue of boundaries with the Russians but stated, "I am sure you will understand that this Government, in accordance with its traditional policy, cannot give a guarantee for any specific frontiers," thus sidestepping a definitive answer. The President's determination to stall decisions on frontier changes had serious repercussions. Churchill later told the House of Commons; during his movement

think it desirable to proceed with an attempt to form a united Polish government without the frontier question being agreed.”¹²⁷ This difference would not be overcome, and both Mikolajczyk and the Marshal took drastic actions after the meeting. The Polish Premier resigned, and the Soviet leader recognized his Lublin puppets.

Spheres of Influence

In describing the events at Tolstoy to FDR, the PM included, “Contrary to his previously expressed view, [Stalin] would be glad to see Vienna the capital of a federation of German states” happily continuing “a large Danubian federation.”¹²⁸ The PM also included, “I should prefer to add Hungary” to the federation, but “U.J. is strongly opposed,” which revealed the line of demarcation between the Russian and British spheres.¹²⁹ At Teheran, Stalin had shot down the idea of a Danubian confederation.¹³⁰ He, like with FDR at Teheran, had reciprocated because Churchill helped the Soviet Premier on a matter important to the preservation of his power – domination of Eastern Europe. Thus, the Marshal removed his objections to a non-Eastern European federation. That the PM does not mention Stalin’s concession about the possibility of a Danubian federation in the actual text of *Triumph and Tragedy* is noteworthy in understanding the actual causes of accepting and discarding the Morgenthau Plan.¹³¹

The federation would, according to Churchill, “fill the gap caused by the disappearance of the Austria Hungarian Empire,” something he believed necessary for European stability.¹³² This omission and the incomplete record described to FDR in the PM’s post-meeting message conveyed details of this story were hidden both contemporaneously and historically. During Tolstoy, Churchill was still touting the Morgenthau Plan, as a means to overcome Stalin’s suspicions, at Teheran, about Britain’s intentions towards postwar Germany.¹³³ However, Germany would be needed for the Danubian confederation to be economically viable, a prerequisite for a confederation’s success. The necessity of an economically viable Germany revealed that one of the reasons

towards Russia, it was the failure of the United States to define its policy on the Polish-Soviet frontiers that caused the breakdown at Tolstoy.

¹²⁷ Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy*, 237.

¹²⁸ Ibid, 241. October 22, 1944 Churchill cable to Roosevelt.

¹²⁹ Churchill, Roosevelt, and Kimball, 364. Oct. 22, 1944 Churchill cable to Roosevelt.

¹³⁰ FRUS: C/T, 602-05.

¹³¹ Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy*, 226ff.

¹³² Churchill, *Hinge of Fate*, 803.

¹³³ Wolner, “The German Problem,” 90-91.

Churchill abandoned the Morgenthau Plan was to pursue his version of the Western-bloc, since now that was needed as part of his plan to work with the Russians. Additionally, the percentage deal protected traditional British trade routes in the Near East decreasing the need for new markets. It would also create a grouping on par with the Americans and Russians who could act as the Big Three's go-between. Thus, the PM's planning had evolved but stayed consistent to its original goals of restoring the Empire and creating a balance of power setup with London as the intermediary to maintain Britain's great power status.

The last reason Churchill abandoned the plan was the Russians' recognition of the Lublin Poles, which eliminated the need to placate Stalin's fears about Germany. The Soviet Premier had his own reasons to maintain the percentage deal – the building up of his Eastern sphere – so that deal would not be upset by Britain pursuing a soft peace with Germany. Also, his “growing concern over the events in Eastern Europe,” proclaims Hilderbrand, “made him only too happy to reestablish a united front with the Americans.”¹³⁴ Thus, the PM wanted to maintain the understanding with the Russians and create a united front with the US that would deal with the remaining thorny diplomatic issues. Additionally, he held fast to the idea of a Western-bloc as a counter balance to America's superior standing. Churchill, therefore, concluded that understandings with the US and USSR would reign in the excesses of the excluded party.

The Russian recognition of the Lublin Poles exposed that Stalin believed the percentage deal to be a permanent arrangement. The Marshal felt that the London Poles would never be the “friendly government” he needed. Therefore, he wanted ‘a handpicked government which will insure Soviet domination,’ wrote Harriman.¹³⁵ So, it was only natural that after Britain seemed to have given them a free hand in the region the Russians would ‘handpick’ a government in their sphere. The President had made it clear the he “was disturbed and deeply disappointed” that Stalin could not “hold in abeyance the question of recognizing the Lublin committee ... until we have had an opportunity at our meeting to discuss the whole question thoroughly.”¹³⁶ If he did not believe the percentage deal was permanent, the Marshal would not have acted with such resolve.

¹³⁴. Hilderbrand, 253.

¹³⁵. Ibid., 214. Harriman quoted.

¹³⁶. Roosevelt and Schlesinger, *My Dear Mr. Stalin*, 282-83. December 29, 1944 FDR letter to Stalin.

The Americans recognized the permanency of the deal at Tolstoy as well. The percentage deal, declared Stettinius, “made it evident that the United States could no longer adhere to the position” that “[a]greements regarding postwar Europe’s problems” could wait until the peace conference.¹³⁷ British actions removed this American option and forced them to make decisions earlier than they desired. Similarly, British decisions also changed FDR’s planning in the Far East.

China’s Fall

General Stilwell launched an attack on Burma with his Chinese forces in April 1944 to open up the Burma Road. Sadly, notes Louis Allen, “by the time the road was safely pushed through to Kunming, it was too late.”¹³⁸ Stilwell’s invasion failed to achieve its objective in time because of the poorly trained nationalist army. Plus, his prospects were made more difficult because Buccaneer had been called off due to a lack of landing-craft. Landing-craft was a problem; however, England’s hearts were not in it. They “believed that Burma should be retaken solely by British forces and then restored to British rule,” which meant they “could not support Stilwell’s plan,” contends Wenzhou Tao.¹³⁹ Buccaneer could have diverted forces away from Stilwell’s operations. Regardless, as a result of the failure to rapidly open the Burma Road, the Chinese would not have the resources necessary to liberate Southeast Asia nor play a decisive role in the final defeat of Japan by clearing Japanese troops out of Manchuria. Supplies were one reason China failed to play the role the President had imagined for them; the other was the Nationalist forces themselves.

From the end of Cairo II until mid-October 1944, Roosevelt tried to reinvigorate and reorganize Nationalist forces. Immediately after Octagon, FDR cabled Chiang, “I have urged you time and again in recent months that you must take drastic action to resist the disorder which has been moving closer to China and to you.”¹⁴⁰ However, the Chinese were never able to coalesce into a proper fighting force. This failure also undermined Stilwell’s invasion plan, which was dependent on these forces moving south to meet his forces moving east from India. Here is where the British attack would have played a vital role making up for Chiang’s forces poor performance. Problems such as discipline,

¹³⁷. Stettinius, *Roosevelt and the Russians*, 13.

¹³⁸. Louis Allen, *Burma*, xv.

¹³⁹. Wenzhou Tao, “The China Theatre and the Pacific War” in *From Pearl Harbor to Hiroshima*, ed. Saki Dockrill (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), 136.

¹⁴⁰. FRUS: Québec II, 465. September 16, 1944 FDR cable to Chiang.

undermanned-formations, and lack of pay plagued the Nationalist Army, but their leadership was what really made them a poor fighting force. Chiang had his excuses and told Wallace, “[T]he failure to initiate an all-out Burma Campaign had had a decidedly adverse effect on Chinese morale.” They “felt that they had been deserted.”¹⁴¹ Still, Roosevelt was so fed up with the generalissimo’s lack of success that he even tried to force him to accept Stilwell as the commanding officer of all Nationalist forces after more negative reports were received post-Octagon.

When Chiang received FDR’s ultimatum, delivered by Stilwell himself, the Chinese leader demanded the general’s recall. Roosevelt recalled Stilwell to appease Chiang.¹⁴² Ostensibly, the lack of success during his operation was used as the justification for the move (Oct. 19). Yet, the President was so despondent with the generalissimo’s regime that he “declined to name another American officer to command Chinese armies,” notes Ronald Specter, “because he thought the military situation in Eastern China was past saving.”¹⁴³ It was the final determination that culminated in the President’s decision to sideline the Chinese for the remainder of his guidance of American diplomacy.

FDR was beginning to realize that Chiang’s China would never play the role he envisioned for them – liberators of Southeast Asia and clearing Manchuria of Japanese troops – prior to Chinese phase of Dumbarton Oaks. As a result, they were now seen as only as a dependent vote in the UNO and “were relegated in advance to a status that was little more than ceremonial,” relates Hilderbrand.¹⁴⁴ Therefore, the Chinese phase, declares Schild, only “confirmed the results of the first phase.”¹⁴⁵ Because the country could still be useful to the President in controlling the organization, after he “realize[d] the lessened importance of China’s military contributions, he did not then reduce his rhetoric or significantly alter the American diplomatic effort in China,” notes Russell Buhite.¹⁴⁶ Still, he now had to adjust his plans for Manchuria and Southeast Asia.

¹⁴¹. FRUS: China, 551. June 22, 1944 memo on Wallace conversations with Chiang.

¹⁴². Heiferman, 163ff.

¹⁴³. Ronald Specter, *Eagle versus the Rising Sun*, 369

¹⁴⁴. Hilderbrand, 229.

¹⁴⁵. Schild, 168.

¹⁴⁶. Russell D. Buhite, *Patrick J. Hurley and American Foreign Policy* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1973), 280.

French Recognition and Southeast Asia

The combination of Chiang's poor performance and Roosevelt's unrealistic expectations for the Chinese meant the British and French were the only forces available to stabilize Southeast Asia. Due to their previous possession of the region, they had administrators with experience in stabilizing Southeast Asia as well as the troops and the desire to assume this role. The Americans used the "effective use" clause of Phase II to increase British participation in the region instead of decreasing it, as Octagon had portended. "British forces" were then given a free hand to liberate their former "colonial holdings in South and East Asia," observes McKerber.¹⁴⁷ FDR also complied with Churchill's request and recognized the Free French as the provisional government of France (Oct. 24). Plus, despite his belief "that Indo-China should not go back to France," Roosevelt allowed the French to reenter Indochina, which had been the centerpiece of his plan to end European colonialism.¹⁴⁸ Thus, before the PM's November abandonment of the Morgenthau Plan, another avenue for reinvigorating trade and preserving the Empire had been presented to him.

The loss of Indochina and the need for Anglo-French forces to stabilize Southeast Asia caused the President's trusteeship plan to evolve. The JCS wanted military bases in the Japanese held islands. Hull related the idea, "I opposed the view of our Joint Chiefs of Staff that the Pacific islands we would take from Japan should become United States property." He contended, "[A]ll of the colonial territories wrested from the Axis should be placed under a United Nations trusteeship system," FDR concurred.¹⁴⁹ Similarly, the UNO could be used as a mechanism to tie the colonial powers to the trusteeship idea. Therefore, the President had a "definite desire that the international trusteeship be firmly established and that the international organization should provide adequate machinery for that purpose."¹⁵⁰ The fall of China's importance in the President's planning is mirrored by the UNO's ascendancy in said plans as the way for the US to control the transition to peace and instill the International New Deal.

¹⁴⁷ Mckerber, "Towards the Postwar Settlement," 40.

¹⁴⁸ FRUS: C/T, 872.

¹⁴⁹ Hull, 1446.

¹⁵⁰ FRUS: Yalta, 57. November 15, 1944 Stettinius memo to Pasvolsky.

1944 was a bittersweet year for the Americans; they had started the path towards the UNO and American economic hegemony. Yet, their options concerning a European settlement were limited by the percentage deal. Furthermore, China's failure as a fighting force meant the Anglo-French combination was America's only choice to liberate Southeast Asia. These events precipitated a reduction in China's importance in FDR's military planning as well, increasing in the US dependence on the Red Army's help in Manchuria. The President was faced with an Anglo-French combination aimed at re-colonizing Southeast Asia and an Anglo-Soviet understanding on Eastern Europe that could extend to all of Europe. This fear was heightened when, acting like Poland was part of a new Soviet sphere, Stalin recognized the puppet Lublin Poles. Faced with these new Anglo-axes, the President's postwar planning was sent reeling.

The tumult surrounding the administration's postwar planning in the final months prior to Yalta has led many astray. However, since FDR's underlying interest – the International New Deal – has been found and his positions have been traced up to this point, briefly retracing this path will help reveal how the President's positions evolved, where they stood entering the conference, and the priority he placed on them. The same process can be used to determine British and Russian strategies entering the conference as well. Therefore, the work turns to the conclusion of the first part – the Big Three's strategies for Yalta.

Epilogue: Strategies

British

The fall of France along with further military setbacks in 1940 convinced British leadership of their inability to win the war alone and thus radically altered British diplomacy. Many Britons worried that “the influence of the mother country and of the Commonwealth in general” was “now in the wane.”¹ The Cabinet felt that, only with “a revived European balance in which Britain had influence, and the recrudescence of a strong Empire,” emphasizes McKerber, “could Britain hope to remain a Power of the first rank.”² They concluded a partner was essential to defeat the Germans and assist them in remaining a great power. American willingness to aid the British and later their entrance into the war offered one potential partner. Equally, the Nazi attack on the Soviet Union presented a second possible collaborator. Each country desired the defeat of the Axis threat, but which of the nations might assist Britain in maintaining their great power status was unclear.

Churchill felt “the common identity of the English-speaking peoples” – liberal democracies – made them the logical choice.³ As the Prime Minister, Churchill was the leader and main mover of British foreign policy; however, the power given the Foreign Secretary allowed Eden to conduct his own policy initiatives. He concluded Russia would be a better partner since they, unlike the Americans, had a stake in European affairs. Eden’s review of the international scene during the interwar period led him to conclude that countries would only protect interests vital to them.⁴

Both men looked to the past as a guide to reestablish a balance of power setup for world politics and as a way to revive the Empire. It is clear, wrote Wallace, that “the English theory was still the balance of power theory – the theory which England has always had.”⁵ The PM wanted to recreate the Congress of Vienna with America, Britain, and Russia controlling the direction of the world politics. The US would dominate the Americas while Britain oversaw the Near East as well as Southeast Asia, and they would partner to maintain order in Europe and the Far East, relegating Russia to their corner of Eurasia. Eden hoped

¹ FO: General, vol. V, 323.

² McKerber, *Transitions of Power*, 322.

³ Peter F. Clarke, *The Last Thousand Days of the British Empire: The Demise of a Superpower* (London: Penguin Books, 2007), 4.

⁴ Harbutt, 96-7.

⁵ Wallace, 238.

to create an understanding with the Soviets to maintain order in Europe. With order established on the Continent, the British could focus their efforts on restarting the Empire and forestalling American encroachment in the Pacific. He assumed the US, like after WWI, retreat back to the Western Hemisphere, but continue their economic expansion into the Far East. Thus, “[i]t is possible to see the two men by 1941 as already more rivals than allies and hence to contend that all their arguments about policy issues have to be seen in this light,” notes Carlton.⁶

Churchill and Eden felt their plans, the Anglo-American partnership and Anglo-Soviet understanding, respectively, would protect British interests best if they guided their combinations planning with the excluded party. They astutely realized their interests could be advanced by directing the manner in which postwar planning transpired through the use of two specific tactics – framing and acting as an intermediary. “England would try to deal with Russia directly and put us in the position of dealing with Russia through England as an intermediary,” noted Wallace.⁷ As a result, Churchill “went to great lengths in his cables to Stalin to present himself,” observes Harbutt, “as the director of Anglo-American strategy.”⁸ By getting out in front of the negotiations, the British could create an advantageous understanding with the party most likely to align with their interests involved in whatever issue was under discussion. Then they could force the hand of non-consulted party, who presumably had a position on the issue that was adverse to English interests, since said party was presented with a bilateral understanding instead of just Britain’s position. Thus, their positions were granted more clout than the weakest party’s position ought to be afforded by limiting the options of the non-consulted party choices to ones that aligned better with British interests.

Through these tactics (procedures) the British harnessed the momentum of the negotiation process affecting how the Americans and Russians viewed the postwar planning alternatives. It is, therefore, revealed how the procedures used allowed the actors to control the process by directing its momentum. Furthermore, it is revealed how the process controlled the actors by limiting their options as the negotiation progressed. However, by pursuing different agendas, the PM and Eden eventually were unable to employ these tactics

⁶ Carrolton, 94.

⁷ Wallace, 238.

⁸ Harbutt, 84-85.

effectively because one of their use of the tactics worked against the other's employment of them.

At the Second Moscow Conference, Churchill presented Stalin with Anglo-American understandings on supplies and the second front, but he framed them in a manner that most protected British interests. The delays in supplies and the second front saved British soldiers and shipping, with the hope of allowing them to maintain parity with the Americans after the war, as well as allowed for a military focus on the Mediterranean, an area of traditional interest to the Empire. However, "the Russians resent[ed]" the "tendency for us to agree on matters with the Americans first, and present the results to the Russians," noted Eden.⁹ Also, the PM's confederation idea and the US refusal to endorse wartime territorial changes, the latter upheld by the British due to Churchill's insistence, gave rise to Russian fears about a revival of the Cordon Sanitaire – the manifestation of Anglo-American ill-will foreshadowed by delays in assistance. Thus, when Eden went to work out his Anglo-Soviet understanding at the Moscow Minister's meeting, he was confronted with a more suspicious Molotov, who had been instructed to increase the Soviet demands required for postwar cooperation.

Making matters worse for Eden in his dealings with the Russians, the Americans were trying to distance themselves from the British. Roosevelt's postwar vision was predicated on controlling the transition to peace; British guidance of the Anglo-American interactions with the Soviets would forestall his ability to implement the International New Deal. Plus, fear of the effect that Churchill's maneuverings were having on his relations with Stalin caused the President to openly separate American and British planning. As a result, Hull was instructed not to seem like he was "ganging up" with the English against the Russians. Eden, therefore, found that the Americans were "most unwilling to make any move" with him in regards to Eastern Europe.¹⁰ The US desire to separate their planning left the Foreign Secretary to bargain with his Russian counterpart *mano e mano*. The dual problem of Hull's abandonment and Molotov's increased demands meant Eden was forced to concede more to gain less than originally envisioned. Furthermore, what he was able to secure – the EAC – was undercut by the same American suspicions generated by the PM.

⁹ Ross, 133. July 12, 1943 Eden memo to Churchill.

¹⁰ Eden, 482.

Similarly, the concessions the Foreign Secretary made to lay the groundwork for an understanding with the Soviets on Europe severely set back Churchill's planning. His Anglo-American partnership was to be aided by a system of confederations for Central and Eastern Europe, one aspect of his plan to reestablish a balance of power setup for Europe and maintain control over Southeast Asia.¹¹ Eden's concessions included allowing the Russians and Czechs to sign a treaty. As a result, Poland and Czechoslovakia would never enter into a confederation as called for in Churchill's planning. While at first Britain's tactics had protected and even advanced their interests, now due in large part to the PM and Eden working at cross purposes, the tactics were backfiring and had caused the US and Russia to evolve their positions away from Britain and towards each other.

The failure of the first attempts to find a postwar combination was typified by the Roosevelt and Stalin talks at Teheran. The President was successful enough at separating Western planning that he and the Marshal began to form their own understanding. Decisions (or lack thereof) at Teheran, reflected Soviet-American preferences on issues, such as the Polish question. The last option to resurrect Britain's failing initial plans – using the Curzon Line as a bargaining chip to attach the Poles to the Czech-Soviet Treaty – was undercut by FDR's acceptance of Stalin's position on the Soviet-Polish border. Afterwards, Eden feared "that Russia has vast aims" and that "it was impossible to work with these people even as partners against a common foe," which caused him to abandon his attempts at an understanding with the Soviets.¹² Even though Teheran was a major setback the two British statesmen were finally working towards the same purpose, meaning future attempts to frame position through acting as an intermediary would be more successful.

The other conferences – Cairo I and II – in the fall of 1943 disturbed the British because there, like at Teheran, the US moved away from England and towards another partner. The possibility of a Sino-American partnership threatened Britain's ability to restart the Empire, just as a Soviet-American understanding would end the hopes of reestablishing a balance of power in Europe. Churchill told Cadogan, 'Certainly [China] would be a faggot

¹¹ FRUS: Québec II, 261. September 8, 1944 State Department briefing memo for FDR on British Pacific Policy; Robert C. Hildebrand, *Dumbarton Oaks: The Origins of the United Nations and the Search for Postwar Security* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990), 39. "[T]he Prime Minister proposed the Council of Europe consisting of the United States, the United Kingdom, and several confederations of states – Balkan, Scandinavian, Danubian – to administer an international police force" for the Continent. Plus the "British [had] a desire to create a Southeast federation of Burma, Malaya, Thailand and Indochina under British aegis."

¹² Eden, 345, 509. March 25, 1944 Eden memo to FO.

vote on the side of the United States in any attempt to liquidate the British overseas Empire.¹³ From Cairo II to Octagon, the PM did everything in his power to undermine this potential partnership. He believed, correctly, that “[i]f China fails to emerge as a strong and dependable factor in the maintenance of stability in the Far East, the need for British co-operation may become more evident than it is at present.”¹⁴ Therefore, Britain could re-colonize the area by controlling its transition to peace.

After the setbacks of 1943, the British statesmen realized a counterweight to an expansionist Russia and America’s attempts to decolonize the Pacific was essential. France was the answer to both of these dilemmas. However, the US was needed to assist in the recovery of France and Britain unless the English could find a way to revitalize their economy quickly and reestablish control over Southeast Asia. The lack of success on both measures was the final impetus for Churchill to alter course; yet, while his planning evolved, Eden continued working towards the same ends as the PM (outside of the their disagreement over the Morgenthau Plan).

Economic issues and FDR’s attempts to control Britain’s role in the Pacific strained Churchill’s belief in the Anglo-American partnership past the point of breaking. Octagon was the culmination of the events that led the PM to abandon, albeit briefly, the Anglo-American partnership.¹⁵ Between Québec I and II, he realized “certain conditions would be attached to that aid,” notes Woods, especially in regards to the British Empire.¹⁶ The failure to find a way to revitalize British trade after the war, particularly at Bretton Woods, caused the PM to accept the Morgenthau plan because it would decrease the need for American postwar aid, with its ramifications for the Empire. The plan would also provide the resources essential for reviving the traditional trade routes of the Empire, but only if they Anglo-French control over Southeast Asia was reestablished. Thus, when Roosevelt made it plain – through clauses in the Lend-Lease Phase II agreement – that Britain’s participation in the Pacific would be dictated by American not British priorities, Churchill went to Moscow.

After Octagon, the price to partner with the Russians – Eastern Europe – seemed to the PM to be less detrimental than America’s fee – dismantling the Empire. Stalin and

¹³ Cadogan, 488.

¹⁴ FO: North American, vol. IV, 238.

¹⁵ Kimball, “The Second Québec Conference”, 11.

¹⁶ Woods, 154.

Molotov had made it plain that Western Europe was Britain's prerogative, including France, and that they cared little for Southeast Asia. Specifically at the time, the Anglo-Soviet understanding on the Balkans – the percentage deal – protected British interests in the Near East, including the all important connection to India – the Suez Canal.¹⁷ Eden justified the deal as the “only practicable policy to check the spread of Russian influence throughout the Balkans,” which would threaten the canal and the Middle East.¹⁸ Furthermore, if the understanding was founded on the British-led Western-bloc, then it could “promote the revival of a strong, independent France.”¹⁹

The PM's planning now centered on Anglo-Soviet spheres in Europe; the British sphere would work with and forestall the Russians. Plus, Anglo-French re-colonization of Southeast Asia, exposed by the “[m]ilitary operations of the SEAC,” which Hull reported was “aimed primarily at the resurgence of British political and economic ascendancy in Southeast Asia.”²⁰ Furthermore, Elliot Roosevelt recalled, “When the British colonial troops marched in, they took with them French Troops and French administrators.”²¹ The Americans even began to refer to SEAC as “Save England's Asian Colonies.”²² Eden was skeptical about the intentions of the Western-bloc because it “might well precipitate the evils against which it was intended to guard.”²³ Still, he was willing to accept Churchill's planning, again “to check the spread of Russia influence.”²⁴

The new strategy was aided by separate American and Soviet decisions in late 1944. Roosevelt reluctantly concluded that Anglo-French forces were the only viable option to restore order in the Southeast Asia. FDR hoped China would play this role, but they needed to open the Burma Road first to allow supplies to flow into China, which was irrevocably delayed by the cancelation of *Buccaneer*. Britain's ability to include the clause “in relation to other operations to be undertaken” into the *Buccaneer* section of the Cairo declaration

17. Ismay, 369. The Americans made it clear in 1943-44 they had little desire to help the British in their maneuverings in the Near East, especially helping Turkey enter the war. Plus, “our intervention in Greece was vehemently criticized,” lamented Ismay, “by the State Department,” for imposing a monarchical regime on the country.

18. Eden, 534.

19. Plokhy, 103.

20. FRUS: Québec II, 261. September 8, 1944 State Department memo to FDR.

21. Roosevelt, 254.

22. Hastings, *Retribution*, 60.

23. FO: General, vol. IV, 302. July 25, 1944 Eden memo to Cooper.

24. Eden, 534.

allowed them to use Anvil to cover their desire not to conduct operation. “Time and again the timing and direction of the Pacific War was influenced by demand of other theaters,” declares Ronald Specter.²⁵ Without the necessary supplies China would not liberate Southeast Asia nor guide its transition to peace. “Above all, American officials, including Roosevelt, wanted an orderly, not revolutionary South East Asia open to Western interests.” Therefore, “he allowed the colonial powers to re-enter Indochina,” relates Lefebvre.²⁶ Thus, the British were reestablished in the region.

After the percentage deal alleviated Stalin’s fears about a Cordon Sanitaire, he indicated support for “a large Danubian federation.”²⁷ Eden’s concessions on confederations had undermined Churchill’s plans for a regional council of Europe. The Marshal’s decision gave the idea new life. The addition of the confederation to the Western-bloc would give the British-led coalition control over half of Europe. Coupled with the agreement that regional councils could be established under the UNO’s auspice, Britain’s bloc as well as the Soviet’s sphere placed atop the European political realm would reestablish balance of power control over the Continent. The Western-bloc was the key to creating this setup; therefore, it survived past the PM’s next planning evolution and caused the abandonment of the Morgenthau Plan.

Churchill’s Anglo-Soviet plans did not last long. The British leader had purposefully left Poland out of the percentage deal hoping that the country would not fall into the Soviet sphere. However, Stalin recognized his puppet Poles only two months after Tolstoy. The PM felt betrayed and “distressed at the course events [were] taking.”²⁸ Churchill realized the Americans, for all their faults, were the better partners, especially since he had undermined FDR’s Sino-American decolonization plans by maneuvering the Anglo-French combination into the role of Southeast Asia’s liberators.

Churchill’s postwar planning had come full circle, not surprisingly, since in multilateral negotiations “structure is reflected in shifting coalitions and in variations in

²⁵ Ronald Specter, “American Seizure of Japan’s Strategic Points, Summer 1942-44” in *From Pearl Harbor to Hiroshima*, ed. Saki Dockrill (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), 84.

²⁶ Lefebvre, 1295.

²⁷ Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy*, 241. October 22, 1944 Churchill cable to Roosevelt.

²⁸ Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy*, 337. January 5, 1945 Churchill to Stalin.

alliance cohesion,” observes Daniel Druckman.²⁹ Plus, now Eden was working towards the same aims. The lessons of the past four years revealed they needed to have some check on American machinations. An Anglo-American partnership was still preferred but would include the Western-bloc built around the Anglo-French combination to lessen British dependency on America. The US commitments to active participation in postwar geopolitics would be secured with British adherence to Roosevelt’s visions of the UNO. “Only by encouraging the formation of some World Organization are we likely to induce the Americans,” wrote Eden, “to accept any European commitments.”³⁰ However, US postwar commitments would only be of import if the French were part of this postwar machinery because “British interest demanded the restoration of French power,” demoting the UNO to Britain’s second priority.³¹ Thus, the inclusion of France in the EAC and a zone for them in the postwar occupation of Germany took the top slot.

To make sure Poland did not fall into the Russian orbit, a liberal democratic reorganization of the Polish government was necessary – the third hard position. Britain still wanted the markets and lack of competition from Germany offered by the Morgenthau Plan, even though they did not want the complete deindustrialization that would preclude it from contributing to the economic viability of a Danubian federation that could act as a bulwark against Russian expansionism. Eden feared, however, that German reparations would create a powerful German economy. As a result, “Britain’s interest as a reparation claimant is distinctly secondary” to “controlling the German economy” so as “to limit German competition with British exports.”³² Their fourth hard position was, thus, to limit reparations claims. Finally, they wanted to maintain their predominance in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Predominance in the Mediterranean was why the British entered into the percentage deal. They did not abandon the agreement when Churchill pivoted back towards a partnership with the Americans because the US had made it plain they were not comfortable with British actions in Greece and the deal would force FDR to accept British primacy in the country. Furthermore, having already secured the agreement meant these positions were of

²⁹ Daniel Druckman, “Content Analysis” in *International Negotiations: Analysis, Approaches, Issues*, 2nd Edition, ed. Victor Kremenyuk, (San Francisco: Jossey Bass, 2002), 302.

³⁰ Eden, 517.

³¹ John Charmley, “Churchill and the American Alliance.” *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, Sixth Series* 11 (2001), 363.

³² FRUS: Yalta, 167. November 10, 1944 State memo for FDR on German economic treatment.

lower priority to the aforementioned positions. Still, it was essential that the scope of the deal expand to “consolidate our position in Greece and Turkey,” wrote Eden.³³ Britain’s fifth through seventh positions were derived from this need: no alteration to Anglo-Soviet agreements on Greece, no Russian encroachment on Turkish sovereignty, and Russian adherence to the Subsiac-Tito agreements for Yugoslavia.³⁴ These were the hard positions that the British wanted adopted.

Remember, the “price that” a party “is prepared to pay to achieve” is often more important than their objectives in determining position priority.”³⁵ French policing of postwar Germany was seen as a way to entice the Americans into accepting a greater role for France, especially an occupation zone for them. Churchill wrote FDR, France “may prove the means for releasing some of your men more quickly than you had hoped.”³⁶ Also to entice the US to accept their planning, British acceptance of the American voting plan was seen as a way to secure their commitment to the UNO. These trades would solidify the Western-bloc and the Anglo-American partnership.

Besides maintaining the percentage deal, bringing Tito into the Yugoslav government would lay the groundwork for an Anglo-Soviet understanding on Eastern Europe. However, the key piece to create a workable arrangement was the most important soft (tradable) position: movement on the Polish border question. Churchill revealed at Teheran he was against moving the border too far to the West. Yet, he was willing to concede these border changes if the Polish government was reorganized. After the setbacks at Tolstoy, “the War Cabinet had assured the Polish Government that they would support the extension of Polish

³³ Eden, 534; Woodward, vol. III, 121. “The only feasible plan was to consolidate our position in Greece and Turkey, to use Turco-Greek friendship as a fundamental factor in South-east Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean.” Furthermore, “We should avoid a direct challenge to Russian interests in Central European centers adjacent to the Soviet Union, but we ought to avail ourselves of every opportunity to spread British influence in [Greece, Turkey, and Italy.]

³⁴ Eden, 512. The accords would bind Tito’s faction with the King’s faction. Eden recalled, “Subasic seemed to think that if the system of collaboration between the King and Tito could be started, he might later be able to tackle the question of the King’s position in more favorable conditions.” The King was pro-British, and that was the only viable way to protect Britain interest on the Eastern bank of the Adriatic.

³⁵ De Cremer, 13.

³⁶ Churchill, Roosevelt, and Kimball, vol. II, 745-47. He continued “If a satisfactory regime were set up in France and you were anxious to withdraw some of your troops from Germany there would probably be little difficulty in French troops being moved into the southern German zone to take over from your men; the French would in those circumstances be only too anxious to assume this responsibility.”

territory in the west as far as the Oder, even if the Americans did not agree,” recalled Eden.³⁷ Maintenance of the percentage deal and movement on the Polish borders was thus seen as both a way to check Russian expansionism as well as entice them to work with the British, a very fine line to walk.

Churchill sent Roosevelt a cable shortly before Malta stating, “Eden has particularly asked me to suggest that Stettinius might come on 48 hours earlier ... so that he (Eden) can run over the agenda with him beforehand, even though Molotov is not invited.”³⁸ The Foreign Secretary’s aforementioned statement and the PM’s letter expressed the sentiment that guided Britain’s strategy for Yalta, consistent with their approach throughout the war: conclude bilateral agreements by acting as intermediaries, which would force the hand of the non-consulted party through limiting their options. By concluding bilateral agreements they could overcome the difficulties with the Russians raised by Britain’s positions on the Near East and reparations as well as the US opposition to the movement of the Poland’s Western border and British primacy in Greece, and finally, both countries’ hostility to a greater role for France.

American

Past success – the balance of power in Europe – guided British planning for the postwar; likewise, Roosevelt’s success during the 1930s would inform his postwar decision-making. His administration held that “the next peace must take into account the facts of economics; otherwise, it will serve as the seedbed for aggression.”³⁹ The same unregulated self-interest that destroyed American economic life – ‘destructive trade restrictions, born largely of greed and unreasoning fear and by ruthless aggression’ – was taking its toll on the world-at-large, according to FDR.⁴⁰ The implementation of the New Deal had allowed the US economy to surmount these problems. If he could “export to all of the world the economic and social goals and techniques that had done so much to raise standards of living, cultural as well as material, in the United States,” they could also overcome the problems of un-checked economic nationalism worldwide, concluded Roosevelt.⁴¹ The idea was to turn

³⁷. Eden, 575; FRUS: Yalta, 510. The US felt “we should make every effort to keep this compensation to a minimum particularly because of the large populations transfer” involved.

³⁸. FRUS: Yalta, 33. January 10, 1945 PM cable to FDR.

³⁹. Eckes, 34. Wallace quoted.

⁴⁰. FO: General, vol. I, 376. May 17, 1941 Roosevelt speech.

⁴¹. Range, 137.

political difficulties into economic ones (how to increase productivity), like he had domestically, what Maier has termed the “politics of productivity.”⁴² As a result, the underlying interest that informed his postwar decision-making was the desire to spread his concepts of liberal capitalism worldwide – the International New Deal.

In the 1930s, the President achieved a modicum of success instilling these ideals in Latin America through the Good Neighbor policy. The success of the policy was founded on “benevolent paternity” aimed at modernizing the aided country and developing its latent potential. US Export/Import Bank loans were the mechanism by which the Good Neighbor policy helped increase productivity in Latin America.⁴³ The policy’s “success in the hemisphere of the Americans,” argued FDR, made “its extension to the whole world seem to be the logical next step.”⁴⁴ It was assumed after the war, ‘Every country will need industrial rehabilitation and reconstruction.’⁴⁵ This need would create a similar opportunity as in Latin America, where “the facilities of the Export-Import Bank in Washington were called upon to tide over several American governments that were under a severe financial or commercial strain,” recalled Welles.⁴⁶ American control of postwar lending would be the mechanism that the President could use to implement the International New Deal. The Americans realized their large monetary holdings granted them predominance in the lending agencies. This advantage, however, would only be useful if the US directed the victorious coalition.

The President’s first attempt to guide the Allies’ transition to peace, especially economically, was revealed at Placentia Bay. “The Atlantic Charter declare[d] the right of all nations to access on equal terms to the trade and to the raw materials of the world” as prerequisite “for their economic prosperity,” declared Hull.⁴⁷ It was hoped with free trade and equal access, world productivity would be invigorated. Roosevelt felt the English-speaking powers could guide this transformation, at first. The British, however, feared the implication of FDR’s planning. Instead of following the President’s economic planning, as he thought they would, Churchill maneuvered to undermine the anti-British aspects of the

⁴² Maier, 607ff. Roosevelt wanted to promote “a supposedly impartial efficiency,” transferrable to all peoples in all situation by “transform[ing] political issues into issues of output.”

⁴³ Herring, 500-01.

⁴⁴ FO: North American, vol. III, 224. September 17, 1943 FDR speech to Congress.

⁴⁵ FO: General, vol. IV, 230. May 17, 1944 Fed Official Charles P. Taft speech.

⁴⁶ Welles, 216.

⁴⁷ FO: General, vol. II, 156. July 23, 1942 Hull speech quoted.

approach. His maneuverings caused Roosevelt to alter his planning, a pattern that would continue throughout the war. The evolution of FDR's planning, therefore, is revealed by his changing methods to achieve American predominance amongst the United Nations. The cause of these alterations – catalyst for position evolution – exposed why the President altered his planning: the British.

Britain's natural tendency to protect the economic foundations of the Empire – colonialism and discriminatory trade – forced a reevaluation of the President's decision to partner exclusively with England. "British dependence on lend lease" was "the leverage" to undermine Britain discriminatory trade practices, relates Harbutt.⁴⁸ The negotiations over the Lend-Lease Master Agreement and at Bretton Woods both exposed this phenomenon. However, no similar leverage existed to cajole the British to take part in Roosevelt's ideas for decolonizing the Pacific. The mechanism FDR envisioned for modernizing the former colonies was a trusteeship, a great power(s) trust over the former colonies with the trustee(s) goals "aimed at future independence" for the colony through modernity.⁴⁹ A local Asian partner would reinforce the Good Neighbor aspect of FDR's International New Deal by removing suspicions of Western domination and help overcome British reluctance to take part in decolonization. China was the ideal decolonization partner because of their large size and potential as well as the fact that they were dependent on America aid.⁵⁰

Placing the Sino-American partnership foremost amongst the United Nations was FDR's new means to implement the International New Deal. Roosevelt's ideas on the UNO developed as he tried to figure out how best to place this new partnership in control of the transition to peace as well how the organization should be set up to establish his socio-economic program. Hence, the President always focused on Big Four control of the group instead of a truly democratic organization. Hull hinted at what Roosevelt envisioned for the transition period: "During this period of transition the United Nations must continue to act, in the spirit of co-operation which now underlies their war effort," i.e., cooperation led by the Big Four power directorate.

⁴⁸ Harbutt, 241-42.

⁴⁹ Roosevelt and Roosevelt, 1489. January. 24, 1945 FDR letter to Hull.

⁵⁰ Christopher T. Jespersen, *American Images of China, 1931-1949* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1996), 54-55.

The Four-Power directorate was a reaction to Britain's protection of their interests. The directorate was also the President's method to overcome the wild card that was the Soviet Union's entrance into the anti-Axis coalition. A different approach was needed to obtain Soviet adherence to American ideas for postwar peace. The US had decided to rally only 90 divisions instead of the 200 divisions the JCS determined would be needed to win the war allied with the British alone, which meant the US was dependent on the Red Army to defeat the Nazis. Once again the President's success during the 1930s was his guide, specifically his dealing with the Vargas regime in Brazil. Roosevelt felt Stalinist Russia could also be transformed in the same manner.⁵¹ The President was sure he could "influence its evolution away from dictatorship and tyranny in the direction of a free, tolerant, and peaceful society," emphasized Stettinius.⁵² The Americans and Russians had to work together in close partnership since, 'Nations will learn to work together only by actually working together,' contended FDR.⁵³ Russian adherence to the Four-Power declaration at Moscow bound the countries together, hopefully granting the time to liberalize Soviet society.

The creation of the Four-Power directorate was, however, the high point for the Sino-American partnership. Cairo II started a year-long process that culminated in the President's abandonment of his close partnership with the Chinese. Afterwards, they were relegated to a mere dependent vote. As noted, British intrigues in the Pacific made a difficult situation impossible – Chiang's ability to liberate Southeast Asia. Roosevelt was, therefore, forced to let the colonial powers reestablish control over the region. After three years of diplomacy, FDR was back to where he started; China "was as much a shambles as it had been in 1942," notes Hastings.⁵⁴ The President once again needed the British to agree with his decolonization planning and was forced to cajole and/or bribe them to go along with the idea. Plus, the lack of military assistance from the Chinese meant Russian participation in the defeat of Japan was now essential as well, since only they had the manpower to clear the

⁵¹ Churchill, Roosevelt, and Kimball, vol. III, 339. September 28, 1944 Roosevelt letter to Churchill. "I think we are all in agreement," FDR wrote the PM, "as to the necessity of having the USSR as a fully accepted an equal member of any Association of the great powers formed for the purpose of preventing international war. It should be possible to accomplish this by adjusting our differences through compromise by all the parties concerned and this ought to tide things over for a few years until the child learns how to toddle."

⁵² Stettinius, *Roosevelt and the Russians*, 324.

⁵³ Burns, 429. FDR quoted.

⁵⁴ Hastings, *Retribution*, 220.

Japanese out of Manchuria. Yet, China was still a dependent vote that would allow the US to direct the UNO's power directorate. As a result, the organization became the President's main focus.

Strong social and economic councils included in the organization were necessary to provide the arena to control the socio-economic direction of the former colonies and the world-at-large. Additionally, pressure on the British to comply with decolonization would be greater if the trusteeships were under the UNO's aegis. The UNO would "serve as mechanisms of political control that allowed [the US]," notes Ikenberry, "to lock other states into a favorable set of postwar relations."⁵⁵ Coupled with their control of the lending agencies the Americans could implement the International New Deal. The need to shape the UNO meant Anglo-Soviet adherence to FDR's positions on the organization's final details. Thus, the President's positions were based on garnering concessions on the UNO via adopting British or Russian positions. Most of the trades were aimed at securing Russian adherence to American positions by agreeing to Soviet positions that were of little importance to US interests.

At Dumbarton Oaks, two major issues – membership and the veto – threatened to undermine the American-led organization the President desired. The membership question almost wrecked Dumbarton Oaks. Yet, Feis recalled before Yalta, "The President had been persuaded that [the admission of extra Soviet republics] would do no harm, and that it might elicit firmer Soviet cooperation in the work of the United Nations."⁵⁶ To overcome the veto deadlock, the State Department had created a new plan: the partial veto (what Britain would adhere to in their attempt to obtain US commitments to Europe via the UNO), thus, admitting a few Soviet Republics could gain Russian adherence to the partial veto.⁵⁷

The other way the Americans planned to gain Soviet adherence to the UNO as designed by Roosevelt and the State Department was to accept the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact territorial changes in Eastern Europe. John Hickerson articulated the idea, "I would favor using any bargaining power that exists in connection with the forgoing matters [Eastern European territorial changes] to induce the Russian to go along with a satisfactory

⁵⁵ Ikenberry, 5.

⁵⁶ Feis, 554.

⁵⁷ It gave the Big Four a veto over UNO actions but not the discussion of issues, which they hoped would quell Soviet fears about being isolated inside the organization.

United Nations organization.”⁵⁸ Throughout the war, FDR and Hull made it clear that Eastern Europe was not a priority. However, American public opinion on the subject worried them. Roosevelt “went to Yalta keenly aware of public opinion,” remembered Bohlen, but not enough to alter his plans.⁵⁹ As a result, “Mr. Roosevelt was in general ready to accept the Russian standpoint, but the matter must be arranged in a manner which would give the least offense to the American public,” recalled Eden.⁶⁰ The State Department, therefore, concocted the Declaration on Liberated Europe (DLE).⁶¹ Like the General Assembly was a sop for the lesser powers, the DLE was a pacifying agent for American public opinion, allowing the President to tacitly accept Stalin’s program for Eastern Europe in return for his adherence to FDR’s version of the UNO.

After Yalta, Ambassador Grew wrote, ‘Russian entry [into the war against Japan] will have a profound military effect in that almost certainly it will materially shorten the war and save American lives.’⁶² As noted, US military decisions were informed, first and foremost, by a desire to “save American lives.” The ambassador’s statement reveals why FDR was more than willing to trade the concessions Stalin had requested in the Far East for Red Army participation in the Pacific. Plus, the agreement would safeguard Chinese sovereignty, essential because Russian troops would be in control of Manchuria after the war. “American officials expected that, once Soviet troops intervened in China, they would work closely with the Communists,” emphasizes Buhite; the deal would hinder this possibility.⁶³ The price was known, which decreased its priority, therefore concluding the Far Eastern trade was secondary to the trades to define of the UNO’s mandate.

FDR was also willing to work with the Russians on their reparations needs, as long as it did not affect his economic planning; the State Department was skeptical that this was possible. “The Americans wanted any assessment to be within Germany’s ability to pay. But

⁵⁸ FRUS: Yalta, 95. State Department’s Briefing book for Yalta. Hickerson was Deputy Director of European Affairs. He further claimed “There are certain thing with the foregoing proposals which are repugnant to me personally, but I am prepared to urge their adoption to obtain the cooperation of the Soviet Union in winning the war and organizing the peace.” This sentiment was widely held in the White House and State Department.

⁵⁹ Bohlen, 177.

⁶⁰ FO: General, vol. III, 66.

⁶¹ Stettinius, *Diaries*, 230. Stettinius wrote at the time the declaration was about “the desirability of unity in fact and in appearance among the great powers *with respect to postwar* (itals MMG) political and economic problems in liberated and satellite states.”

⁶² Joseph C. Grew, *Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic Record of Forty Year, 1904-1945* (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1952), 1458. May 21, 1945 diary entry.

⁶³ Buhite, 174.

Roosevelt wanted to avoid giving the impression that the United States was ganging up with Great Britain in a callous effort to prevent the Soviet Union from gaining compensation for its grievous suffering.”⁶⁴ The President’s other positions on European issues, such as the willingness to move Finnish borders in Russia’s favor or revisiting the Monteux Treaty, were aimed at deal-making as well.⁶⁵ Concessions on Eastern Europe and the Far East could obtain Stalin’s cooperation; French concessions were necessary for British cooperation.

Once FDR reluctantly allowed the French back into Southeast Asia, he was more ambivalent about their role in European affairs. He hoped to use Britain’s desire to revive France, declares Lefeber, as “leverage to moderate Anglo-French activities in [Southeast Asia],” specifically British adherence to trusteeships inclusion in the UNO’s charter.⁶⁶ As a result, “The President was disposed to give the French a zone” of occupation in Germany to persuade Britain to adhere to his planning for the UNO.⁶⁷ His only concern was the possibility of France wrecking American control of the UNO’s power directorate; hence, he was hesitant to give France an immediate spot on the Security Council. Recall, at Dumbarton Oaks, it was decided the France would receive a seat “in due course;” if maintained, the Big Four would still control the transition to peace.

American strategy, therefore, was to use British and Russian aspirations to influence European affairs to shape the UNO, particularly by imbuing it with far-reaching powers to transform the socio-economic conditions of the world. Plus, the US delegations could utilize Russia’s desire to safeguard their Eastern approaches and for a Pacific outlet to maintain Chinese sovereignty, while having the Red Army carry the load in Manchuria.

Russian

Soviet diplomacy is frequently portrayed as “a mystery, inside an enigma,” citing Churchill’s famous line.⁶⁸ However, Stalin, the single architect of said diplomacy, was quite consistent in his aims up to Yalta: domination of Eastern Europe and the Northern Far East, plus the integration of the territories included in the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the

⁶⁴ Smith, 13.

⁶⁵ FRUS: C/T, 566. The Monteux Treaty governed the use of the straits that ran through the Dardanelles. It was written to protect Turkey, who controlled the territory, against the Russians. FDR had mentioned at Teheran his willingness to rewrite this convention after the war.

⁶⁶ Lefeber, 1293.

⁶⁷ FRUS: Yalta, 499. February 1, 1945 Foreign Minister’s meeting at Malta, agreed minutes.

⁶⁸ Churchill radio broadcast October 1939, <http://www.churchill-society-london.org.uk/RusnEnig.html>, accessed Sept. 17, 2013.

Far Eastern Agreements.⁶⁹ The pact exposed the Soviet Premier's territorial ambitions and the concern that guided his thinking. The territory it added to the Soviet Union had one underlying theme – protecting the approaches to the country. This theme would define Stalin's territorial ambitions through Yalta. He believed “[d]efense through strategic retreat and exploitation of depth” was Russia's best strategic option, notes Gordetsky.⁷⁰ The territories the Soviet Union gained and the areas they wanted to dominate were essential for a successful implementation of the policy. All other considerations were consigned to the dictator's main concern – the preservation of his power. Molotov's pact with Ribbentrop displayed Stalin's willingness to subsume communist ideology to the preservation of his power. The evolution of his postwar planning, therefore, reflected the Marshal's perception about how the changing circumstances would affect the preservation of his power during and after the war, not the desire to expand communism.

Military prowess dictated the power a leader had within his country and throughout the world, according to Stalin. He “worship[ped] military might,” declares Mastny.⁷¹ The Nazi attack revealed that the Soviet's military power was far weaker than he realized. Almost immediately, however, Russia was provided a way out of this predicament when the West promised aid and wartime alliance. Supplies and a second front were the two items needed the most, both of which the West could impart. If the Anglo-Americans armed the Red Army and opened a second front, Stalin could preserve and perhaps even enhance his power – his minimal conditions. He would suppress his hatred of capitalism if his allies made available these desperately required elements.

From America's entrance into the war until the conferences of 1943, the West failed to live up to the conditions that Stalin believed necessary for Grand Alliance cooperation.⁷² Western positions, most often dictated by British priorities, seemed to portend that they “wanted the Soviet Union and Germany to bleed each other white,” declared Gromyko.⁷³ For a man who felt military power was the primary factor in geo-politics, these machinations

⁶⁹ Eastern Poland; parts of Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania; the Baltic States and Königsberg; as well as the Kurile and South Sakhalin Islands. Only after Yalta does the Marshal start to look covetously on the Mediterranean and the South Pacific, but this is important for the Russian strategy post-Yalta, not for the conference.

⁷⁰ Gorodetsky, 209.

⁷¹ Mastny, “The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity,” 16.

⁷² Mastny, *Russia's Road*, 79. The second front was the Soviets main test of Western intentions, according to Mastny.

⁷³ Gromyko, 37.

could not help but cultivate doubts in the Marshal's mind. As noted, American refusal to endorse wartime territorial changes increased Soviet concerns when the British idea of confederations seemed to signify a new Cordon Sanitaire – the potential manifestation of the perceived Western ill-will. The FO sent Eden a memo stating, “[T]he Russians will regard our attitude on the subject of Confederation as one of the tests of our real intentions towards them.”⁷⁴ The situation was mostly rectified in the fall of 1943.

Eden's concessions at Moscow and Stalin's talks with FDR at Teheran alleviated some of his fears. However, it was the adamant determination to launch the second front that finally assuaged the Soviet Premier's apprehension about Western intentions enough for the Russians to conclude ‘there are certainly conditions for the continuation of cooperation ... into the postwar period.’⁷⁵ The West was again displaying a desire to assist his military; therefore, Stalin could again work with them. Still, the first two years of the Grand Alliance had made him wary of Anglo-American maneuvering. As a result, Russia's price for postwar cooperation had increased. After the Western intrigues, the Russian ruler now required endorsement of his security scheme before the Soviets would cooperate with the US and Britain.

The UNO was Stalin's mechanism to bind his allies permanently to their wartime promises. “[T]he long-term continuation of the Grand Alliance assumed greater, not lesser, importance” as the war came to an end, observes Geoffrey Roberts.⁷⁶ If the Russians played their cards right, then the UNO could codify their wartime gains and transition the Grand Alliance into a peacetime triumvirate. The visible expression of this cohesion was, according to Stalin, “the unanimity of agreement of the four powers.”⁷⁷ The organization, therefore, had to endorse “the principle of unanimity” through the Big Four's possession of an unchecked veto, his first hard position.⁷⁸

Stalin's next set of hard positions reflected his desire to dominate Eastern Europe. First, the Allies had to approve the continuation of the percentage deal, his second hard position. Then, the Polish government had to be dependent since “it could be turned into a

⁷⁴ Ross, 115. Christopher Warren memo to Eden.

⁷⁵ Zubok, *Failed Empire*, 14. Litvinov quoted.

⁷⁶ Geoffrey Roberts, *Stalin's War*, 199.

⁷⁷ Roosevelt and Arthur Schlesinger, ed. Susan Butler, *My Dear Mr. Stalin: The Complete Correspondence between Franklin Roosevelt and Joseph Stalin*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), 257-58. September 14, 1944, Stalin letter to FDR. Stalin cared little for China as a great power; he assumed they were an American dependent.

⁷⁸ Mastny, “Cassandra,” 369.

convenient bridgehead for anti-Soviet adventures,” noted Gromyko.⁷⁹ The best way to ensure the Poles were dependent on the Russians was to guarantee they feared future “German aggression.”⁸⁰ Moving the Polish borders towards Germany would cultivate this potentiality. Thus, the movement of Polish borders westward was the Soviets’ next hard position, which meant explicit Western endorsement of the Curzon Line. The line had foreign security ramifications, like all of the Russian ruler’s postwar planning, but it also had domestic implications.

In the early days of the war, the Nazi advances were aided by Soviet minorities on their Western border, chiefly the Lithuanians, Ukrainians, and White Russians. “[T]o [Stalin’s] dismay, [the Nazis] had sometimes been welcomed as liberators,” relates Gellately.⁸¹ Plus, Cripps noted prior to Barbarossa, “there is a great deal of Fifth Column work in the Ukraine,” which “must have done a great deal of harm to the Russians.”⁸² The Curzon Line would increase these areas’ economic viability. Still, Stalin did not believe this was enough to cease the separatists’ agitation; they needed a political outlet.⁸³ Request for membership for all sixteen Soviet Republics was a tactic concocted in response to the perceived Anglo-American intention to isolate the Soviet Union in the UNO.⁸⁴ With a veto, however, the USSR could not be isolated as it had been in the League. Therefore, the Russian position on membership was about placating subversive groups to protect the Marshal’s power. Thus, Stalin wanted the republics of Lithuania, the Ukraine, and White Russia to acquire a seat, each hot beds of subversion and border territories. Membership for a different group, however, was more important, relegating membership for the republics to the fifth hard position.

⁷⁹ Gromyko, 82.

⁸⁰ Woodward, Vol. III, 127; Roosevelt, Schlesinger, and Butler, 222-24. March 23, 1944, Stalin letter to Churchill. The Russians would remove “the chance of a Polish-German reapproachment by the extension of Polish frontiers westwards and to the Baltic at German expense.”

⁸¹ Gellately, 15.

⁸² FO: Russia, vol. I, 408.

⁸³ Plokhy, 168-173. “The Soviets came back in 1944 as champions of the liberation and reunification of ancient Ukrainian lands. They took a page from the book of the Ukrainian Nationalist Army, which was also fighting for the unification of all the Ukrainian ethnic lands. Like the Ukrainian nationalists, the Soviets were in favor of the development of Ukrainian culture, unlike their foes, they had in mind a very peculiar form of culture.”

⁸⁴ FRUS: Yalta, 712. February 7, 1945 Fourth Plenary Session at Yalta, Bohlen minutes. The above interpretation is revealed by the way Molotov raised the question at Yalta. He stated, “It was not the Soviet intention to raise the question in the same form as had been done at Dumbarton Oaks, but they would be satisfied with the admission of three or at least two of the Soviet Republics [Lithuania, Ukraine, and White Russia] as original members.”

A seat for Poland's Lublin government was essential so that the regime could acquire prestige as quickly as possible to emasculate any possible agitations or uprisings, making it Stalin's fourth hard position. Plus, it was feared an uprising in Poland would lead to agitation in the eastern republics. A "constant concern," relates Geoffrey Roberts, existed "in Moscow that non-Soviet Ukrainians and Belarusians living in Poland could be used as a base for the subversion of their compatriots within the USSR."⁸⁵ Military force could be used to suppress these agitators; however, this would run counter to the goals of the organization codifying Stalin's gains. Therefore, he needed the Russian borderland – Eastern Europe – to be dependent on the USSR. The best way to accomplish this as well as reduce intra-state subversion was to aid in rebuilding.

Molotov told Mikolajczyk, 'The USSR undertakes to settle the reparation claims of Poland from its own share of reparations,' thus fostering Polish dependency on Russia.⁸⁶ The Soviets, therefore, needed a good reparation settlement since the country had been devastated by the war. "Whenever the future of Germany is discussed[,] the Russians bring up the question of reparations. That is what interests them," remembered Moran.⁸⁷ They wanted a large reparation settlement and half of its total receipts – Stalin's sixth hard position. If accepted, his first five hard positions would create the Western section of the security scheme.

Eastern Europe was the pathway of most invasions of Russia; therefore, Stalin prioritized positions related to dominance of the region. However, the Northern Far East had also been an avenue for invasion. As a result, security on this border was necessary as well. His sixth hard position was the Western backing of Russian predominance in the area. If these positions were adopted then Stalin believed a path for Grand Alliance postwar cooperation existed.

Soviet preparation for Yalta revealed Stalin "wanted to have the best of both worlds: the benefits of continued cooperation with the Western Allies and at the same time the consolidation of their newfound positions, the latter being the more vital and ultimately decisive priority," declares Petchanov. His study of Soviet planning documents also led Petchanov to conclude that, unlike at Teheran, a Western "combination against the USSR

⁸⁵. Geoffrey Roberts, "Stalin at Teheran," 37-38.

⁸⁶. Mikolajczyk, 140.

⁸⁷. Moran, 280.

was considered unlikely given ‘the Anglo-American contradiction,’ which provided the Soviet Union with additional room for maneuver.”⁸⁸ Thus, the Marshal believed he could exploit his advantageous position – military control of Eastern Europe and American dependence on the Red Army’s participation in Manchuria – to make a number of horse trades to acquire adherence to his hard positions.

The deal-making aspect of the Russians’ strategy for Yalta focused on American adherence to or movement towards Soviet positions rather than British, since the percentage deal was still in effect.⁸⁹ America’s concern over the defeat of Japan made Red Army participation in the Pacific Stalin’s most tradable asset; the Eastern section of his security scheme could be secured if he played this card right.⁹⁰ The Marshal also realized that the Americans had pinned their hopes on a successful UNO and wanted to shape the organization. With the veto, the other US concepts for the organization would not matter much to the Russians. Trading Soviet backing for America’s position on the UNO would secure Roosevelt’s movement towards Stalin’s hard positions.⁹¹

Yet, Britain was the country that could codify Russia’s the Western section of the security scheme, since the US was publically opposed to spheres of influence. Litvinov argued, “[I]t is difficult to outline some concrete basis for [American] positive political cooperation apart from a mutual interest in the preservation of world peace” because of “[their] resistance to spheres of influence;” therefore “deals of this kind with the British” were necessary.⁹² Greater recognition of France was something the Russian ruler preferred not to occur, but it was a Western Europe country, and if Britain codified his domination of Eastern Europe, he could tolerate French concessions. Harriman noticed, prior to Yalta, that “Stalin’s attitude towards” France “had changed abruptly” since Teheran.⁹³ Similarly, the Soviet Premier had given up any say in the direction of Greece to gain British acceptance of his predominance in the remainder of the Balkans. He was more than willing to threaten this arrangement if the British tried to reestablish themselves in the region. Conversely, he was willing to help Britain maintain the setup if they were pressured by the Americans to

⁸⁸ Petchanov, 18, 22.

⁸⁹ Harbutt, 151-52; Mastny, *Russia’s Cold War*, 256.

⁹⁰ Berezkhov, 342.

⁹¹ Roosevelt, Schlesinger, and Butler, 257-58. September 14, 1944 Stalin letter to FDR.

⁹² Petchanov, 10-11. Litvinov’s planning paper “On the Relationship with the USA.”

⁹³ Harriman, 374.

liberalize their policy on Greece, since “[it] was never high on the list of Russian and Soviet geopolitical objectives,” notes Plokhy.⁹⁴

Yugoslavia was a source of differences between the two powers due to the percentage deal outlining joint predominance in the country. Stalin wanted to prevent her from becoming a “springboard for foreign invaders,” notes Gordetsky, “by preserving Yugoslavia’s sovereignty.”⁹⁵ The Russian ruler feared the British would control a government run exclusively by the King. He controlled Tito (or assumed he did) and felt he could adhere to the Subasic-Tito agreements once the “little Marshal” was brought formally into the Yugoslav government, thus preserving Soviet predominance in the country.

Russian strategy, therefore, was based on trading their adherence to the Western delegation’s greatest concerns in return for dominance over Eastern Europe and the Northern Far East endorsed by the UNO under a Big Three triumvirate. Britain’s fear of the Red Army’s power in Europe and the US need for these troops in the Pacific provided Stalin the leverage believed he could use to secure Anglo-American agreement to his security scheme.

To assess the Big Three leaders’ performances, their ability to move their counterparts towards their hard positions must be ascertained. Churchill and Eden’s strategy aimed at agreement on French inclusion in the EAC and the occupation of Germany, American commitment to the UNO, a liberal reorganization of the Polish government, small-scale reparations, British predominance in Greece, maintenance of Turkish sovereignty, and Russian adherence to the Subasic-Tito agreements. Roosevelt wanted the partial veto, trusteeships as well as economic and social councils included in the UNO, Red Army participation in the Pacific, and Russian adherence to the DLE. Stalin went to Yalta striving for the UN veto, recognition of his Western Sphere – perpetuation of the percentage deal, acceptance of the Curzon Line, recognition of the puppet Polish government, membership for the three republics, and large-scale reparations – as well as the creation of his Eastern Sphere. Furthermore, what return did they acquire from their soft (tradable) positions?

⁹⁴ Plokhy, 150.

⁹⁵ Gorodetsky, 143.

Interestingly, a noticeable lack of planning for Germany was apparent. Besides reparations and the zones of occupation, the latter determined beforehand, treatment of postwar Germany was discussed in vague generalities during the preparations for Yalta. As FDR often stated, ‘Our attitude should be one of study and postponement of final decision.’⁹⁶ Churchill fluctuated between wanting to build up Germany as a bulwark against Russia or following the President’s lead and postponing decisions until greater information on the state of postwar Germany was ascertained. Stalin wanted his counterparts to take the lead on the German problem except where German issues encroached on his other positions. As Murphy noted, in his study of the Soviet actions in the EAC, they were “in no hurry to make binding agreements concerning Germany’s future.”⁹⁷ The Soviet Premier’s planning was a cynical ploy to use the outwardly aggressive nature of his Allies stances on Germany as propaganda to gain greater influence for the Soviets in postwar Germany.

⁹⁶. Beschloss, 206. FDR quoted.

⁹⁷. Robert D. Murphy, *Diplomat Among Warriors* (London: Collins, 1964), 284.

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Curriculum Vitae

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Education:

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Relevant Professional Experience:

2003-4 Outside Sales Executive, Indiana Daily Student

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2005-6, 2010 Legal Assistant, Chapman and Nelson

2007 Analyst, Cohen, Klein, and Stewart

2009-10 Analyst, Larson and Associates

2011-13 Legal Assistant Mark Kemper, PC.

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Conferences Attended:

2004 Newspaper Association of America Annual Meeting for College Newspapers

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Publications:

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